A Peircean theory of action. by Benedetti, Donna J.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1987
A Peircean theory of action.
Donna J. Benedetti
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Benedetti, Donna J., "A Peircean theory of action." (1987). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2027.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2027

A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF ACTION
A Dissertation Presented
by
DONNA J. BENEDETTI
Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
September 1987
Philosophy
Copyright by Donna J. Benedetti 1987
All Rights Reserved
A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF ACTION
A Dissertation Presented
by
DONNA J. BENEDETTI
Approved as to style and content by:
ruce Aune, Chairperson of Committee
L ^ L. ^ ^ L
Gajreth Matthews, Member
Richard Robin, Member
Michael Jubien, Department Head
Philosophy
iii
PREFACE
Although C. S. Peirce is considered the father of
American pragmatism, his philosophical orientation is most
often characterized as being that of a scientist. Specifi-
cally, it is thought that his theory of belief and method
of inquiry provide only an account of the fixation of
scientific belief— an account, that is, of the slow, evolu-
tionary progress made by the community of thinkers toward
"the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate." Beliefs and actions as they affect
the ordinary person's daily life are thought to be rela-
tively unimportant for Peirce or, worse yet, they are wholly
ignored in favor of his development of the notion of a habit.
And it is held that it is Peirce's emphasis on habits of
action and habits of thought which distances his views from
those of James who, instead, emphasized individual actions
and particular sensations. Peirce is the logician and
scientist whose concern is primarily objective relations
and the community of thinkers, whereas James is the humanist
whose concern is primarily subjective perceptions and the
individual agent. In his book. Pragmatism and the American
Mind
,
Morton White says: "The pragmatism of Peirce was
basically a theory about the meaning of scientific beliefs."
IV
And in his discussion of Peirce, James, and Dewey, Gail
Kennedy says that "Peirce and Dewey were trying to formulate
a theory of meaning and of truth which looked to the model
of disinterested scientific inquiry."^ And there are many
other such examples in the literature which place Peirce in
the camp of the disinterested scientist.
This is a reasonable emphasis to place on Peirce's
^^itings; however, it has the infelicitous effect of down-
playing Peirce's contributions to the field of human actions.
Moreover, it discourages a careful examination of the role
of actions in Peirce's overall philosophy. In what follows,
I shall try to remedy this situation. I shall be presenting
a Peircean theory of deliberate action, culled from what
Peirce says about belief, volition, desire, and intentions.
And by way of underscoring the importance of deliberate
action in Peirce's philosophy, I shall show the various
roles action plays in his semiotics and pragmaticism-- two
cornerstones of Peircean philosophy. The upshot of this
discussion will be a theory of action which is through and
through Peircean and which will fill a gap in Peircean
scholarship— a gap which has been taboo for far too long.
V
NOTES
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ABSTRACT
A PEIRCEAN THEORY OF ACTION
SEPTEMBER 1987
DONNA J. BENEDETTI
A.B., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY
M.A., SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor Bruce Aune
In this dissertation, I examine a topic long-neglected
by Peircean scholars: deliberate action. I claim that a
theory of action can be readily developed from Peirce's
writings and, moreover, that deliberate action is an impor-
tant feature of at least two familiar Peircean theories:
semiotics and pragmaticism. Further, I argue that a proper
consideration in Peirce's philosophy of particular actions
does not commit Peirce to the Jamesian nominalism he emphat-
ically rejected.
I begin this study by examining Peirce's notion of
habits of deliberate action, and show how habits of action
causally effect actions themselves. Through my analysis of
the Peircean habit of deliberate action it becomes clear
that acting deliberately requires a prior process of
Vll
deliberation as well as a relevant desire. In examining
this process of deliberation, I consider a Peircean dis-
tinction between deliberate and intentional actions, the
exercise of self-control, and resolutions which may become
^^terminations to act. I argue that actions themselves are
properly placed in Peirce's category of Secondness, while
desire is an aspect of the category of Thirdness. I further
extract a Peircean account of voluntary and directly willed
actions, the relationship between desired actions and in-
tended actions, and internal and external freedom.
Finally, I argue that a full understanding of Peirce's
theories of semiotics and pragmaticism requires an adequate
account of particular actions. I show that actions may be
energetic interpretants of signs, signs themselves, and
they may contribute to one's acquisition and understanding
of general habits of actions. Thus, having begun with a
consideration of the effect of habits of action on actions
themselves, I end with a consideration of the effect of
actions on habits of action. The result of my discussion
is that actions—deliberate actions--have a rightful place
in Peirce's philosophy and should be given their due.
viii
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Chapter I
BELIEF
One reason for the neglect of Peirce's theory of
action is the limitation commentators have placed on his
notion of habits. It is clear from his papers and from the
extensive commentaries on those papers that Peirce's notion
of habit is most often used to point to an essential or
real element of things. Habit is quite often intended by
to pick out the lawlike behavior of things— their
Thirdness.^ In his article, "Habits and Essences," Michael
L. Raposa stresses this aspect of habits and suggests
that Peirce linked habits of action to final causation.
According to Raposa,
The essence is no collection of properties, but
rather, it is a special "habit of action." More
specifically, it is a "bundle" of habits or a law-
cluster that operates as a final cause specifying
the general patterns of behavior that a given object
or organism will tend to manifest.
^
With this emphasis, the habit of action is identical with
a thing's essence, or "final cause"; it supplies a thing
3
"with its distinctive purpose and mode of operation."
If this were all Peirce meant when he used the notion
of habits of action, there would be little justification
for introducing it in a discussion of human action. Such
1
2habits would be purely metaphysical in nature, accounting
for the nature of things generally; they would have no
special relevance for the subject of human action. Yet
one can understand Peirce to be giving more than a theory
of metaphysical realism based on the notion of habits of
action; one can understand him as also linking habits with
action in a way which is significant for a theory of action.
Consider the following passages:
A cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will
determine what we do in fancy as well as what we do
in action, is called a belief. [3.160 (1880)]
[Readiness] to act in a certain way under given
circumstances and when actuated by a given motive
is a habit, and a deliberate, or self-controlled,
habit is precisely a belief. [5.480 (c. 1906)]
Clearly one need not accept the limited metaphysical
account, for Peirce himself did not offer only that. But
precisely how habits and actions are related by Peirce so
that a theory of action results is a matter for further
analysis. And here the waters are murky.
It seems promising to begin an inquiry into Peirce's
theory of action by examining the connection between habits
and belief, for these are often linked in Peirce's writings,
though in ways not altogether clear. In some passages,
Peirce seems to argue that beliefs are habits of mind or
habits of thought; in others, that they are habits of action.
As I shall show, beliefs serve well to illuminate not only
Peirce's pragmaticism but also his views about human action.
3Habits of Thought and Habits of Action
Considered as habits of thought or habits of mind,
beliefs play a major role in all our inferential reasoning.
And since, for Peirce, the only process of cognition is
that of valid inference, they assume a predominant position
in Peirce's overall views about mental action.^ Peirce
refers to a belief as "an habitual connection of ideas" and
illustrates this with the following:
For example, to say that I believe prussic acid is a
poison is to say that when the idea of drinking it
occurs to me, the idea of it as a poison with all the
other ideas which follow in the train of this will
arise in my mind. Among these ideas, or objects
present to me, is the sense of refusing to drink it.
This, if I am in a normal condition, will be followed
by an action of the nerves when needed which will
remove the cup from my lips. It seems probable that
every habitual connection of ideas may produce such
an effect upon the will. If this is so, a belief and
an habitual connection of ideas are one and the same.
[ 7.359 ( 1873 )]
Exactly how a particular belief "will be followed by an
action of the nerves when needed" remains to be seen. The
point I wish to note here is that a belief, according to
Peirce, is a habit of thought; an habitual connection of
ideas. Whenever I have the belief that prussic acid is a
poison, I will also have a cluster of other ideas or beliefs.
No belief stands alone; every belief a habitual connection
of ideas. And "if I am in a normal condition," it will be
followed by one particular type of action rather than some
other. My belief that prussic acid is poisonous will be
4followed by my action of removing the cup of poison from my
lips, unless, of course, some countervailing consideration
comes to mind, such as the intention to commit suicide.
Beliefs also serve as leading principles or guiding
principles of our inferential reasoning. In "The Fixation
of Belief," Peirce spells out this function of beliefs.
That which determines us, from given premisses, todraw one inference rather than another, is some habit
of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired.
The habit is good or otherwise, according as it
produces true conclusions from true premisses or not;
and an inference is regarded as valid or not, without
reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion
specially, but according as the habit which determines
it is such as to produce true conclusions in general
or not. The particular habit of mind which governs
this or that inference may be formulated in a proposi-
tion whose truth depends on the validity of the
inferences which the habit determines; and such a
formula is called a guiding principle of inference.
[ 5.367 ( 1877 )]
In an inference which involves deliberation about the wisdom
of drinking prussic acid, a good guiding principle would be
the belief that poisonous substances should not be drunk.
Knowing that prussic acid is a poisonous substance, I will
infer that the acid should not be drunk. The specific role
of belief as a guiding principle of inference is being high-
lighted here, but beliefs play a role at every step in the
inference
.
Peirce gives us a detailed analysis of just how beliefs
or belief-habits function as premises and conclusions of
inferences
:
5cerebral habit of the highest kind, which willetermine what we do in fancy as well as what we doin action, IS called a belief
. The representation toourselves that we have a specified habit of this kindIS called a judgment
. A belief-habit in its develop-ment begins by being vague, special, and meagre, itbecomes more precise, general, and full, without limit.The process of this development, so far as it takesplace in the imagination, is called thought. A judg-
ment IS formed; and under the influence of a belief-habit this gives rise to a new judgment, indicating
an addition to belief. Such a process is called aninference ; the antecedent judgment is called thepremiss ; the consequent judgment, the conclusion ; thehabit of thought, which determined the passage from
the one to the other (when formulated as a proposition)
the leading principle
. [3.160 (1880)]
According to Peirce, we represent belief-habits to ourselves
as judgments. And by means of an inference, a judgment
(premise) which was once vague becomes a "more precise,
general, and full" judgment (conclusion) "under the influence
of a belief-habit " (the leading principle; also a premise in
the reasoning process). Out of old beliefs, new beliefs are
formed; this is "the spontaneous development of belief"
[3.161 (1880)]. Moreover, it is a neverending process
which is constantly being altered and revised according to
"fresh peripheral excitations." "Thus, belief is partly
determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience"
( Ibid . ] . Finally, this process of thought known as inference
is a habit of thought (as shall become clear momentarily)
,
just as a belief itself is a habit of mind.
We have seen that an inference is the process by which
one belief determines another. But a belief is itself
a habit of the mind by virtue of which one idea gives
rise to another. [7.354 (1873)]
6One can characterize ^ habit of thought which is
t^ process of inferential reasoning and the habit of
thought which ^ a belief in a way which brings out their
relationship as follows: A habit of mind is a habit of
inferential reasoning in accordance with a leading principle,
a belief, P. And one's habit of reasoning, according to P,
is good when (a) one's relevant reasoning is invalid if -P,
and (b) P can be given as one's justification of the
relevant reasoning. Suppose, for example, that one's
leading principle, is of the form 'Q 3 R'
,
the premise
(yet another belief) is 'Q', and the conclusion is 'R'.
Then (a) tells us that the reasoning is valid; it would be
invalid if i.e., if 'Q & -R'
.
Peirce says:
The habit is logically good provided it would never
(or in the case of a probable inference, seldom) lead
from a true premiss to a false conclusion; otherwise
it is logically bad. That is, every possible case
of the operation of a good habit would either be one
in which the premiss was false or one in which the
conclusion would be true; whereas, if a habit of
inference is bad, there is a possible case in which
the premiss would be true, while the conclusion was
false. (3.163 (1880)]
And (b) tells us that the inference from 'Q' to 'R' is
justified by the leading principle 'Q^ R' . There may,
of course, be other leading principles which will give us
the valid inference from 'Q' to 'R'. But of note here is
that a reasoning process which obeys the laws of logic
occurs and, by it, we are led from old beliefs to new
beliefs in accordance with still other beliefs, i.e, leading
7principles. And it shall become clear in Section 4 below
that these are the beliefs on which one either acts or is
prepared to act.
But it is a matter of constant experience, that if a
man is made to believe in the premisses, in the sense
that he will act from them and will say that they are
true, under favorable conditions he will also be ready
to act from the conclusion and to say that that is
true.
^
Something, therefore, takes place within the
organism which is equivalent to the syllogistic
process. [5.268 (1868)]
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that belief-
habits are quite clearly thought of by Peirce as habits of
thought or mind. They function at every step in the
reasoning process as premises and conclusions of inferences,
and each belief is itself "a habitual connection of ideas."
Yet since, according to Peirce, thoughts "... are actions
having beginning, middle, and end" [5.395 (1878)], one might
5
as readily think of belief-habits as habits of action.
Given this, I believe one should resist the temptation of
placing a restriction on the scope of belief-habits. They
ought not to be tagged exclusively either as habits of
thought or as habits of action.
This conclusion, however, is not one which would sit
well with some Peircean commentators. For example according
to Thomas M. Olshewsky, "Peirce saw scientific laws as
habits of objects, much as beliefs are habits of action and
g
concepts are habits of thought." But as suggested by
Raposa's account, scientific laws might just as well be
8thought of as habits of action. Moreover, in an unpublished
paper, "A Survey of Pragmaticism, " Peirce claims that many
concepts, insofar as they are conjectures, are indistin-
guishable from belief-habits.
Every concept, every general proposition of the great
of science, first came to us as a conjecture.
.
.
^ . Meantime, do not forget that every conjecture is
equivalent to, or is expressive of, such a habit thathaving a certain desire one might accomplish it if one
could perform a certain act.
.
. [Readiness] to act
in a certain way under given circumstances and when
actuated by a given motive is a habit; and a deliberate
or self-controlled habit is precisely a belief.
[5.480 (c. 1906)]
To distinguish between beliefs and concepts as Olshewsky
does— saying that beliefs are habits of action and concepts
are habits of thoughts— is to impose a separation between
beliefs and concepts, or habits of thought and habits of
action, which is not supported by Peirce's writings.
The upshot of this is that Peirce's terminology is some-
what loose. An understanding of his views on habits will be
aided more by allowing for the various uses of his terms
than by restricting them unnecessarily. Belief-habits are
habits of thought and should be regarded as such, but they
are also habits of action insofar as habitual connections
of ideas are habits of action. But there is yet another
sense in which beliefs may be regarded as habits of action,
and it is this sense which is immediately relevant to the
Peircean theory of action I propose. I should now like to
consider beliefs as guides to action; as rules of action.
9Habits of Action as Rules of Action
Peirce tells us that belief "involves the establish-
ment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short,
a habit [5.397 (1878)]. But he goes further than this,
saying that
The essence of belief is the establishment of ahabit ; and different beliefs are distinguished by
the different modes of action to which they give
rise. If beliefs do not differ in this respect, if
they appease the same doubt by producing the same
rule of action, then no mere differences in the manner
of consciousness of them can make them different
beliefs, any more than playing a tune in different
keys is playing different tunes.
[5.398 (1878); my underscore]
In a later paper, "Reason's Rules," Peirce suggests that the
essence of belief may well be expectation [5.541 (c. 1902)].
This shift in the essence of belief— from the establishment
of a habit to an "expectative" quality— seems to be the
result of Peirce's considerations of the differences between
practical and theoretical beliefs (a topic which I shall
discuss shortly) . The shift, however, may not be as signi-
ficant as it first appears, for Peirce also says in his
1878 paper, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear,"
Now, the identify of a habit depends on how it might
lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances
as are likely to arise, but under such as might possibly
occur, no matter how improbable they may be. [5.400]
And here there is the identification of a belief-habit with
those actions which we might expect to arise, no matter how
improbable the circumstances might be. But in either case.
10
whether we are considering actions under probable or actual
circumstances or actions under any conceivable circum-
stances, the actions are law-governed, following from rules
of action— that is, from beliefs. Beliefs, in this way,
establish habits of action.
To give a simple example, one might believe that
wearing warm clothing in cold climates will help reduce the
risks of illness. And so, assuming normal desires, one
set on that belief as a general rule of action. One
form the habit of wearing warm clothes in inclement
weather. Of course, a suicide-prone person may form a
different habit, such as wearing skimpy cut-off jeans in
such weather. But a person who (a) has normal desires, in
(b) circumstances of cold weather, with (c) the belief that
wearing warm clothing in cold weather will help reduce the
risk of illness, will (d) conclude that he should wear warm
clothing in cold weather, and (e) he will wear warm clothing
in cold weather.
But notice a corollary to the notion that the establish-
ment of a habit is the essence of belief: beliefs which
produce the same "modes of action" cannot be differentiated
from each other. And here, Peirce seems to be standing on
questionable ground, for consider a possible outcome of
this view. Returning to the example above, we can see that
there is a significant difference between the belief that
11
wearing warm clothing in cold climates will prevent illness
and the belief that wearing warm clothing in cold climates
will prevent the evil spirits of vicious men who died in
winters past from entering and harming one. And yet both
beliefs would produce the same habit of action; to wit, the
habit of wearing warm clothing in cold weather. So for
Peirce, the beliefs would be the same since they both
produce the same mode of action. ".
. . what a thing means
is simply what habits it involves" [5.400 (1878)]. What a
belief means is given by the habits of action it produces;
"two" beliefs will mean the same thing if they produce the
same habits. But surely there are two very different
beliefs here.
As a way of avoiding this infelicitous result, one
might suggest that Peirce places more importance on the
condition that they appease the same doubt in order for the
two beliefs to be indistinguishable. But this is of no help
at all in the case of the two beliefs mentioned above. For
if two people have a doubt as to whether or not they should
dress warmly, the doubt would be appeased in the first case
by the belief that dressing warmly is a good way to prevent
colds; in the second case, by the belief that dressing
warmly will prevent evil, demonic spirts from entering the
body. In both cases, the same doubt would be appeased by
the same mode of action. And yet the beliefs seem to be
12
quite different.
The more promising way out of this puzzlement is to
look to other modes of action which the beliefs will
establish. Perhaps the believer in the evil spirits of
winter will also wear a talisman when he goes out in cold
weather, whereas the believer who is concerned solely with
his health will not. The beliefs would be different after
^11 iu Peirce s view, since when all the modes of action
which would result from the beliefs are given, the two
would, indeed, differ in their modes of action. The same
doubt would be appeased, but not by the same modes of
action. Hence, the beliefs would be different.
If we consider Peirce's pragmatic principle, this
seems to be what he has in mind.
. . . Consider what effects, that might conceivably
have practical bearings, we conceive the object of
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these
effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
[5.402 (1878)]
As it turns out, we may not be able to specify all the
consequences of a belief— the modes of action which could
conceivably result from a given belief. But it would be
all of these "effects, that might conceivably have practical
bearings" which would serve to identify our beliefs. And
by "practical," Peirce means "apt to affect conduct; by
'conduct,' voluntary action that is self-controlled, i.e.,
controlled by adequate deliberation" [8.322 (undated)].
13
Clearly, an understanding of Peirce's notion of practical
bearings or practical conduct will provide a further clue
to his views on action. In order to make sense of his
notion of the practical, I turn now to an examination of
practical beliefs.
3 . Practical Beliefs
To begin, Peirce gives an apparently clear example of
a practical belief:
Now to say that a man believes anthracite to be a
convenient fuel is to say no more nor less than that
if he needs fuel, and no other seems particularly
preferable, then, if he acts deliberately, bearing
in mind his experiences, considering what he is doing,
and exercising self-control, he will often use
anthracite. [5.538 (c. 1902)]
And he concludes this passage by saying that "A practical
belief may, therefore, be described as a habit of deliberate
behavior" [ Ibid . ] . A person who holds a certain belief--
that anthracite is a convenient fuel, for example—will
usually act in a certain deliberate way, given his needs
and preferences: he will buy this hard coal rather than
invest in some other less efficient form of heat.
It might seem that there is a problem here for Peirce
at the outset since it seems one could have a practical
belief— a habit of deliberate behavior—without ever having
14
acted on it, and without ever acting on it in the future.
The solution to this problem is one which Peirce himself
is well aware of and one which I will discuss more fully
in the next section. Briefly, Peirce resorts to the
language of the subjunctive conditional to handle these
types of cases. Thus, a practical belief will be phrased
in terms of the sort of behavior which [one could expect]
would occur, assuming one were to have certain desires, if
one were to have a practical belief. In order to handle
those beliefs which are never acted on, I will adopt at
this point Peirce's use of the subjunctive conditional.
Returning to Peirce's example of a practical belief,
then, it would seem that for every practical belief, E,
there are some desires or other whose satisfaction condi-
tions are indicated by B. Having the belief, B, is knowing
what those conditions are and, if one were to have the
desires and if those desires were not over-ridden by others
together with other beliefs, then one would be disposed to
realize those conditions by acting appropriately. Thus,
if I believe that anthracite is a convenient fuel, and if
that desire is not over-ridden by other desires together
with other beliefs (e.g., I prefer a form of fuel, such as
gas, which gives off no smoke), then I would be disposed
to satisfy that desire by acting appropriately. In short,
I would usually buy anthracite. My practical belief is a
15
habit of deliberate behavior; it is an indication of the
deliberate actions which would most probably occur, given
my belief.
Embedded in Peirce's notion of a habit of deliberate
behavior are two important elements: desire and delibera-
tion. It is obvious that desire is an essential part of a
Peircean practical belief: a belief indicates the satis-
^^^hion conditions given certain desires. So desires and
particular actions appear to be related in a significant
way. I shall return to a full examination of desires and
their relationship to actions in Chapter III. it is,
perhaps, less obvious how deliberation functions in a
practical belief. But in considering the relative values
of one's desires and belief s--considering, that is, whether
there are any which over-ride the desires associated with
the practical belief in questions—one is involved in the
mental act of deliberation. And for Peirce, any resulting
deliberate action will be preceded by a rather complex
mental act of deliberation--one which involves bearing in
mind one's experiences, considering what one is doing, and
g
exercising self-control, among other things. For the re-
mainder of this section, then, I would like to consider in
some detail Peirce's notion of the mental act of delibera-
tion which necessarily precedes any deliberate action.
Using the passage cited above, 5.538, one can begin
16
to get an idea of what a rich, complicated affair an act of
deliberation is. As I noted above, it involves bearing in
mind one's experiences, considering what one is doing, and
exercising self-control. But that is not the end of the
story, for Peirce also says that
The word "deliberate" is hardly completely definedby saying that it implies attention to memories of
past experience and to one's present purpose, together
with self-control. [5.538 (c. 1902)]
An act of deliberation now seems to be stretched to include
attending to one's present purposes and intentions. But on
closer inspection, this would seem to be simply a precise
account of what it means to say a person is "considering
what he is doing." For when we say a person is considering
what he is doing, we ordinarily mean that he is giving some
thought to his actions and its consequences; he is consi-
dering his actions in light of his intentions and purposes.
In addition, Peirce allows for the possibility that
no memory of an actual past experience may enter into one's
deliberations, only an imagined stimulus together with an
imagined reaction which has received a "deliberate stamp of
approval." And
This act of stamping with approval, "endorsing" as
one's own, an imaginary line of conduct so that it
shall give a general shape to our actual future
conduct is what we call a resolve. (5.538 (c. 1902)]
And this resolve, according to Peirce, is a "frequent
attachment" to practical beliefs, though not essential
17
to them. So this resolve to act in a certain way, based on
an imagined course of action, would seem to function as an
alternative to one's memories of past experiences. Both
should be included in a discussion of the deliberation
process
.
Accordingly, one can summarize what is involved in a
mental act of deliberation in the following way:
(a) Attending to one's present intentions and
purposes
;
(b) Bearing in mind one's past experiences or making
a resolve based on an imagined line of conduct;
(c) Exercising self-control.
Obviously, the notion of an act of deliberation warrants
further discussion. I would now like to consider each of
the three stipulations noted above.
(a) Peirce says very little about the notion of
intentions, and in his 1903 "Lectures on Pragmatism," he
seems to belittle the notion of intention as being psycho-
logical in nature [5.28]. Yet given his theory of signs
(a topic I shall take up in Chapter V)
,
one would expect
intentions to play some role in his overall philosophy.
Moreover, acting intentionally would seem to be a necessary
feature of acting deliberately. And if, for Peirce, a
practical belief is a habit of deliberate behavior, we
should expect from him some comment regarding the intentions
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which an agent would have were he to act deliberately on
his belief.^
As It turns out, Peirce does make a distinction between
—
gpyerned ^ reason and actions which are purely
mechanical
,
the key difference being that intentions are
involved in the former but not the latter. He gives a
delightfully clear example.
The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away a date-
stone which struck the eye of a Jinnee. This waspurely mechanical, and there was no genuine triplicity.
The throwing and the striking were independent of one
another. But had he aimed at the Jinnee's eye, there
would have been genuine triplicity, the stone being
not merely thrown, but thrown at the eye. Here,
intention
,
the mind's action, would have come in.
[ 2.86 ( 1902 )]
In all action governed by reason such genuine tripli-
city will be found; while purely mechanical actions
take place between pairs of particles. [Ibid.]
The "triplicity" of which Peirce speaks refers to his
category of Thirdness. The Peircean categories are not
germane at this point; thus, I shall defer an examination
of them for now. One can glean, however, that, given
Peirce's rich notion of deliberation, an action which is
done deliberately will be an action "governed by reason.
"
And if all action governed by reason is intentional, as
Peirce suggests above, then deliberate action can also be
considered intentional action. But then the question
arises: Is intentional action synonymous with deliberate
action? Unfortunately, no explicit answer is forthcoming
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from Peirce. However, I shall argue that Peirce seems to
use intentional action as the more restrictive notion of
the two: deliberate action is necessarily intentional for
Peirce, but an intentional action is not necessarily deli-
berate. In order to see this distinction, it is useful to
understand just what Peirce means by intending some action.
As a start, it seems quite clear that in explicating
the notion of intention, we are forced to introduce its
correlative notion of ends or purposes, as Peirce's example
suggests. The merchant's action of simply throwing away the
datestone which happens to hit the genie would be quite
^iffsrent from an action of throwing the datestone at the
genie. In the former case, the merchant did not intend to
hit the genie; rather, he was thoughtlessly discarding the
datestone. But in the latter case (had it occurred), the
merchant would have intended to hit the genie; his purpose
would have been to hit the genie, or to cause him some pain,
or some such thing. An act which is intentional, then, is
an act done with some purpose or end in mind. Moreover, it
is preceded by some reasoning to the effect that a certain
action will help realize that purpose or end. The inten-
tional action is not done mechanically; it is governed by
reason and done with some purpose in mind.
I shall have more to say about intentional actions in
Chapter IV; however, I would like to emphasize here that
stipulations (b) and (c) need not be introduced in order to
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explain Peirce's notion of acting intentionally. Strictly
speaking, for Peirce, an intentional action is not neces-
sarily a deliberate action. And this seems quite right.
One can act intentionally--wi th some purpose in mind
—
without having previously deliberated about the action or
its consequences. Bursting into song whenever one hears
his favorite melody, for example, is an intentional action
done, perhaps, for the purpose of expressing one's emotions.
But it would not be considered a deliberate action. It is
done, rather, on a whim or impulse. One need not exercise
self-control in order to act intentionally. Nor must one
bear in mind past experiences or make resolves in order to
act intentionally. In short, no process of deliberation
is required in order to perform an intentional act. Thus,
although deliberation requires that a person attends to his
present intentions and purposes and, hence, a deliberate
action is an intentional action, the converse is not true.
An intentional action is not necessarily a deliberate action
since attending to one's present intentions and purposes
does not require that one also undergo a process of deliber-
ation, in Peirce's sense of deliberation, or in any other
sense for that matter.
(b) Bearing in mind one's past experiences is another
important feature of a mental act of deliberation. But it
may be that the deliberation is not based exclusively on
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one’s memories of past experiences, but on one’s perception
that a certain action would satisfy some need or desire
should it arise. in such cases, a person may have fonr.ed
a resolve to act in a certain way based primarily on an
imagined stimulus and an imagined reaction. Exam.ples of
both cases—memories of actual past experiences which will
be a part of the deliberate action and a resolve to act in
a certain way based largely on an imagined situation--are
readily at hand.
In the first case, our friend the antracite user will
have recalled that anthracite served him well in the past
as an efficient fuel. He will decide which type of fuel
to buy based on his past experiences using anthracite. In
the second case, had he not actually used the coal but onlv
learned of its efficiency from other sources (friends whom
he trusts, consumer magazines, etc.), then his deliberate
act of using anthracite on some future occasion would be
a result of his resolve that should he need an efficient
fuel, he would use anthracite. The action will still be
deliberate, but his past experiences using the fuel are of
no help here, for clearly he has no such experiences. But
what serves this non-anthracite user are other related
experiences--hear ing or reading about the fuel, for example--
together with his imagining a hypothetical situation in
which he might need an efficient fuel. On the basis of
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this, he forms a resolve to buy anthracite should the need
arise
.
The example Peirce gives of a resolve is the quick
action his brother took when his mother's dress caught fire.
He immediately extinguished the flames by smothering them
with a rug. Peirce says:
We were astonished at his promptitude, which, as hegrew up, proved to be characteristic. l asked himhow he came to think of it so guickly. He said, "Ihad considered on a previous day what I would do in
^^se such an accident should occur.
"
[5.538 (c. 1902); cf. 5.487, n. 1]
Fortunately for Peirce's mother, one of her sons had formed
"a real habit produced by exercises in the imagination"
[5.487, n. 1 (c. 1906)]; he had resolved, or decided, to
act in the manner he did based primarily on an imagined
course of action.
In "A Survey of Pgramaticism , " Peirce emphasizes the
importance of resolves, calling them "commands to one's
future self." And he explains just how a habit of deliberate
behavior may be acquired either by "reiterations in the
inner world," the "world of fancies," or by "reiterations
in the outer world," the "world of percepts." He says:
Moreover--here is the point— every man exercises more
or less control over himself by means of modifying his
own habits; and the way in which he goes to work to
bring this effect about in those cases in which circum-
stances will not permit him to practice reiterations
of the desired kind of conduct in the outer world shows
that he is virtually well-acquainted with the important
principle that reiterations in the inner world— fancied
reiterations— if well-intensified by direct effort.
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3ust_as do reiterations in the outerthese habits will have power to influence
—
in the outer world ; especiaJIv. if~each reiteration be accompanied by a peculiar strong
effort^ that is usually likened to issuing a commandto one s future self. [5.487 (c. 1906)]
In terms of Peirce's terminology of the inner and outer
worlds, memories of past experiences may be thought of as
the result of reiterations in the outer world, whereas
resolves are primarily the result of reiterations in the
inner world, the world of fancies. And in the special,
though I emphasize common, case of reiterations in the
inner world, an additional "command to one's future self"
or stamp of approval of the imagined action is needed in
order for one's imagined behavior to become or, at least,
to influence actual behavior.
. . . multiple reiterated behaviour of the same kind,
under similar combinations of precepts and fancies,
produces a tendency— the habit—actually to behave in
a similar way under similar circumstances in the
future. [5.487 (c. 1906)]
Thus, memories of past experiences and exercises in
the imagination together with the all-important resolve
would seem to be central to Peirce's account of the forma-
tion of habits. And here it is helpful to note that by
'habit' Peirce means
. . . only that the person or thing that has the
habit, would behave (or usually behave) in a certain
way whenever a certain occasion should arise. [8.380
(1913); See also 5.538 (c. 1902)]
I shall return to this sense of 'habit' in Sections 3 and 4
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below. For my purposes here, it is enough to notice that a
habit of deliberate behavior—a practical belief—will not
necessarily result in some actual behavior or action. it
may, but it need not. m this sense, the Peircean habit
seems to be quite similar to what philosophers now call a
disposition. But more of this later.
There is one more point which warrants comment here.
Peirce seems to limit unnecessarily the work of resolves.
As he describes them, they are associated with exercises in
the imagination or reiterations in the inner world; they are
the end-products of a very specific mental activity. But it
seems to me that by a resolve Peirce actually means a reso-
lution to act in a certain way whenever the appropriate
circumstances present themselves. As such, a person will
^she up his mind to act in a certain way (given the relevant
circumstances) after having considered an imagined line of
conduct or past experiences or a combination of both. I^ore-
over
,
a resolution concerning one's future behavior will
also be made on the basis of one's desires and intentions.
If this is so, a resolve is not simply the end-product of
an imagined line of conduct; rather, it is the conclusion
of one's entire process of deliberation.^^
(c) Peirce also claims in the lengthy passage cited
at 5.487 that both kinds of reiterations will produce habits
"if well-intensified by direct effort." The condition is a
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mysterious one, but I believe it can be clarified somewhat
in terms of the exercise of self-control— the final stipu-
lation for acting deliberately. Very roughly, self-control
introduces another element of conscious reasoning into the
notion of deliberate behavior.
According to the maxim of Pragmaticism, to say thatdetermination affects our occult nature is to say thatIt IS capable of affecting deliberate conduct; and
since we are conscious of what we do deliberately, we
are conscious habitual iter of whatever hides in thedepths of our nature; and it is presumable
. . . that
a sufficiently energetic effort of attention wouldbring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation
of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a
special sense, a conscious operation; and this no doubt
is the consciousness of reasoning. [5.441 (1905)* See
also 5.493 (c. 1906)
]
Peirce also says at one point that "deliberate conduct is
self-controlled conduct" [5.442 (1905)]. But neither this
nor the claim that controlled behavior in some way involves
a "consciousness of reasoning" helps one to understand just
what Peirce is thinking about when he maintains that a
person acts deliberately when (among other things) he
exercises self-control. However, he provides a major clue
to this notion of self-control in a letter written to
F. C. S. Schiller.
The power of self-control is certainly not a power
over what one is doing at the very instant the
operation of self-control is commenced. It consists
(to mention only the leading constituents) first, in
comparing one's past deeds with standards, second, in
rational deliberation concerning how one will act in
the future, in itself a highly complicated operation,
third, in the formation of a resolve, fourth, in the
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°Th?s'op«it?o;
The notion of self-control now looms before us as the
central feature of Peirce's account of deliberation, just
as the notion of deliberation was found to be at the heart
of his notion of a practical belief. The Peircean notion
of self-control might be thought of as spanning stipula-
tions (a)
, (b)
,
and (c) of the mental act of deliberation.
But obviously it involves more than (a) attending to one's
present intentions and purposes, and (b) bearing in mind
one s past experiences or making a resolve based on an
imagined line of conduct. Self-control involves not simply
a consideration of what one is doing in terms of one's
intentions and purposes, but a rational deliberation con-
cerning how one will act in the future. It involves not
merely the memory of past experiences and resolves, but a
comparison of one's past deeds with standards. And finally,
on the basis of the resolve, it involves "a strong determi-
nation, or modification of habit.
Some of these elements of the power of self-control
have already been examined; others, such as comparing
one's past deeds with standards, are new and seem just as
mysterious as the notion of self-control for which they
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serve as explicans
. In Lecture I of the "Lowell Lectures
of 1903, Peirce speaks about "rules of conduct" which
might be thought of as standards. But in referring to
these rules, he usually has in mind future conduct rather
than past deeds. For instance, he says that
convenient and serve to minimizethe effects of future inadvertence and, what are well-named, the wiles of the devil within him. [1.592ff.]
Implicit in the use of rules as guides to future acts,
however, is the assessment of one's past actions or deeds
in terms of these same rules. And this assessment is under-
taken for the purpose of minimizing a future breach of one's
standards or rules of conduct. Thus, past deeds are com-
pared with one's standards of conduct so that one can
deliberate rationally about future actions. One becomes
aware of having done something well (according to one's
of conduct) in the past and will consider that this
is how it should be done in the future also. Or one is
aware of having done something which was a violation of his
rules of conduct and considers altering his future conduct.
In sum, when one exercises self-control he is, among other
things, consciously reasoning about past deeds and future
actions in light of standards of conduct.
To say that conduct is deliberate implies that each
action, or each important action, is reviewed by the
actor and that his judgment is passed upon it, as to
whether he wishes his future conduct to be like that
or not. His ideal is the kind of conduct which attracts
him upon review. [1.574 (1906)]
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The other constituent of self-control warranting
further discussion is the notion of a strong determination
or modification of habit, based on a resolve. We have
already seen that a resolve is like a command to one's
future self. But the resolve itself need not issue in
action. When a person is at the stage of having made a
resolve or resolution to act, there is nothing which
suggests that he or she will follow the course of action
decided upon, that there will be a modification of behavior
or actions.
This resolution is of the nature of a plan; or, as one
might almost say, a diagram
. It is a mental formula
always more or less general. Being nothing more than
an idea, this resolution does not necessarily influ-
ence his conduct. [1.592 (1903)]
But then, according to Peirce, a "conversion" takes place,
though
We do not know by what machinery the conversion of a
resolution into a determination is brought about.
[1.593 (1903)]
By determination' Peirce means "a really efficient agency,
such that if one knows what its special character is, one
forecast the man's conduct on the special occasion"
[1.592 (1903)]. Our determinations would seem to take us
far beyond our resolves, if knowing what the determination
is one could predict behavior.
How are we brought from a resolution to a determina-
tion? Somehow our resolves or resolutions are impressed
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upon us in "a process similar to that of impressing a
lesson on one's memory. So although Peirce readily admits
that he does not know exactly how the conversion from
resolution to determination occurs, there is the suggestion
that conscious repetition serves as the bridge from the
earlier stage of resolution to a subsequent determination.
And together with this conscious repetition, there is
A peculiar quality of feeling [which] accompanies theirst steps of the process of forming this impression;but later we have no direct consciousness of it.
[1.593 (1903)]
Peirce is understandably vague when he tries to give an
account of what this feeling might be. He says that
We may become aware of the disposition, especially if
it is pent up. In that case, we shall recognize it
by a feeling of need, of desire. [ Ibid .
]
I suppose by this accompanying feeling Peirce means some-
thing such as a need or desire we are aware of (at first,
anyway) to act in a particular way. For example,
"I really should act in way W, if occasion 0 arises."
Or
"I really want to act in way W, if occasion 0 arises."
So given this type of feeling and a conscious repetition of
the sort,
"If occasion 0 arises, I will act in way W,"
we could predict how I will act whenever occasion 0 arises.
Peirce provides us, as he often does, with a lucid illus-
tration of the entire process.
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In order to fix our ideas, let us suppose a case inthe course of my reflexions, I am led to think that it
certain'wlf ' I°" " certain^p^^Lnln fain way. i resolve that I will do so when we meet
miL? conversation? T
_
g t be led to take a different tone, I proceed to
that^wh
^®^°l^tion upon my soul; with the resulten the interview takes place, although mythoughts are then occupied with the matter of thetalk, and may never revert to my resolution, neverthe-less the determination of my being does influence myconduct. [1.593 (1903)]
Here one can see just how the "logical sequence" of
self-control "is converted into mechanical sequence or some-
thing of the sort" [8.320 (undated)]. In exercising self-
control, one compares past deeds with standards, deliberates
concerning future actions, form.s a resolve, and, finally,
converts his resolution into a determination to act in a
certain way. This involved mental activity of self-control
will, under normal circumstances, influence one's conduct
in a habitual way in a way which makes prediction possible.
In Peirce s terminology
,
it would seem there is a logical
sequence of mental action which becomes a mechanical sequence
of deliberate action.
Recall now that I slipped into a discussion of self-
control by trying to make sense of Peirce's perplexing
statement that reiterations will produce habits "if well-
intensified by direct effort." It seems we can now shed
some light on this statement. Our resolutions to act in a
certain way based on reiterations in the inner world as well
as reiterations in the outer world are now consciously
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impressed on a person through a process of reptition. it
IS as though we say to ourselves over and over again, "This
IS how I will act if a certain occasion arises." Added to
this, there is a need or desire to act according to one's
mental resolution, the result being a determination to
act according to one's resolution and desires. And this
determination will have "really efficient agency." it is
quite clear that, for Peirce, the notion of exercising
self-control--with all it implies--is an important feature
of the deliberation process and of the very possibility of
deliberate action.
In my opinion, it is self-control which makes any
other than the normal course of thought possible,just as nothing else makes any other than the normal
course of action possible; and just as it is precisely
that that gives room for an ought-to-be of conduct, I
mean Morality
,
so it equally gives room for an ought-
thought, which is Right Reason; and where
there is no self-control, nothing but the normal is
possible. [4.540 (1906)]^^
There are two comments I would like to make here.
First, as an account of how we control our actions, Peirce's
theory seems overly optimistic. In most cases of deliberate
action, a Peircean notion of self-control seems to play no
part. Rarely does one have his wits about him enough to
impress a resolution on his soul. How often does one
mentally rehearse how he wants to act on some future
occasion? But even when such a rehearsal occurs, combined
with that "peculiar quality of feeling," there is nothing
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which will guarantee that the desired behavior or actions
will occur in the future and, hence, prediction of expected
behavior cannot be guaranteed.
Second, Peirce admits that we do not know how the
conversion from resolution to determination occurs. He
suggests that conscious repetitions combined with feelings
of some sort will account for this conversion. But there
IS another weak area in his analysis which he seems to over
look altogether. He speaks of a determination as being a
"really efficient agency" without offering any account of
how such a determination "influences" behavior. Is there
some causal connection? The expression "efficient agency"
suggests this, but then some explanation of how a deter-
mination (still mental) influences, i.e., causes behavior
should be forthcoming. And none is.
Be that as it may, we have thus far travelled a some-
what tortuous path in giving an account of Peirce's notion
of a practical belief. And before examining theoretical
beliefs, I would like to summarize the key points of this
discussion. I began by considering Peirce's notion of a
practical belief--a habit of deliberate behavior--and found
that a key element of such beliefs is deliberation. But
deliberation is a mansion with many rooms, among them,
intentions and purposes, memories of past experiences.
resolves, and self-control. And self-control leads off
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into still other areas: comparing past deeds with standards,
deliberating concerning future actions, and converting
resolutions into determinations or modifications of habits.
Much of Peirce's account of deliberation seems generally to
be correct when we deliberate we do often recall past
experiences or imagine possible lines of conduct; we do
consider what we are doing insofar as our intentions and
purposes are considered; we often compare past deeds with
standards; we make resolutions to act in certain ways under
specific circumstances. However, as I pointed out, Peirce's
notion of resolves is far too limited and the role of self-
control remains rather obscure. One can only wish that
Peirce had considered resolves in a broader sense and
provided more in the way of clarifying such a key concept
as self-control.
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4 . Theoretical Beliefs
Practical beliefs, as we have just seen, are habits
of deliberate conduct. And according to Peirce, deliberate
conduct is self-controlled conduct. Ke further claims that
• • • it is to conceptions of deliberate conduct that
Pragmaticism would trace the intellectual purport of
symbols" [5.442 (1905)]. To determine the intellectual
purport or meaning of a belief, one must determine the
deliberate conduct which could possibly follow from the
belief
.
• • • s conception
,
that is, the rational purport
of a word or other expression, lies exclusively
in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of
life . .
. [5.412 (1905); See also 7.361 (1873)]
Thus, here again we see that the meaning of a belief is
identified with the habits of action and, in the specific
case of a practical belief, with the deliberate conduct
which could conceivably result from the belief. Practical
beliefs, it would seem, must be the primary concern of the
pragmaticist
,
for these are the beliefs to which we can
"trace the intellectual purport of symbols."
But in Peirce's account of the quality of expectation
which occurs in his explanation of theoretical beliefs, it
becomes quite clear that intellectual purport is not to be
restricted simply to practical beliefs. In fact, before his
category of theoretical beliefs is able to stand on its own.
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Peirce merges, to some extent, theoretical beliefs with
practical beliefs in the following way:
If an opinion can eventually go to the determination
o a practical belief, it, in so far, becomes itself
a practical belief; and every proposition that is notpure metaphysical jargon and chatter must have somepossible bearing upon practice. [5.539 (c. 1902)]
And regarding those beliefs which we may think are purely
theoretical and have no possible consequences, Peirce says:
if they are to mean anything, they must be somehow expecta-
tive" [5.541 (c. 1902)]. For any proposition or belief to
have meaning or rational purport, there must be some element
of expectation.
To say that a quadratic equation which has no real
root has two different imaginary roots does not sound
ss if it could have any relation to experience. Yet
it is strictly expectative. It states what would be
expectable if we had to deal with quantities expressing
the relations between objects, related to one another
like the points of the plane of imaginary quantity.
[5.541 (c. 1902); Cf. 5.32-33 (1903)]
In this way, Peirce illustrates just how a theoretical
belief--if it has any meaning at all--will have "some
possible bearing upon practice.
Notice, however, that the arena of possible actions or
consequences has now shifted to the highly contingent future
situation in which the theoretical belief may at some time
function as a guide or rule of action. What could we expect
to occur if other conditions were in fact to occur? Such is
the rather inelegant expression of the expectative state
involved in theoretical beliefs. But it is because there
36
is this element of expectancy that any theoretical belief
will have intellectual purport, as much as any practical
belief. A theoretical belief is not a practical belief in
the sense that deliberate, self-controlled action results
from the belief. However, it can be considered a practical
belief in the sense that it "can eventually go to the deter-
mination of a practical belief"; it could be a rule for
certain deliberate behavior
,
if such and such conditions
held. We could act according to such a belief; there are
certain actions which could be expected to follow from a
theoretical belief, ^ it has any meaning at all.
An example of a highly theoretical belief which seems
to fascinate Peirce is that of the belief in transubstan-
tiation. In "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878)
,
Peirce
seems to dismiss such a belief as senseless jargon. However,
in a later work, he appears far more sympathetic to the idea
that such a belief could actually mean something. The
example is instructive insofar as it shows the extent to
which Peirce was willing to go in merging theoretical beliefs
and practical beliefs. In "Reason's Rules" (c. 1902), Peirce
grants that the belief in transubstantiation may be purely
expectative. The Roman Catholic Church maintains that the
communion wafer and wine become body and blood, under the
appearances of bread and wine. And as a matter of faith,
the Roman Catholic layman is supposed to believe that this
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actually occurs. Peirce echoes the layman's puzzlement at
what this could possibly mean, and then proceeds to account
for the meaning of the belief in terms of the believer's
expectative attitude. He says:
What does that mean? It means that the layman is totrust that if he could understand the matter and knowthe truth, he would find that the priest was right.But trust--and the word belief means trust primarily--
essentially refers to the future, or to a contingentfuture. The implication is that the layman may some-
time know, presumably will, in another world; and thathe may
^
expect that if he ever does come to know, he
find the priest to be right. Thus, analysis shows
that even in regard to so excessively metaphysical a
matter, the belief, if there can be any belief, has toinvolve expectation as its very essence.
[5.541 (c. 1902)]
Peirce's reflections on the nature of theoretical
belief have led him to observe, as noted above, that "It
now begins to look strongly as if perhaps all belief might
involve expectation as its essence" [5.542 (c. 1902)]. And
where any expectation can be discerned, even the most highly
theoretical belief will be imbued with meaning or rational
purport. Thus, it now becomes clear that intellectual
purport is not restricted to just those beliefs which are
obviously practical beliefs. Any belief, insofar as it
involves some element of expectation, has meaning and could
function as a rule of deliberate behavior. The dividing
line between practical beliefs and theoretical beliefs
appears, on closer scrutiny, to be very hazy, indeed.
All beliefs, then, whether they be practical or
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theoretical, will involve some element of expectation.
And to accommodate this expectative quality, Peirce relies
on the form of the subjunctive conditional
— the "would-be"
or would-acts" or "would-dos .
" This is illustrated in
Peirce s explanation of what it means to say that there is
a one-third probability that when a die is thrown, a number
divisible by three will turn up.
The statement means that the die has a certain
would-be ; and to say that a die has a "would-be"
is to say that it has a property, quite analogous
to any habit that a man might have. Only the
"would-be" of the die is presumably as much simpler
and m.ore definite than the man's habit as the die's
homogeneous composition and cubical shape is simpler
than the nature of the man's nervous system and soul;
and just as it would be necessary, in order to define
a man's habit, to describe how it would lead him to
behave and upon what sort of occasion--albeit this
statement would be no means imply that the habit
consists in that action— so to define the die's
"would-be," it is necessary to say how it would
lead the die to behave on an occasion that would
bring out the full consequence of the "would-be";
and this statement will not of itself imply that the
"would-be" of the die consists in such behavior.
[2.664 (1910)]
The die example is particularly apt here because it serves
to highlight the "would-act" or "would-do" involved in a
belief. As Peirce explains, a belief can be defined in
terms of "how it would lead him to behave and upon what
sort of occasion." And although a habit does not consist
in the action, he claims he knows "no other way of defining
a habit than by describing the kind of behavior in which
the habit becomes actualized" (2.666 (1910); See also 5.491
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’ • • • ^hat a thing means is simply what habits
it involves" [5.400 (1878)].
With the consideration of theoretical beliefs, we have
been brought face to face once again with Peirce's pragma-
tistic principle (See p. 11 above)
. We have been brought
to this point by considering the expectative quality of
beliefs. And with this, we seem to have strayed far from
those beliefs which are habits of deliberate action— the
beliefs which would seem to be especially relevant to a
theory of action. But we have not gone so far afield after
all. This expectative quality of both theoretical and
practical beliefs invites examination of the relationship
between beliefs as habits of action and action— the topic
to which I now turn.
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^ • Belief and Action
Throughout more than thirty-five years of writing in
which he changed his views on various topics, Peirce main-
tained a core view about the relationship between beliefs
(or habits of action) and actions. In "The Logic of 1873,"
for example, he tells us that "A belief which will not be
acted on ceases to be a belief" [7.356]. And in the first
of his series of lectures, "Detached Ideas on Vitally
Important Topics" (1898)
,
the following connection between
belief and action is made:
We believe the proposition we are ready to act upon.
Full belief is willingness to act upon the proposition
in vital crises, opinion is willingness to act upon
it in relatively insignificant affairs. But pure
science has nothing at all to do with action . . .
There is thus no proposition at all in science which
answers to the conception of belief. But in vital
matters, it is quite otherwise. We must act in such
matters; and the principle upon which we are willing
to act is a belief
.
[1.635-36]1^
In his 1905 article, "What Pragmatism Is," Peirce claims
that "Whenever a man acts purposively, he acts under a
belief in some experimental phenomenon" [5.427]. And
finally, he tells us that "pragmatism is scarce more than
a corollary" to Bain's definition of belief "that upon which
a man is prepared to act" [5.12 (c. 1906)].
Although the emphases in these passages differ, I cite
them to indicate Peirce's commitment to the view that
beliefs play a significant role in influencing individual
actions. ('Influencing' is an unfortunately vague term.
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intended to cover the various locutions we find in Peirce.)
As we have seen, Peirce claims that a belief is that upon
which we are willing or prepared to act, and when we act, it
IS on or under a belief. i defer, once again, to an example
Peirce gives which illustrates what it means to act on a
belief
.
belief that prussic acid is poisonous unless
when the particular occasion comes up I am led to thefurther belief that that particular acid is poisonous;
and unless I am further led to the belief that it is
a thing to avoid drinking. For all these things are
necessary to my acting on my belief. [7.356 (1873)]
For Peirce, it is quite possible that a belief will be a
"motive for action directly"; that is, we may come to a
point in our reasoning where we finally act on a particular
belief "without the intervention of a more special belief"
[7.357 (1873)]. And it is in this sense, then, that a
belief will function as a direct motive for action.
Still it is unclear just what Peirce means when he
says a person acts on a belief and, therefore, when he says
that a belief is a direct motive for action. If he means
that a belief causes us to act in a certain way, then he
would be attributing causal efficiency to the belief
itself--an interpretation suggested by Dewey. In his essay,
"The Pragmatism of Peirce," Dewey says:
Moreover, not only are generals real, but they are
physically efficient. The meanings "the air is stuffy"
and "stuffy air is unwholesome" may determine, for
example, the opening of the window.
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Now Peirce did hold that a belief or habit of action is a
"Real general" [6.485 (1908)], though the act itself is
"the most perfectly individual" of objects [5.529 (c. 1905)]
And as we have seen, he did maintain that "habits will have
power to influence actual behavior in the outer world"
[5.487 (c. 1906)]. Moreover, Peirce did maintain that
beliefs have a causal influence on actions:
To ask whether a given fact is due to psychical orphysical causes is absurd. Every fact has a physical
side; perhaps every fact has a psychical side. Itsphysical aspect--as a mere motion— is due exclusively
to physical causes; its psychical aspect—as a deed
—
IS due exclusively to psychical causes.
[1.265 (1902)]
But now recall that Peirce considers a determination to be
a really efficient agency, and a determination is not a
belief; rather, it is a repeated resolve to act in a certain
way accompanied by a feeling of need or desire. Now this
determination may directly lead us to act in a certain way,
and the determination will be based on certain beliefs. But
then it would seem that the causal agency has shifted from
beliefs to determinations based on beliefs. More questions
arise. If these determinations are the causes of actions,
what role do beliefs play in influencing actions? How do
beliefs (or determinations, for that matter) cause actions?
And still, what does Peirce mean by "acting on a belief"?
To answer the first question, one need only recall the
role determinations play in the analysis of practical
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beliefs. Having a determination, remember, is an element
of exercising self-control, and that, in turn, is one of
the stipulations for an act of deliberation. And finally,
deliberation is one of the key elements for saying that
a person has a practical belief— a habit of deliberate
behavior. So although determinations may cause us to act,
there is nothing on the face of it which could preclude
Peirce from holding the view that beliefs also cause us to
act. Beliefs as well as determinations may serve as causal
influences on what we will do. And on the Peircean view, it
is clear that they do. But remember that Peirce gives us no
account of just how determinations cause us to act, nor does
he justify his excessively optimistic view of the role of
self-control and, hence, of determinations in getting us to
act. We are met with greater success, however, in piecing
together an account of the causal efficacy beliefs them-
selves have on actions. And, indeed, the more interesting
question is just how beliefs can cause us to act. As it
turns out, an answer to this provides us with Peirce's view
of acting on a belief.
The first point I wish to make concerns the generally
uncontroversial view that beliefs provide reasons for our
actions. They occur in the reasoning process that leads
one to act and, thus, provide an explanation of why a person
has acted as he has. If an agent were asked why he acted as
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he did, he would, in all likelihood, offer an account in
terms of some of his beliefs. For example, if asked why he
did not drink the prussic acid, the pale, would-be victim
who knew what was in the cup would probably reply that the
liquid IS poisonous and had he drunk it, he would surely
have died. Of course, there are other beliefs as well
which may surface as reasons for refusing the potion. He
may believe, for instance, that he is physiologically like
other people, and those who have drunk prussic acid in the
past have not had a very good survival record. The point
I wish to make here is simply that beliefs provide reasons
for our deliberate actions. Peirce would not dispute this,
but neither would he say that this is the sense in which
beliefs cause us to act.
A belief, for Peirce, is that upon which we are willing
to act . It puts us into a "ready position," so
to speak, to act in a certain way whenever a certain occa-
sion arises. In this sense, a belief is a cause of my
being prepared to act in a certain way whenever a certain
occasion may arise. In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce
tells us that
Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into
such a condition that we shall behave in some certain
way, when the occasion arises. [5.373 (1877)]
This dispositional sense of a belief is brought out nicely
in a letter Peirce wrote to F. A. Woods on the "Would Be.
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. . . and if it [the conditional
any meaning, i.e. if it is calcu
mind, in a person who -i-
proposition] conveys
Peirce also expresses the would-be of deliberate conduct
his future conduct as follows:
If I should do so and so, I should bring about such
and such a result.
Now I will not bring about that result.
Ergo, I shall not do "so and so."
To illustrate graphically this "should-do" of deliberate
conduct one which predisposes me to a certain way of
acting I have only to consider my belief that prussic acid
is poisonous. Though I have never been offered this color-
less, acrid liquid, I do believe that it is poisonous, and
that if I should drink it, the results would most surely be
fatal. I do not want to bring about such results; ergo, I
shall not drink prussic acid whenever I might be offered
some. I am willing and prepared to act on the belief that
prussic acid is poisonous even though the occasion for
acting on the belief has never arisen and, with some luck,
will never arise. I am predisposed to act in a certain way
given my belief that prussic acid is poisonous. And my
belief—my habit of action— is a causal factor of my
as a "should do," telling us that a man will reason about
( 8.381 ( 1913 )]^^
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predisposition
—mv beina in a v-^ ^Y g m a ready position to refuse the
lethal potion when offered.
Should I be offered the acid, however, I will then act
on my belief, all things being equal. And since a belief
causally affects one's disposition to act, the ensuing de-
liberate action-should it occur-will have been causally
affected by my belief. m this way, beliefs affect the
causal order in virtue of the habits they produce. We act
on those beliefs which predispose us to act in a certain
way. Moreover, it can be said that one acts on a belief, B,
just when B could be given as one of the reasons for that
action; that is, when B could be given as a justification of
one's action. Thus, beliefs directly cause us to be disposed
to act in a certain way (a belief is that upon which we are
prepared to act) and, consequently, beliefs indirectly cause
us to act ("habits will have power to influence actual
behavior in the outer world").
One final comment here. For Peirce, there is no diffi-
culty in explaining how these mental habits of deliberate
action (beliefs) can cause physical actions— either directly
or indirectly. His doctrine of continuity
—
synechism--
enables him to avoid the overwhelming difficulty of Cartesian
dualism; that is, the difficulty of explaining how mental
and physical phenomena are able to interact. As Peirce
puts it;
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broadest legitimate meaning as thephilosophy which performs its analyses with an axe
bIino"®th®
ultimate elements, unrelated chunks'of
cuia?' ^he^
"" to synechism. In parti-
Dsvchica^ Oh^ not admit that physiLl and
.Ptienomena are entirely distinct,
—whether
as eni?r!r^ categories of substance, or
insist that shield,—but willphenomena are of one character, thoughsome are more mental and spontaneous, others mirematerial and regular. [7.570 (c. 1892)]
For Peirce, there is no wedge between mental and physical
phenomena. Synechism is "the tendency to regard everything
as continuous" [7.565 (c. 1892)].
The present writer holds that in advance of positiveknowledge, the presumption ought to be that there is
such a unity in the universe that the differencebetween mental and natural phenomena is only a dif-
^rence of degree
. Presumably, the same elements arein both; and if so, so far there is no essentialdifference in their intelligibility.
[7.463 (1893); my underscore]
. .
.
physical events are but degraded or undeveloped
forms of psychical events
. . . the phenomena of matter
the result of the sensibly complete sway of
habits upon mind
. .
. [6.264 (1892)]
Granted that the difference between mental and physical
phenomena is one of degree only, Peirce nevertheless main-
tains that mind is primary in some sense, and he supposes
that "matter is merely mind deadened by the development of
habit" [8.318 (1891)]. With this, Peirce hints at the way
in which his synechism operates under the law of habit-
taking :
Supposing matter to be but mind under the slavery of
inveterate habit, the law of mind still applies to
it. According to that law, consciousness subsides
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as habit becomes established, and
at the breaking up of habit. But
of mind involves a great readiness
and a great readiness to lose them
is excited again
the highest quality
to take habits.
[6.613 (1893)]
As habits are established. consciousness subsides; as habits
are broken up, consciousness awakens. In the former case
phenomena are "more material and regular"; in the latter,
phenomena are "more mental and spontaneous."
Now the manner in which habits generally get broken
up IS this. Reactions usually terminate in the
removal of a stimulus; for the excitation continues
as long as the stimulus is present. Accordingly,habits are general ways of behaviour which are asso-
ciated with the removal of stimuli. But when the
expected removal of the stimulus fails to occur, the
excitation continues and increases, and non-habitual
reactions take place; and these tend to weaken the
habit. [6.264 (1892)]
Thus, the phenomena of matter are but the result of the
sensibly complete sway of habits upon mind" [ Ibid . ] . And
Peirce goes so far as to say that "mechanical laws are
nothing but acquired habits, like all the regularities of
mind" [6.268 (1892)].
In sum, Peirce's synechism points to a solution of the
Cartesian problem of mind-body interaction; of psychical
phenomena causally affecting physical phenomena. The
difference between psychical phenomena and physical phenomena
is one of degree only, and the degree to which they differ
depends on the degree to which habits have taken hold.
Although Peirce's metaphysical views are open to challenge
—
it is doubtful, for example that the doctrine of continuity
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would pass Peirce's own pragmatistic test--this doctrine of
synechism can be offered as Peirce's explanation of the
mechanics" of mental beliefs causing physical actions.
6 • Concluding Remarks
I began this discussion noting that Peirce's use of
the term 'habit' is understood most often as pointing to a
thing's essence. This emphasis is found in Peirce, to be
• But if this is the only way in which we regard habits
as they are presented in the Peircean corpus, we are blinded
to their significance for a theory of action. For habits of
action also serve as a description of beliefs, and the link
between belief and action is quite clear in Peirce. Thus,
I disentangled two ways of looking at beliefs: beliefs as
habits of thought or mind, and beliefs as habits of action.
The former provides us with an account of beliefs as they
function in the inferential reasoning process; the latter
provides us with an account of beliefs insofar as they are
rules of action. Both emphases are important for a Peircean
theory of action.
Next, I considered Peirce's notion of a rule of action
which has practical bearings—a practical belief. I examined
what it means to have such a belief and found a rather
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tangled web. As a start, I pointed out that, for Peirce,
a practical belief is a habit of deliberate behavior,
and I suggested that deliberation and desire are the two
key elements of such a belief or habit. Included in the
notion of deliberation were (a) attending to one's present
intentions and purposes, (b) bearing in mind one's past
experiences or making a resolve based on an imagined line
of conduct, and (c) exercising self-control. This last
stipulation led me to a consideration of still other mental
activities involved in the act of deliberation: comparing
past deeds with standards, deliberating about future con-
duct, and converting one's resolutions into determinations
to act. All of this, recall, was given as an account of
the deliberation process which necessarily precedes any
deliberative act.
On first blush, these practical beliefs or habits of
deliberate behavior were the ones which seemed to be
especially important to Peirce, since these were the ones
to which "Pragma ticism could trace the intellectual purport
of symbols." But theoretical beliefs also have meaning in-
sofar as they involve some elem.ent of expectation. With
this, the notion of a "would-act" or "would-do" was intro-
duced. And with this, theoretical beliefs become as
relevant to a Peircean theory of action as are practical
beliefs
.
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Finally, beliefs of either type are those on which I
am prepared to act and, in some cases, they are what I do,
in fact, act upon. They directly cause us to be disposed
to act in a certain way and, in this sense, they are causes
of our dispositions to act. But beliefs also indirectly
cause us to act in the sense that one's disposition to act
may, in turn, causally affect one's actions. And with this,
the link between beliefs and actions seems to be soldered
in a natural yet Peircean way. And although I have been
discussing beliefs in terms of deliberate action, and have
attempted to clarify Peirce's notion of deliberation and,
hence, deliberate action, it now seems useful to examine
more fully action itself. I turn now to such a discussion.
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NOTES
Peirce s view that the lawlike behavior of things is
due to habitual behavior— behavior which characterizes a
thing's essence— is shared by C. D. Broad in "The 'Nature'
of a Continuant, an excerpt from his book. Examination of
McTaggart's Philosophy
. In his discussion. Broad makes the
following three points:
(i) Every substance has a set of supreme dispositionalproperties, each of finite order
(ii) No substance can change in respect of any of its
supreme dispositional properties
.
(iii) Any substance whose inner nature had differedin any respect from that which S in fact has would
necessarily have been a different substance from S.
These are propositions Broad believes are "self-evident" to
t>oth science and common sense. [Rpt. in Readings in Philo-
sophical Analysis
,
ed. Herbert Eeigl and Wilfrid Sellars
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts
,
Inc., 1949), p. 478.
2 .Michael L. Raposa, "Habits and Essences," Transactions
of the Peirce Society
, 20 (Spring 1984), p. 158.
^ Ibid
.
,
p. 159.
4 See, for example, "Some Consequences of Eour Incapa-
cities," especially 5.266-82 (1868).
5See also 5.396-99 (1878). Peirce also held, in his
later writings, that "Thinking is a kind of action ..."
[8.191 (c. 1904)].
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^Thomas M. Olshevsky, "Peirce's Pragmatic Maxim,"
Transactions of the Peirce Society
. 19 (Spring 1983), p. 205.
7For variations of the pragmatic principle, see 5.438
(1905); 5.9 (c. 1905); 5.2-3 (1902); 6.490 (c. 1910). I
shall return to a discussion of pragmaticism as it relates
to action in my last chapter.
gThis bears some similarity to Aristotle's notion of
deliberating about the means to some desired end. However,
according to Aristotle, "wish relates rather to the end,
choice to the means" [lllb26]
,
and "we deliberate not about
ends but about means" [1112bl3]
. I believe Peirce would
not restrict deliberation to means only, and I believe he
would hold that deliberation is prompted by a combination
of desires and beliefs, not simply desires. See Bruce
Aune's Reason and Action (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1977)
,
pp. 117-19, for a concise account
of these two questionable Aristotelian claims. [Quotations
from Aristotle are from the Nicomachean Ethics
.
]
9See Aune's article, "Formal Logic and Practical
Reasoning," for a defense of the view that "practical
reasoning, narrowly understood, involves premisses or con-
clusions that include actual or potential expressions of
intention" (in Theory and Decision
,
20 (1986)
,
p. 306) .
In the article, Aune presents a "logic of practical in-
ference" which includes, as premises, volitional statements
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which express intentions. See especially pp. 309-13.
IOt, .Peirce s notion of a resolve would seem to be
similar to Aristotle's notion of the "object of choice,"
for consider:
The object of choice being one of the things in our
own power which is desired after deliberation, choice
will be deliberate desire of things in our own power;for when we have decided as a result of deliberation,
we desire in accordance with our deliberation.
[Nicomachean Ethics
, 1113al0]
^^It should be noted here that Peirce's notion of self-
control bears little similarity to the Platonic notion of
sslf~control with its emphasis on moderation or temperance.
See, for example, the Republic
,
390b, 430c-431a, and 461b.
And in the Philebus
,
Plato says:
Temperate people are of course constantly restrained by
the proverbial maxim they all follow, bidding them do
'Nothing in excess.' But with intemperate, unre-
strained people the intense pleasure that possessed
them sends them roaring about like lunatics. [45d7-e4]
12Frank P. Ramsey offers the following two senses of
self-control
:
Self-control in general means either
(1) not acting on the temporarily uppermost desire,
but stopping to think it out; i.e., pay regard to all
desires and see which is really stronger; its value
is to eliminate inconsistency in action; or
(2) forming as a result of a decision habits of acting
not in response to temporary desire or stimulus but in
a definite way adjusted to permanent desire.
The difference is that in (1) we stop to think it out
but in (2) we've thought it out before and only stop
to do what we had previously decided to do.
[From The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical
Essays
,
ed . R. B. Braithwaite (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1931), p. 201.]
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It would seem that Peirce is interested in self-control in
sense (2), although he, too, is interested in the consis-
tency of actions [See, for example, 7.357 (1873)].
See also 5.453-58 (1905); 5.467-68 (c. 1906); 6.485
(1908); and 8.380-81 (1913).
Note here that Peirce's views about the expectative
quality of beliefs (theoretical and scientific beliefs in-
cluded)
,
as given in "Reason's Rules" (c. 1902), would
seem to supersede this statement made in 1898 that "pure
science has nothing at all to do with action."
15^ uJohn Dewey, "The Pragmatism of Peirce," in Chance,
Love and Logic
,
ed . Morris R. Cohen (New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Co., Inc., 1923), pp. 303-304.
Also, he may not wish to die just yet. In this way,
desires may be understood as providing a reason for his
acting as he does. And, in general, desires often serve
as reasons for our deliberate actions.
17Compare C. D. Broad's example of a disposition of
a thing in "The 'Nature' of a Continuant," especially pp.
473-74 and 481.
1
8
The reasoning process associated with the would-be
of deliberate conduct is simply that inferential reasoning
in accordance with a leading principle (the first premise
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here) which I discussed in Section 1. Compare Aune's valid
inference patterns, particularly with respect to Peirce's
second premise in Aune, this is a volitional statement
expressing an intetion (in "Formal Logic and Practical
Reasoning," pp. 309-13).
Chapter ll
VOLITION
A belief, be it practical or theoretical, is that
on which I ^uld act whenever appropriate circumstances
present themselves. And as should be quite apparent, I
often ^ act on a belief. Further, as I have argued, a
belief can function both as a cause of my acting in a
certain way and as a cause of my being prepared to act in
a certain way whenever a certain occasion may arise. But
this causal role of beliefs casts doubt on whether it can
be said that an agent ever acts freely. One problem for
a Peircean theory of action is, therefore, to determine
what it means to say that a person acts voluntarily, given
that the performance of his action is causally determined
(at least in part) by his belief. Of course, any theory of
action must come to terms with the notion of a voluntary
action; I am, in effect, saying that a Peircean theory is
• 1
no exception.
There are yet other reasons for examining such notions
as "a voluntary action," "a willed action," and a "volition,"
for in his writings Peirce says: "If I act from a reason at
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all, I act voluntarily [5.339, n. 1 (1868)]; will to
act in a way of which I have a general conception" [2.696
(1878)]; and "The final upshot of thinking is the exercise
of volition, and of this thought no longer forms a part"
[5.397 (1878)]. But these passages raise more questions
than they answer. For instance, what does Peirce mean by
"volition," by a "voluntary action"? is the "exercise of
volition" identical to a "voluntary action," to "willing
to act"? Finally, all these phrases suggest that an agent
acts freely though he acts on his beliefs. How does a
Peircean analysis account for this in view of the causal
and expectative aspects of beliefs?
A natural point of departure for an examination of
these questions will be Peirce's category distinctions.
Volition, as it turns out, figures prominently in the
category of Secondness, as action. Thus, an understanding
of what Peirce has to say on the topics of volition.
voluntary actions, and actions themselves will best be
approached via an understanding of the Peircean categories.
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1
. The Categories
Peirce's overall division of philosophy into the
branches of phenomenology, normative science, and meta-
physics gives phenomenology a central position. As one
philosopher aptly puts it:
Phenomenology takes inventory of what appears with-
out passing any judgment upon what it deserves
It says neither "true" or "false" nor "good" or
"bad" about the phenomena. One might say that, for
Peirce, phenomenology merely observes and catalogs
the contents of experience. Normative science
evaluates and judges the data thus collected, while
metaphysics tries to comprehend their reality. It
is clear, therefore, that in some sense phenomenology
the most basic of the philosophical disciplines
—
the one without which the enterprise could not even
begin. The categories which phenomenology provides
will be the conceptual frame in which the other
psrts of philosophy will make their analyses and
explanations .
2
According to Peirce, phenomenology is
. . . the Doctrine of Categories, whose business it
is to unravel the tangled skein [of] all that in any
sense appears and wind it into distinct forms.
[1.280 (1902)1
The subject matter of this tangled skein is, of course,
phenomena, by which Peirce means "... whatever is before
our minds in any sense" [8.265 (1903); cf. 1.186 (1903)].
In some passages Peirce expresses his discontent with
using the language of 'phenomenology' and 'phenomena' and
introduces the terms ' phaneroscopy ' and 'phaneron.' The
shift in language is not one of content; rather, it is a
defensive measure Peirce takes to distinguish his views from
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those of Hegel. in a letter to William James, he says:
I am not sure that it will do to call this science phe-
nomenology owing to Hegel's Phanomenologie being somewhat
different [8.298 (1904)]. And the difference, according
to Peirce? Hegel
. . . restricted himself to what actually forces itself
the mind and so colored his whole philosophy with
the ignoration of the distinction of essence and exis-
tence and so gave it [phenomenology] the nominalistic
and I might say in a certain sense the pragmatoidal
character in which the worst of the Hegelian errors
have their origin. [5.37 (1903)]
Peirce expands the range of phenomena to include "whatever
is experienced or might conceivably be experienced or become
an object of study in any way direct or indirect" [ Ibid . ]
.
The science of phaneroscopy
. . . does not draw any distinction of good and bad
in any sense whatever, but just contemplates phenomena
as they are, simply opens its eyes and describes what
it sees; not what it sees in the real as distinguished
from figment--not regarding any such dichotomy--but
simply describing the object, as a phenom.enon, and
stating what it finds in all phenomena alike.
[5.37 (1903)]
In Peirce's phaneroscopy, no judgments are made as to
whether a phaneron is good or bad, real or imagined; rather,
an exhaustive inventory and classification is made of all
that is or can be experienced.
In keeping with his propensity for triads, Peirce
categorizes all phaneron according to just three divisions:
"conceptions of quality, relations, and synthesis or media-
tion" [1.378 (c. 1890)], or "quality, fact, and law" [1.427
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(1896)]. The category of Secondness
— the category of
relations or facts--encompasses volition and, as Peirce
himself notes, "The practical exigencies of life render
Secondness the most prominent of the three [categories]"
[8.266 (1903)]. This is the category I am primarily in-
terested in here; however, first things first.
The category of Firstness includes as its phaneron
the being of positive qualitative feeling" [1.23 (1903)].
It IS the category of mere possibility. What exists as a
First IS a mere m.ay-be and exists as a possible object of
experience
.
. . . Among phanerons there are certain qualities of
feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of
sttar
,
the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of
quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating
a fine mathematical demonstration, the quality of
feeling love, etc. I do not mean the sense of actually
experiencing these feelings, whether primarily or in
any memory or imagination. That is something that
involves these qualities as an elem.ent of it. But I
mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves
,
are m.ere may-bes, not necessarily realized .
[1.304 (c. 1904); my underscore]
The quality has being even if there is no mind to perceive
it and even if there is no material thing in which it in-
heres. It is a
. . . mere abstract potentiality; and the error of
those schools [the nominalistic schools] lies in
holding that the potential, or possible, is nothing
but what the actual makes it to be. [1.422 (c. 1896)]
The quality of feeling of magenta-ness
,
for example, does
not refer to a sensation or feeling of something being
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magenta colored, though such an experience would "involve"
the quality of magenta-ness
. Rather, the quality of feeling
has being in the sense that a thing could be magenta-colored
whether or not any magenta-colored thing actually exists or
there is a mind to perceive it if it does exist.
That mere quality
,
^
or suchness, is not in itself an
occurrence, as seeing a red object is; it is a mere
may-be. Its only being consists in the fact that
there might be such a peculiar, positive, suchnessin a phaneron. When I say it is a quality, I do not
mean that it "inheres" in [a] subject.
[1.304 (c. 1904)]
This quality of feeling, then, apart from any experience of
the feeling, is the Peircean "pure monad." ".
. .it can
be imagined to be without any occurrence.
. . Its mere
may-being gets along without any realization at all" [1.304
(c. 1904) ] . It is "in itself without parts or features,
and with embodiment. Such is a pure monad" [1.303 (c. 1894)].
The category of Firstness, then, consists of these
general qualities of feelings; it consists of mere possibi-
lities. These possibilities are, however, real— they have
reality— though they are not existent, according to Peirce.
He distinguishes between reality and existence, saying that
. . . reality means a certain kind of non-dependence
upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character,
while existence means reaction with the environment,
and so is a dynamic character . . . the two meanings
. . . are clearly not the same. [5.503 (c. 1905)]
It is, in part, this distinction which is brought out in
Peirce's rejection of Hegel's use of 'phenomenology.'
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Peirce s phaneroscopy includes phaneron which are real but
do not exist; whereas Hegel "restricted himself to what
actually forces itself on the mind.
. .
"
There is another point regarding the category of
Firstness which requires clarification. It concerns three
types of things related to Firstness which are easily con-
fused: (1) the qualities of feelings, (2) true feelings
,
and (3) feelings which are recognized only in a judgment.
Strictly speaking, only (1) satisfies the description of a
Peircean First. These are the pure monads I have examined
above. (2) and (3)
,
on the other hand, are, for Peirce,
matters of "psychology" [1.378 (c. 1885); 1.552 (1867)].
A "true feeling" is
. . . mere passive feeling, which does not act and
does not judge, which has all sorts of qualities but
does not itself recognize these qualities, because it
does not analyze nor compare— this is an element of
all consciousness to which a distinct title ought to
be given. [1.376 (c. 1885); my underscore]
It is "the consciousness which can be included with an
instant of time, passive consciousness of quality, without
recognition or analysis" [1.377 (c. 1885)]. True feeling,
for Peirce, just is immediate consciousness.
. . . although the entire consciousness of any one
instant is nothing but a feeling, yet psychology can
teach us nothing of the nature of feeling, nor can we
gain knowledge of any feeling by introspection, the
feeling being completely veiled by introspection, for
the very reason that it is our immediate consciousness.
[1.310 (1907); cf. 1.343 (1903)]
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We can, according to Peirce, understand "what a feeling in
general is like [Ibid
. ] , but once we attempt to understand
this momentary state of consciousness
— this true feeling
—
we have introduced an element of comparison and analysis
into an otherwise "immediate consciousness." We can never
get at this individual, monadic feeling.
Thus, if you perceive that you must at the instantin question have been looking at a given specimen of
red- lead, you know that that color has some resem-blance to your feeling at that instant. But this
only means that when the feeling gives place to com-parison this resemblance appears. But there is no
resemblance at all in feeling, since feeling is what-
ever it is, positively and regardless of anything
else, while the resemblance of anything lies in the
comparison of that thing with something else.
[1.310 (1907)]
Thus, a true feeling, being immediate consciousness, is not
a quality of feeling, for the quality is "an element
separated from everything else and in no world but itself";
it is "merely potential" [1.424 (c. 1896)].
But neither is a true feeling something we could
recognize in a judgment. It is not, for example, the
redness of the book in front of me, since a recognition of
that redness involves a comparison from, at least, one
moment to the next. Like pleasure and pain, redness "can
only be recognized as such in a judgment" [1.376 (c. 1885)].
Empirical psychology has established the fact that
we can know a quality only be means of its contrast
with or sim.ilarity to another. [1.552 (1867)]
In his discussion of Peirce's categories, Christopher
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Hookway elaborates on an example Peirce uses and, in so
doing, explains clearly just how qualities may be "realized"
in the world of existents— in Seconds, that is. The
quotation is lengthy, but bears repeating in full since it
captures the way in which Firsts are related to Seconds.
Suppose that I observe a red object—Peirce uses
^cc
livery of a guardsman in London[SS 24) . Now what I observe may involve elementsdrawn from all three categories-- the guardsman is
experienced as other than me, and as marching in alaw-governed fashion (Secondness and Thirdness]
. But,
I can concentrate upon the colour of the uniform andprescind from the law-governed behaviour and even from
the fact that the shade is decorating the uniform of
an existing
_ individual. Thinking just of the shade
I think of it in abstraction from its setting: it
is something which could be realized in an actual
individual but need not be [Firstness]
. I do not
have to think of it as reacting with me or anything
else: it is 'as it is independently of any other
thing.' I don't think of it as part of the existing
universe but as a qualitative character which could
possibly be accompanied by the secondness that marks
actual existence. I do not have to think of it as a
relational phenomenon at all. It is monadic, first-
ness . ^
As the monadic elements of the world. Firsts are non-
relational. They "could be realized in an actual individual
but need not be." And if they are "realized" or "instan-
tiated" in an actual individual, we can know of it only
through some judgment which we make concerning the experi-
enced existent.
What we encounter in perception, then, is the instan-
tiation of qualities by particular existing things.
The perceptual judgment refers to an individual, a
quality, and asserts that the former instantiates the
latter .
^
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The monadic category of Firstness differs from the
dyadic category of Secondness insofar as a feeling "is all
that it is positively, in itself, regardless of anything
else" [1.306 (1907)], but "A dyad consists of two subjects
brought into oneness" [1.326 (c. 1894)]. A Second is "the
conjunction of two qualities of feeling" [7.533 (undated)].
We can now think of existing things or, more generally,
facts as being the embodiment of qualities. Owing to its
immediacy, a First is not "an event, a happening, a coming
to pass [1.307 (1907) ] . But a Second is a "being of actual
fact [1.23 (1903)]; it is the being of existence or
actuality
.
All the existence a feeling can have is had the moment
it is thought. But a sensation is not had until I am
really acted upon by something out of my control.
[7.543 (prob. c. 1900)]
The notion of being acted upon by something external
to the self as well as the notion of acting on something
other than the self are key features of Secondness. "The
individual fact insists on being here irrespective of any
reason ..." [1.434 (c. 1896)]. "In itself, as reaction,
it is arbitrary, blind, and brute exertion of force" [7.532
(undated)]. It has no generality, no law governing it. It
is "anti-general" [7.532].
The chair I appear to see makes no professions of
any kind, essentially embodies no intentions of any
kind, does not stand for anything. It obtrudes it-
self upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything
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anything. it simply knocks at theportal of my soul and stands there in the doorway.
[7.619 (1903)]
Viewed simply as Seconds, facts fail to have any meaning
for us, they lack intentionality or any degree of law-like
behavior. They are simply brute and irrational.
Yet we become aware of facts through a sense of resis-
tance. Through sensation and volition, the self (ego) is
confronted with something other than the self (the non-ego)
In a colorful passage, Peirce explains:
Whenever we come to know a fact, it is by its resis-
ting us.
_
A man may walk down Wall Street debating
within himself the existence of an external world;
if in his brown study he jostles up against some-body who angrily draws off and knocks him down, the
sceptic is unlikely to carry his scepticism so far
as to doubt whether anything beside the ego was con-
cerned in that phenomenon. The resistance shows him
that something independent of him is there.
[1.431 (c. 1896)]
And just as one only knows that there is something other
than the self by means of some resistant force, so also one
comes to believe that facts exist only because they, too,
come up against something other.
. . . the fact fights its way into existence, for it
exists by virtue of the oppositions which it involves.
. . . For just as we can only know facts by their
acting upon us, and resisting our brute will ... so
we can only conceive a fact as gaining reality by
actions against other realities. And further to say
that something has a mode of being which lies not in
itself but in its being over against a second thing,
is to say that that mode of being is the existence
which belongs to fact. [1.432 (c. 1896)]
A thing without opposition ipso facto does not exist
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11.457 (c. 1896)]. I shall return to a more detailed dis-
cussion of sensation and volition below, since the latter
relates directly to actions.
Thirdness is "being of law that will govern facts
in the future" [1.23 (1903)]. it is the category which
includes law, habit, thought, meaning, representation, and
mediation a seemingly eclectic grouping.^ Thirdness is
intended as the category which captures all that is rational
in the world, and this is something which is wholly missing
in Firstness and Secondness. A First is "eternal, indepen-
dent of time, and of any realization," and it lacks reason.
. . . to ask why a quality is as it is, why red is red
3nd not green, would be lunacy. If red were green it
would not be red; that is all. [1.420 (c. 1896)]
But Thirds, considered as thoughts, "can be produced and
grow," and they must have some reason for their being.
Furthermore, Seconds lack the generality of law, whereas
Thirds are general.
No collection of facts can constitute a law; for the
law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines
how facts that may be, but ^1 of which never can
have happened, shall be characterized.
[1.420 (c. 1896)]
And although for purposes of analysis it is possible to
separate the three categories, it will never "be possible
to find any Secondness or Firstness in the phenomenon that
is not accompanied by Thirdness" [5.90 (1903)].
Clearly, for Peirce, Thirdness is the most important
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and complex of the three categories. Besides the grouping
mentioned above, Peirce also includes "generality, infinity,
continuity, diffusion, growth, and intelligence" as "ideas
of prominent Thirdness" [1.340 (c. 1895)]. And it is the
category of Thirdness which places Peirce in the philo-
sophical tradition of scholastic realism, for one conse-
quence of maintaining that Thirds are real is the need to
acknowledge that " general principles are really operative
in nature " [5.101 (1903); Peirce's emphasis].^
An investigation of Thirdness, with its wealth of
ideas, would be a task which would take me far beyond the
scope of this project. But now dwelling on it at length
in this section does not mean I will be ignoring it alto-
gether. On the contrary. As I argued in the last chapter,
beliefs, as habits of action, causally affect one's dispo-
sition to act. As habits of action, beliefs function as
laws— as Thirds— so that given a certain belief, we can
7expect certain actions to follow. In this chapter, I
shall claim that a voluntary action is one which is mediated
by a Third, and it is this aspect of a voluntary action
which distinguishes it from an involuntary action. And in
the remaining chapters, I shall be introducing other aspects
of Thirdness when I present the topics of desiring, intending
and action as it relates to pragmaticism and semiotics.
Thirdness is an important feature of Peirce's phaneroscopy
,
and it is just as important as a feature of a Peircean
theory of action.
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The three categories, then, give us a complete listing
of all that there is. And each of them is simple and irre-
ducible (a First cannot be reduced to something simpler than
a monad; a Second cannot be reduced to a monadic relation;
and a Third cannot be reduced either to a dyadic or a
monadic relation [5.82 ff. (1903)].^ An account of the
phaneron would be imcomplete were any of the three cate-
gories omitted. Peirce often made a point of saying how
wrong Hegel was in disregarding Seconds in his account of
what reality consists of. "The brute element exists and
must not be explained away as Hegel seeks to do" [8.27
9(1902)]. It is, I believe, to Peirce's credit that he
saw the importance of Seconds in his universe, dominated
as it was by reason and representations.
. . . the third category--the category of thought,
representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine
thirdness, thirdness as such--is an essential in-
gredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute
reality, since this category . . . can have no concrete
being without action, as a separate object on which to
work its government, just as action cannot exist with-
out the immediate being of feeling on which to act.
[5.436 (1905)]
With this sketch of the categories as a background, I turn
now to that aspect of the category of Secondness which
Peirce refers to as "psychological." It is this aspect
which is immediately relevant to the topic of actions.
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2 . SGnsation and. Volition
According to Peirce, both sense and will provide
instances of dyadic relations--reactions of Secondness.
In sense and will, there are reactions of Second-
ness between the ego and the non-ego. In will theevents leading up to the act are internal, and we
say that we are agents more than patients. In sense,the antecedent events are not within us; and besides
5k
which we form a perception (thouqh notthat which immediately acts upon the nerves) remains
unaffected. Consequently we say that we are patients,
not agents. [1.325 (Unidentified Fragment)]
In this way, Peirce considers sense and will to be two
varieties of that state of consciousness which involves
an awareness of the ego and non-ego. A "struggle" occurs
between the two a commotion, an action and reaction,
between our soul and the stimulus" [1.322 (c. 1903)]. A
sense of resistance occurs— a sense which gives us our only
consciousness of activity. "We are conscious of hitting or
of getting hit, of meeting with a fact" [1.376 (1890)].
Without resistance there would be no effort; without resis-
tance there would be no consciousness of fact, for it is
resistance and reaction to it which informs us of fact and
existence. As Hookway explains it:
Peirce finds in this sort of phenomenon the clue
to the analysis of individual existence; existing
objects react against us and each other.
H
In this way, too, a polarity is established between subject
and object (ego and non-ego)
,
action and reaction, and a
parallel is drawn between sense and will.
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tt
together. The common element is the sense ofan actual occurrence of ao-t-n.,! a. • -i c r
There is an in+-f^nco ' i action and reaction.
exDe^Pn.r i about this kind of
While I am'sLt^d'"^
sundering of subject and object,
ai T eated calmly m the dark, the liqhts are
^ turned on, and at that instant I am conscious
thL Ln change, but yet of something more
'
of a sa^tus Tf i have a lensel , o there being two sides to that instant
phrasf'trd"®"'-K"
polarity would be a tolerably gcS^se o describe what occurs. For will, then, asone of the great types of consciousness, we ought to
Idlin'" sense. [1.380 (c. 1885); cf. with1.330 (Unidentified Fragment)]
This polar sense which includes both the consciousness of
willing and sensation is also referred to by Peirce as the
altersense." "Altersense is the consciousness of a di-
rectly present other or second, withstanding us" [7.551
(prob. c. 1900)]. This awareness of something other than
oneself occurs by means of shock. And again, this is true
^ith respect to the experience of willing as well as the
experience of sensing, though Peirce admits that one might
not think so. He says:
Now the only way in which any force can be learned
is by something like trying to oppose it. That we
do something like this is shown by the shock we
receive from any unexpected experience. It is the
inertia of the mind, which tends to remain in the
state in which it is. No doubt there is a marked
difference between the active and intentional volition
of muscular contraction, and the passive and uninten-
tional volition that gives the shock of surprise and
the sense of externality. But the two are to be
classed together as alike modes of doubt conscious-
ness, that is, of awareness, at once and in the same
swaiTGnGss, of an Ggo and
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a non-Gqo
. . .
[1.334 (c. 1905)]
In the volition of muscular contraction and in the volition
"that gives the shock of surprise and the sense of exter-
natilty" we become aware or conscious of both an ego and
non-Ggo
.
Now it should bG notGd that "volition" is usGd by
PGircG in two diffGront ways, though he does not sggiti to
bG awarG of it. Hg oftGn usgs it in a broad sonsG to covGr
thG GntirG psychological aspect of the category of Second-
ness. He refers, for example, to the psychological triad
as "feeling, volition, cognition" [1.332 (c. 1905)]. And
when he speeks of volition in this way, it seems clear he
does not intend any differentiation between sense and will.
Volition is through and through dual. There is
the duality of agent and patient, of effort and
resistance, of active effort and inhibition, of
acting on self and on external objects.
[1.332 (c. 1905)]
But just as often, Peirce intends "volition" in a stricter
sense to cover that phenomenon which seems to bear, at
least initially, some resemblance to what has been tradi-
12tionally referred to as "willing." Volition understood
strictly is to be understood as something different from
sense. This should be clear from the preceding discussion,
yet this difference between sense and will merits further
elaboration
.
Peirce tells us:
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fo^ck'upofth: ^ind? voluion
J' uu LLom us. 17.543 (prob. c. 1900)]
Another way of understanding the difference between the
two can be gleaned from a distinction Peirce makes between
two different types of dyadic relations. Monoidal dyads are
coincidences, par excelence contingent, or 'accidental'"
[1.429]; "two monoid dyads oppositely situated" involve
an exertion of strength. The coincidence or accidental
relation characterized here as a monoidal dyad would seem
to describe the relationship of sense; it is "the passive
and unintentional volition that gives the shock of surprise
and the sense of externality" [1.334 (c. 1905)]. But an
exertion of strength involves two monoid dyads and seems to
characterize volition.
. . . in the exertion of strength, although I act
on the object and the object acts on me, which are
two relations of one kind and joined in one relation,
yet in each of these two relations there is an agent
and a patient, a doer and a sufferer, which are in
contrary attitudes to one another. So that the action
consists of two monoid dyads oppositely situated.
[1.429 (c. 1896)]
Peirce's example of a man trying to open a door helps
to clarify his conception of these dyadic relations.
Standing on the outside of a door that is slightly
ajar, you put your hand upon the knob to open
and enter it. You experience an unseen, silent
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resistance.^ You put your shoulder against the doorand, gathering your forces, put forth a tremendous
effort. [1.320 (c. 1910)]
This is "the active and intentional volition of muscular
contraction." in the language of Peirce's earlier writings
the man is both agent and patient, doer and sufferer,
acting on an object (the door) and being acted on by the
door. He is exerting effort both on self (by straining his
muscles) and on an external object (by pushing the door)
.
And the door is both agent insofar as it resists the man's
and patient insofar as it is acted upon by the man
But precisely how volition or will is exhibited here re~
•l^ires further examination. It is volition in this strict
sense which is of interest to the topic of action. With
that in mind, I will now leave aside further discussion
of sensation as an instance of Secondness and will focus
on volition as an act of willing in the remainder of this
Chapter
.
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^ • Volit ion, Desire^ and Voluntary Actions
We have seen that Peirce uses the term 'volition' to
refer broadly to the psychological aspect of the category
of Secondness and to refer strictly to anything having to
do with will as it is considered in a traditional way. It
is this stricter sense of volition which I plan to examine
more fully at this point. Taking a clue from Peirce, there
is now a further refinement which should be made on this
sense of volition,
' and that is the dissociation of desire
or purpose from will.
In a letter to James, dated December 17, 1909, Peirce
describes the "psychological" aspect of Secondness as
"Molition—volition minus all desire and purpose, the mere
consciousness of exertion of any kind" [8.303]; "double
consciousness of exertion and resistance" [8.304]. Applying
this refinement to "volitions or acts of willing" [7.541
(c. 1900)], we should consider any volition as having no
element whatsoever of desire or purpose— no element of
Thirdness, that is. Let us see just how this might work.
In his clearest example of a "pure dyad," Peirce illus-
trates what one would suppose is an instance of molition.
His example: "God said, let there be light, and there was
light ... we must simply think of God creating light by
fiat" [1.327 (c. 1894)]. For Peirce, this is an act of
arbitrary will, unmediated by any process of reasoning,
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desire, or purpose.
tion^?o subjects. The act of crea-IS to be regarded, not as any third object
and
suchness of connection of Godlight. The dyad is the fact. It determinesthe existence of the light, and the creatorship of
hPtw^^n'-hh process intervening
havrhL this would
^r^hp ^ element. Thirdness,® category, is the same as media-
reason, pure dyadism is an act ofarbitrary will or of blind force; for if there isany reason, or law, governing it, that mediatesbetween the two subjects and brings about their
connection. [1.328]
One might wonder to what extent this particular example
illustrates a pure dyad. It would seem that purpose and
reasoning are important aspects of the action itself, for
after all, assuming the act of creation occurred, was not
purpose and design part of the Divine Plan? One might go
along with the view that creation was a purposeful act,
but Peirce would reject outright the view that purpose,
desire, reasoning, or any such intentional element is part
of the action itself. "The f ina
1
upshot of thinking is the
exercise of volition, and of this thought no longer forms
a part ..." [5.397 (1878)]. And of this, I would add,
desire no longer forms a part either. For Peirce volition
as a pure dyad is simply the exercise of brute will. " (I
say brute will, because after I have determined how and
when I will exert my strength, the mere action itself is
in itself brute and unreasoning) . . ." [1.432 (c. 1896)].
Reasoning, desire, or purpose is no longer a part of the
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action, though it may well have preseced the action itself.
This sundering of volition from desire and purpose is
also discussed in his "A Guess at the Riddle." Here Peirce
specifically addresses the question of whether the will
involves desire, and he emphatically disagrees with those
who say that "the will is nothing but the strongest desire"
[1.380 (1890)]. He thinks that the difference between the
two should be evident to anyone who considers the difference
between dreaming (i.e., wishing, desiring, etc.) and doing.
This is not a question of defining, but of noticinq
^hat we experience; and surely he who can confound
desiring with doing must be a day-dreamer. [1.380]
This differentiation is further brought home in Peirce's
comment on the role of volition in light of conflicting
desires. Our desires, he admits, may have nothing to do
with volition, with what a person will do.
Though "desire" implies a tendency to volition,
and though it is a natural hypothesis that a man
cannot will to do that which he has no sort of
desire to do, yet we all know conflicting desires
but too well, and how treacherous they are apt to
be; and a desire may perfectly well be discontented
with volition, i.e., with what the man will do .
[1.331 (Unidentified Fragment); my underscore]
So far, so good. The difference between desire and volition
is again pointed out. And Peirce seems consistent through
and through. (There is a further point to be noted here
which is the identification of volition with a person's
action. I will return to this point in Section 4 below.)
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However, Peirce again addresses the question of voli-
tion and desire in "A Guess at the Riddle," but this time
he seems to suggest that there is some element of desire
which ^ a part of the volitional act. In this particular
passage, he is criticizing the traditional threefold
division of mind into "Feeling, Knowing, and Willing." And
there is the strong suggestion that there is a certain type
of volition which, in its analysis, would include in some
way, some aspect of desire or purpose. Consider the
following
:
Wishing is not willing; it is a speculative variation
of willing mingled with a speculative and anticipatory
feeling of pleasure. Desire should therefore be
struck out of the definition of the third faculty,
leaving it mere volition. But volition without desire
is not voluntary; it is mere activity. Consequently,
all activity, voluntary or not, should be brought
under the third faculty. Thus attention is a kind
of activity which is sometimes voluntary and sometimes
not so. [1.376 (c. 1890)
]
Granted that Peirce is commenting on a division which is
not his, and granted the passage is somewhat confusing.
Still there is something to be learned here. It seems that
Peirce's revision emphasizes activity—voluntary or not--as
being the proper constituent of the category of "Willing"
or volition. In the passage at hand, Peirce refers to
attention as an activity which is sometimes voluntary and
sometimes involuntary. And here, he is using the notion
14
of volition as attention. And so if Peirce were to have
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his way, the traditional division of the mind would have
the third faculty, the faculty of Willing. I
can infer, then, from what Peirce says that all activity
is volitional, though not all activity is voluntary.
The question arises now as to where desire should be
placed in this scheme since, according to Peirce, it somehow
contributes to an action being voluntary— "volition without
desire is not voluntary.
. .
" [1.376 (c. 1890)]. And yet,
as I have argued, desire is something wholly distinct from
volition or action, from what the man will do. The problem
phrased more directly: Are desire and volition always
and, hence, is there really no such thing as a
voluntary volition, or are desire and volition sometimes
and in some way mixed together as would seem to be the
case with voluntary volitions (action)?
The answer, of necessity, straddles the disjunction.
For Peirce, desire should be struck out of the defintion
of the traditional third faculty of willing, and it should
be struck out of his category of Secondness (the category
which might be thought of as being parallel to the tradi-
tionalist's third faculty). And so it would seem there
could be no voluntary actions. But this would be a most
undesirable result for this pragmaticist . As I pointed
out in my discussion of deliberate behavior in Chapter I,
Peirce maintains that we do deliberate about future actions
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and we resolve to act in the future based on that delibera-
tion. It would be incoherent for him to maintain that there
are no voluntary actions. Thus, I suggest that when Peirce
alludes to a voluntary volition
— a volition with desire--
such volitions exist, though the desire which is "an element
of volition" in actuality precedes the action. So he is not
saying that there are no actions which "involve" purpose or
desire and, hence, there are no voluntary actions. Rather,
he seems to be committed to a far less radical view which
holds that while the presence of desire or purpose distin-
guishes a voluntary action from an involuntary action,
desire is not part of the action itself. There are volun-
tary actions and these are determined by the preceding
desire or purpose or reasoning. Thus, volition is some-
times voluntary and sometimes not so, but no volition or
action "contains" an element of desire in its analysis.
Returning to the somewhat ethereal example of God's
fiat we can see that if there was such an event as creation
by fiat and if God has his reason for performing it, then
God's action would have been voluntary. But the purpose
1
6
God had in mind would have preceded the event. Still,
reason would have mediated between "the causal act and the
effect" in the sense that it would have brought about a
connection between God and his action of creation. And
that action would have been voluntary. It is clear.
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however, that Peirce does not consider the example as he
uses it to be a voluntary action-it is an example of a
pure dyad without an intervening process of reasoning. So
let us turn to a more mundane but felicitous example of a
voluntary action.
I lift a cup of coffee to my lips so that I might
enjoy the warm brew. A desire for warm coffee and some
thought as to how I might obtain what I desire preceded the
action; in Peircean terminology, reason mediated "between
the two subjects and brings about their connection" [1.328
(c. 1894)]. And so the voluntary action is mediated by
reason or law Thirdness. In fact, it would seem that most
all of our actions will be governed by some aspect of
Thirdness
.
If I act from a reason at all, l act voluntarily;
but which of two reasons shall appear strongest to
me on a particular occasion may be owing to what I
have eaten for dinner. Unless there is a perfect
regularity as to what is the strongest motive with
me, to say that I act from the strongest motive is
mere tautology. [5.339, n. 1 (1868)]
At this point I would like to fill out this discussion
of voluntary actions by taking a brief look at what would
seem to constitute a genuine involuntary action, i.e., a
"mere activity" which is not preceded by some process of
reasoning. An example might be the unconscious movement
of my hand, perhaps a nervous tic. This condition is not
subject to my control, it is not a deliberate act, and I
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have no desire to move my hand in this particular way.
Nevertheless, it is an action according to the Peircean
account of Secondness and, furthermore, it would be an
example of a volition, albeit an involuntary one.
A mental operation may be precisely like reasoninain every other respect except that it is performedunconciously. But that one circumstance It11 IT-
reasoning. For reaLnLgIS deliberate, voluntary, critical, controlled all
An uncon^c"
""" consciouh?!'
involuntary; an involuntary
act Is
=°"trol; an uncontrollableS not deliberate nor subject to criticism intne sense of approval or blame. [2.182 (1902)]
In this passage from "The Minute Logic," Peirce spells out
the difference between reasoning as a conscious and, there-
fore, voluntary activity, and other actions which are per
formed unconsciously and are, therefore, involuntary.
Recall now that a pure dyadism is
... an act of arbitrary will or of blind force;
for if there is any reason, or law, governing it,
that mediates between the two subjects and brings
about their connection. [1.328 (c. 1894)]
possible to describe an instance of a pure dyadism
(other than the theistic type Peirce gives)
,
then the in-
voluntary, unconscious act would seem to qualify, simply
because in this case there clearly is no intervening (or
preceding) process of reasoning of any kind. And contrari-
wise, when Peirce speaks of a voluntary action, then the
action itself is preceded by some reasoning process or
purpose, i.e., some element of Thirdness. An element of
84
law ana reasoning plays a significant role in any volnntary
actron, though reasoning plays no role in the action itself.
It is this sort of consideration which prompts Peirce to
remark.
We may say that the bulk of what is aconsists of Secondness—or bettL a ^ ®predominant character of what ha^ beerSone?"
""
[ 1.343 ( 1903 )]
And so it would seem that it is volitional activity which
covers the field of human action, whether that be voluntary
or involuntary action. And a voluntary action, it would
seem, is just a special case of a volitional action-one
which is mediated by a Third; one which is mediated by
reasoning
.
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Volition and Action
Thus far, I have examined action linked to volition in
a way which was essentially negative. l argued that desire,
reason, and purpose should be excluded from any account of
Dyadic Secondness— "fact, action, and actuality" [ 1.419 (c.
1896)]. I also claimed that it is the presence of some
such element of Thirdness which makes a volition or an act
of willing voluntary. But I have not yet explained why and
how Peirce thinks volitions are identified with actions--
human actions. Answers to these questions will bring us
fact to face with yet another refinement of Peirce's notion
of volition; to wit, there is a distinction between those
actions which we directly will (i.e., do) and those which
we indirectly will. And what we directly will is an action
of the nerves and muscles; any other human action can only
be indirectly willed. Allow me to explain.
First, it is easy to find passages throughout the
Peircean corpus which forge a link between volition and
some physical phenomenon. Recall that Peirce defines
volition as "what the man will do" [1.331 (Unidentified
Fragment)]. And Peirce's answer to the question, "what is
man?" includes the notion of a soul which exerts "a certain
17
material force called volition" [7.580 (1866)]. By means
of the aspect of Secondness which is part of the physio-
logical triad, it appears that a solid link is made between
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external and
Consider
internal volitions, and a physical activity,
the following, taken from "A Guess at the
Riddle"
;
sens;, as wragrefd^to^cair?t''^r
with the dischirge ofn^rvouf4ne gf
casr;^?r"- vontion, IL moTt%lTa.l
celL ' ® discharge into muLlels..
. In internal volition, or self-control
^s a?so\^°“® inhibitory action of the nerves^ whlchIS l o known to involve the movement of nervousforce.
.
. [1.386 (1890); cf. 8.41 (c. lTs 5 )]^S
This is perhaps as technical as Peirce gets on the matter,
The explanation of just what the connection is between
volition and the nervous system is simply that this is
what volition involves : a nervous reaction. 'Involves'
IS unfortunately vague, but pressing along with Peirce, we
find the relationship described as one of concomitance.
Remembering that the polar sense is the sense of
the difference between what was before and what is
after a dividing instant, or the sense of an instant
as having sides, we see clearly that the physiological
concomitant of it must be some event which happens
very quickly and leaves a more abiding effect, and
this description suits the passage of a nervous dis-
charge over a nerve-fibre so perfectly, that I do
not think we need hesitate to set this phenomenon
down as the condition of dual consciousness. [Ibid.]
The physiological concomitant of the polar sense is a
nervous discharge; we are not much better off than we were
with the vague "volition involves a nervous reaction." But
I think we can do better.
In the now-familiar Unidentified Fragment, Peirce
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states that what we directly will in the case of our own
physical movements is the contracting of certain muscles.
Trying to shove something too heavy for the man
measure
^^heless accomplishes in considerable, the only thing that he directly willed todo -namely to contract certain muscles.^
[1.331; See also 8.41 (1885)]
We may think we have willed to shove the table, but
this is a half-truth at best. On the Peircean analysis,
we could only wish or desire to shove the table, we could
not directly will the shoving of the table. We could
only directly will the contraction of certain arm and
leg muscles. And it may be that we also desired the
contraction of those muscles, but that is beside the
point. To summarize, I can desire to move the table and
I can desire to contract the muscles necessary to complete
such an action. Furthermore, I can indirectly will to
move the table, but the only thing I can directly will
is the contraction of certain muscles. Given this account,
a directly willed volition seems to be identified with an
activity of muscular contraction by means of a discharge
1
9
of nervous energy.
In the same passage, Peirce also uses the example
of "table-turning." In this seance activity favored by
spiritualists and non-spiritualists alike, a group of
people seated some distance from a table try with all their
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might to get the table to move sim.ply by willing that it
Should move. And of this, Peirce says:
• • -while we were pos sessed of no othe r "might"ove e^ table thanlfe^^I^FW muse 1 es . w.
of ^ direct consciousnesswilling that the table move, accompanied by thevision of Its wondrous obedience. Until it moved,
we were only longing
, not willing
. [1.331 (Unidenti-
fied Fragment)
,
my underscore]
Though at first blush it may not appear so, this example
IS consistent with his earlier example. The volitional
action of willing the table to move occurred when and only
when the table actually moved. But here again, one only
wills directly the contraction of certain muscles by means
of a nerve impulse. Indirectly, one can will the table to
move; directly one can only will the "nervous discharge
over a nerve-fibre."
At this point, it might seem that Peirce's position
is similar to that of James and Prichard. But it would
be a mistake to saddle Peirce with either view. First,
according to James, ".
. . the only direct outward effects
of our will are bodily movements." Now as is the case
with many of James's pronouncements, this initially sounds
as though it bears a close resemblance to Peirce's position
But on closer scrutiny the dissimilarity becomes glaring.
For notice that James holds that we will something to occur
and, while that may be a certain bodily movement, the act
of willing is something distinct from its effects, i.e..
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bodily movements. Moreover, volition is something which is
essentially mental in nature. James says:
. . . volition is a psychic or moral fact pure and
simple and is absolutely completed when the stable
state of the idea is there. The supervention of
motion is a supernumerary phenomenon depending on
executive ganglia whose function lies outside the
mind
.
Peirce would protest loudly. The act of willing is not
distinct from its effects, nor is volition something
psychic, nor is the physical phenomenon which occurs with
the act of volition supernumerary to the volition. As we
have seen, volition for Peirce ^ "a certain material
force"; it ^ "what the man will do." It is this con-
sideration which prompts Peirce's disagreement with Jam.es
on the question of free will. In a letter to him dated
March 18, 1897, Peirce takes issue with his account of
freedom of the will as it was presented in James's paper,
"Dilemma of Determinism." Peirce says:
I cannot admit the will is free in any appreciable
measure, for reasons that may be found in my "Man's
Glassy Essence." Namely, chance can only amount
to much in a state of things closely approximating
to unstable equilibrium. Now in the act of willing
there is no such state of things. The freedom lies
in the choice which long antecedes the will. There
a state of nearly unstable equilibrium is found.
But this makes a great difference in your doctrine.
[8.311]
Any choice, any exercise of freedom, occurs prior to the
volitional act— the act of willing. In the act of willing
itself, there is nothing which is at all like an unstable
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states of equilibrium. The willing is the doing, and of
this, thought or choice is no longer a part.
Second, according to Prichard, "doing something is an
act of willing. "22 Prichard's views are fleshed
out, any superficial resemblance to Peirce evaporates,
for Prichard maintains that willing is a kind of mental
activity having causal efficacy. Moreover, Prichard's
view would more aptly be characterized as the mirror image
of Peirce’s insofar as he (Prichard) analyzes any inten-
tional bodily movement in terms of a mental set of willing.
Consider his words:
When, e.g., we think of ourselves as having moved
our hand, we are thinking of ourselves as havingperformed an activity of a certain kind, and, it
almost goes without saying, a mental activity of
a certain kind, an activity of whose nature we
were dimly aware in doing the action and of which
we can become more clearly aware by reflecting on
* •
•
_ ssk 'What is the word used for
this special kind of activity?' the answer, it
seems, has to be 'willing.
Thus, It should be clear from my gloss on the distinction
between James and Peirce on the matter of willing that
Prichard's views would also be antithetical to those of
Peirce. Peirce, of course, finds nothing whatsoever
mental about volition. He does maintain that when we act
we are aware of some sense of effort or exertion, but
this awareness occurs only through the activity of doing
itself. This awareness does not come by means of a mental
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event that precedes the action;
of what it is we are doing.
it is simply the experience
By an experience of exertion, I do not mean a con-sciousness of resolving to do something, nor the
collection of force preparatory to an effort, butmerely what we experience in the very act of doing.
[7.531 (Undated)]
The experience of exertion, then, is what we experience in
the very act of doing; it is not the reflection that some
unique mental activity has occurred. Prichard and James
on the one hand, and Peirce on the other, are as far apart
as they could be on these points.
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. Concluding Remarks
I began this study of volition by asking how it could
be said that a person acts freely when his beliefs, in part,
cause him to act as he does. For Peirce, this apparent
dilemma poses no real difficulty. But the key to under-
standing why this is so rests with his special uses of
volition. After examining volition, first as a general
way of speaking about Secondness and then, more specifically
as action, I showed that Peirce thinks of volitions as
either voluntary or involuntary. And a volition is volun-
tary just when it is preceded by some process of reasoning,
purpose, or desire; without a mediating Third, a volition
is involuntary. I also claimed that, for Peirce, what one
directly wills is nothing more than a discharge of nervous
energy to the muscles. We can indirectly will all sorts
of things, but can directly will only a discharge of
nervous energy.
A question now arises: Does Peirce think that a
directly willed volition is a voluntary volition? If so,
some element of Thirdness should mediate between the person
and the directly willed action which, as should be clear
by now, can only be an activity of the nervous system. The
voluntary volition I examined earlier was the action of
lifting a cup of coffee to my lips so that I might enjoy
some warm coffee. The action was conscious and voluntary
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since both beliefs and desires preceded the action. But "an
unconscious act is involuntary" (2.182 (1902)], and unques-
tionably most of one's directly willed volitions occur
unconsciously. Thus, if my volition is directly willed it
is not necessarily a voluntary volition; it may be, but it
need not be. For Peirce, the term 'volition' covers the
field of human actions, including those actions which we
"perform" unconsciously and, thus, involuntarily. A dis-
charge of nervous energy is, on the Peircean account, a
volition. It IS unconsciously and involuntarily performed,
perhaps; nonetheless, that is the volition which is directly
willed
.
It should be obvious, at this point, that the actions
which are the result of a process of deliberation are
volitions. Moreover, they are voluntary volitions, in a
Peircean sense, since reason, desire, or purpose--some
aspect of Thirdness--media tes between the agent and his
action. It now seems appropriate to take a more careful
look at the important role of desire in a Peircean theory
of action, for it has been considered in only a tangential
way in both this chapter and the previous chapter. Yet it
appears to be an essential link between beliefs and actions.
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For example, according to Bruce Aune
,
"an action or
doing is voluntary only if it is either intentional, an
essential part of something intentional, or a foreseen con-
sequence of an intentional act" [ Reason and Action (Holland
D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977), p. 87]. Although this is
not Aune
' s complete account of a voluntary action, it is
adequate for seeing the sort of action which might be con-
sidered voluntary.
2 .Vincent G. Potter, S.J.
,
Charles S. Peirce: On Norms
an_d
.
Ideals (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press
1967), p
.
8
.
3Christopher Hookway, Peirce (Boston: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1985)
,
p. 106. For an illuminating discussion
of Peirce's categor ies--one which is far more detailed than
I intend to give—Hookway ' s treatment in Chapter III is
quite useful (pp. 80-117).
^
Ibid
.
,
p. 168
.
^See 1.420 (c. 1896); 1.476 (c. 1896); 1.337 (c. 1875)
1.343 (1903); 5.105 (1903).
^Cf. 4.50 (1893); 5.48-49 (1903); 5.77n (1903); 5.93-
101 (1903); 5.423 (1905); 5.453 (1905). For further dis-
cussions of Peirce's scholastic realism see Hookway, pp.
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112 17, John P. Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic BpaH.n,
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963): and
Charles K. McKeon, "Peircp'c; o-i- • i-> t •irce s Scotistic Realism," in Studies
in the Philosophy of Charles Sa nders Peiroe
. ed. Philip p.
Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1952)
.
^Peirce describes this law-like behavior of habits as
follows
:
n expectation is a habit of imagining
not an affection of consciousness; itlaw of a(^tion, such that on a certain
of occasion a man will be more or less
a certain general way. [2.148 (1903)]
. A habit is
is a general
general kind
apt to act in
For further discussion on the categories, see Isabel
S. Stearns, "Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness," in
Judies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce , ed
.
Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1952); Donald W. Mertz, "Peirce; Logic,
Categories, and Triads," in Transactions of the Charles S.
Peirce Society
, 15 (Spring 1979)
.
^Cf. 8.45 (1885); 1.40-41 (c. 1892); 1.524 (1903);
8.268 (1903); 5.436 (1905).
In his article, "Willing," A. I. Melden says some-
thing which has a distinctive Peircean ring to it:
I do not try to raise my arm unless, for example,
it is held down--I simply raise it; and I do not
try to flex my biceps unless there is some obstacle
to overcome or some chance of failure.
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[Philosophical Review
, 69 (1960), rpt. in The Philosophy of
Action, ed. Alan R. white (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1968
)
, p. 71
.
^^Hookway, p. 106.
In his book, Reason and Action
, Bruce Aune gives a
brief, lucid explanation of the traditional view of willing.
When a person raises his arm,
. . . one brings about the movement ^ one's conscious,voluntary activity. This conscious activity was called
willing'; and the traditional view is that, when we
make a voluntary movement, we will that movement intobeing. The activity of willing is thus regarded as akind of mental cause; it is a conscious process from
which the physical movement of an arm or leg might
naturally result.
[(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1977),
P. 1] .
13
In the case of humans, it is plausible to accept the
view that some intentional element precedes all voluntary
action; however, in the case of God, this is not so clear.
14
In some of Peirce's earlier writings, we find him
referring to volition as "the power of concentrating the
attention, of abstracting" [5.248 (1868)]. And in a Lecture
of 1893, he speaks of man's "power of effort or attention"
[7.589]. This notion of volition as attention seems to
be applicable primarily to internal volition in which we
exhibit self-control. But the view is held concurrently
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with that of volition as "a certain material
(1866)], and this seems to be appropriately
internal and external volition [see 1.386 (c
Section 4 below]
. The volition-as-attention
be absent from his later writings.
force" [7.580
applied to both
. 1890)
, and
view seems to
In his dismantling of the "myth of volitions,"
Gilbert Ryle gives an infinite regress argument to show
the absurdity of characterizing volitions as either volun-
tary or involuntary. [ The Concept of Mind (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 67.] But it should
be clear that Peirce's use of 'volition' is quite different
from that given in what Ryle refers to as the "traditional
dogma" of the tripartite division of the mind— the division
which Peirce is also criticizing. Thus, by using 'volition'
to mean activity, Peirce avoids the infinite regress problem
Ryle describes.
1
6
Whether any of God's actions are free or all are
necessitated is a question I leave to the theologians.
17Had Peirce been aware of the proscriptions of the
American Philosophical Association in the eighth decade of
this century, he surely would have replaced the offending
'man' with a less offensive 'person. ' Surely he would have
done that.
18That aspect of internal volition mentioned here
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covers the notion of "reiterations in the inner world" or
fancied reiterations which we looked at earlier.
19
„
•Peirce sometimes elliptically refers to a volition
which involves a nervous action affecting the muscles as
a "muscular contraction" [1.344 (c. 1905); see also 1.331
(undated)]. When I speak of a directly willed volition in
this way, i.e., as a muscular contraction, I, too, am being
elliptical
.
20
,,. T , .lilism James, Psychology (1892; rpt. Cleveland:
The World Publishing Co., 1948), p. 415.
21
Ibid
.
,
p. 449
.
22
H. A. Prichard, "Acting, Willing, Desiring," in Moral
Obligation (1949), rpt. in The Philosophy of Action, ed.
Alan R. White (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968),
p. 64
.
^^ Ibid
.
,
p. 61
.
Chapter in
desire
In "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce tells us with
what seem to be carefully chosen words that "Our beliefs
guide our desires and shape our actions" [5.371 (1877)].
As I pointed out in Chapter I, Peirce advances the view
that beliefs are a direct cause of our disposition to act
and an indirect cause of our actions. But Peirce also
mentions quite often that beliefs are not alone in getting
us to act as we do. Recall that in my examination of
practical beliefs, I stated that one of the conditions for
saying a person has such a belief is that he has certain
needs or wants. A desire of some kind, then, guided by
belief, also seems to be an essential element of a person's
action: a desire or wish "to remove a stimulus" is evi-
necessary for an action to occur. This point is
implicit in Peirce's reminder:
Meantime, do not forget that every conjecture is
equivalent to, or is expressive of, such a habit
that having a certain desire one might accomplish
it if one could perform a certain act.
[5.480 (1906)]
And in an even stronger statement, Peirce says that desire
"is cause, not effect, of effort" [5.486 (1906)]. The
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effort of which desire is a cause would, of
volitional act of Secondness. So it seems
necessary for action to occur and it is one
course, be
that desire
other causa
a
is
1
factor of actions.
Furthermore, in the last chapter I argued that Peirce
considers desire and volition to be distinct. Yet at the
same time he maintains that any voluntary action must be
preceded by desire. Obviously any discussion of a Peircean
theory of action must take up the question of desire. To
paraphrase Peirce, what, then, is desire? what is the
something" that has the features just mentioned? These
are some of the questions I shall be addressing in this
chapter
.
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1 • Desire as Judgment
As a start, Peirce considers desire or a wish to be
"a sort of proposition. To long for anything is to judge
it to be good and urgently good" [7.58 (c. 1902)]. He does
not seem to be saying only that we desire something which
we judge to be good; rather, he is making the stronger
claim that desiring, longing, wishing--call it what you
that the thing longed for is good.
Now while it may seem plausible (at least to some)
that desire is a judgment, it is disputable that the judg-
ment in question must be to the effect that something is
good. It is certainly true that in many cases when I
desire something I judge it to be good. If l desire a
piece of chocolate candy, for example, then quite clearly
my desire includes the judgment that chocolate candy is
good (in some sense or way)
.
But suppose I am being held
at gunpoint and I am told, "Your money or your life." Not
being Jack Benny, I hesitate not a second. That the robber
not harm me is something I readily judge as good and
"urgently good." Thus, I want the robber to take my money;
in fact, I long for it. But is my desire that the robber
take my money something which I also judge to be good? It
seems to me it would be unusual to consider that desire--
as it stands
—
good. Yet with only a minor modification.
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it becomes reasonable to sav tha-t- -t-hi c • • oY m tn s, too, is a judgment
that the thing longed for is good.
The modification I am suggesting is called for because
of the special circumstances of the case. There is certainly
a sense in which I do not want the robber to take my money.
Yet there is also a sense in which I do desire that this
act of thievery should happen, and that is the sense in
which the theft is a necessary means "unqualified" (as Kant
would say)
. l long for the robber to take my money given
that he holds a gun to my head. in this way, my desire can
be seen to be good but with a qualification. In general, a
qualified desire might be expressed as D (q/p) , read as "the
desire for q given p. " Although I might not ordinarily
desire q, I do given the special circumstances p. Moreover,
because of these special circumstances p, my desire for q
is also the judgment that q is good, given p. So even if I
would not ordinarily judge that a robber taking my money is
something good, I would judge it to be so given the special
circumstances. And in this case, I judge that it is
urgently good, though with qualifications. Thus, Peirce's
claim that to long for anything is to judge it to be good
and urgently good passes muster with respect to the value
placed on the thing desired.
I now wish to examine more carefully Peirce's claim
that desire is a judgment, and for this, a brief digression
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into the nature of judgment is called for.
a judgment to be ’'something closely allied
Peirce considers
to assertion"
[5.29 (1903)]. As an example of an assertion. he describes
what is involved when a person gives an affidavit ("where
the assertive element is magnified").
Here a man goes before
takes such action that
evil consequences will
a notary or a magistrate and
if what he says is not true,
be visited upon him.
[5.30 (1903)]
The judgment is the act of mentally accepting a proposition
[2.309 (c. 1902)]; It is "a psychical act, which is the
most obscure of phenomena or facts" [2.309, n. 1 (c. 1902)].
Thus, when a person gives an affidavit, he is vouching for
his own acceptance of his testimony to the extent that he
will accept the unpleasant consequences if it is found that
what he ways is not true. In a similar way, a judgment is a
peculiar act of assent" [2.309 (c. 1902); Cf. 5.117 (1903)]
It expresses acceptance of, or assent to, that which is
judged. So if desire is an expression of a person's judg-
ment that some x is good, then that person has accepted the
proposition that x is good; he has the belief that x is good
And his judgment is simply the representation to himself
that he has this particular belief—one on which he is
prepared to act.^ This is the first thing, then, to be
noted about Peirce's analysis of a judgment: it is the act
of accepting a proposition. It signals to oneself (and
perhaps to others) that he or she has a certain belief.
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The second thing to notice about Peirce's account of
judgments is that he distinguishes between the mental act
of acceptance of a proposition and the proposition itself--
the object of one's acceptance. And not surprisingly,
Peirce thinks that the proposition is the more intelligible
notion of the two, affording us a better understanding of
judgments broadly construed.
To explain the judgment in terms of the "proposition"
it by that which is essentially intelli-gible. To explain the proposition in terms of thejudgment" is to explain the self-intelligible interms of a psychical act, which is the most obscure
of phenomena or facts. [2.309, n. 1 (c. 1902)]
Thus, for Peirce, a judgment broadly construed seems to
include two elements which are now generally assumed in the
philosophical literature: propositions and propositional
attitudes such as believing that, wishing that, fearing
2that, etc. Identifying the proposition itself is, as
Peirce suggests, largely unproblematic. And a "judgm.ent"
narrowly construed closely resembles the propositional
attitude insofar as it is a mental act or disposition. But
it must be remembered that, for Peirce, this mental act is
distinctively pragmaticistic
. That is, a Peircean "proposi
tional attitude" is a mental act of accepting a proposition
And given Peirce's magnified example of the affidavit,
accepting a proposition seems to be quite similar to
believing a proposition. The state of belief
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no^ ^ish satisfactory state which we dot w to avoid, or to change to a belief in anv-
not^merelv* to*^h
contrary, we cling tenaciously,y believing, but to believing iust whatwe do believe. [5.372 ( 1877 ) ] 3
^ ^
In fact, accepting a proposition is believing that proposi-
tion, and that means being prepared to act on that belief.^
I return now to Peirce's claim that desire is the
judgment that some thing is good. Given the account of
judgment I have just presented, a desire as judgment will
be the act of mentally accepting the proposition that some
X is good, and that means being prepared to act on the
belief that some x is good. Is it plausible to think of
desire as a judgment in this sense? When we desire x, do
we always mentally accept the proposition that x is good
to the extent that we are prepared to act on it? Do we
always do what we can to satisfy our desire for x? I think
not. As often as not, we curb our desires, opting to do
what is suggested by the dictates of reason. I may desire
to watch yet another viewing of Casablanca on television
tonight, but I decide to forgo that particular pleasure
and work instead. Though I have a strong desire to see
Casablanca again, it would seem I do not have a Peircean
"desire" for the simple reason that I am not willing or
prepared to act to satisfy that desire. Peirce's account
of desire as judgment, therefore, seems inadequate unless
it can accommodate the effect other desires and beliefs
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have on the particular desire in question. And it shall
become clear below that Peirce’s overall views can handle
this apparent inadequacy. Peirc(= m’TTQc-Y i^eirce gives us a more detailed
account of the nature of desire in h-iois discussion of natural
classes where he explains three features of desire:
generality, vagueness, and a "third dimension." Although
each of these features is helpful in understanding Peirce's
account of desire (and the "third dimension is specifically
helpful in accounting for the problem of conflicting
desires)
,
I am particularly interested in the feature of
desire referred to as "generality." i would now like to
examine these features with a special emphasis on the
generality of desire.
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2. Additional Features of Dpc;ir<^
In describing the way natural classes are determined,
Peirce tells us that the broadest and most fundamental
classes are defined by purpose. And purpose, he says, "is
an operative desire." He continues:
some\?n^''o? general; that is, it is alwayskind f thing or event which is desired* atleast, until the element of will, which is always
exercised upon an individual object upon an individual
occasion, becomes so predominant as to overrule thegeneralizing character of desire. Thus, desires
create classes, and extremely broad classes. Butdesires become, in the pursuit of them, more specific.
[1.205 (1902)]
A desire, according to Peirce, is always general insofar as
it is always some kind of thing or event which is desired.
When a desire gives way to a volitional act (which is
always exercised upon an individual object upon an indivi-
dual occasion)
,
it is no longer general. But the desire
does not at that moment "become particular"; rather, it is
no longer operative, though some other desire may be. And
even though an object of desire may become more specific
"in the pursuit" of it, it is still general as long as it
is an object of desire. Peirce's example is helpful here.
Suppose we desire economical illumination. We may
satisfy that desire in several different ways: through
the use of combustion, electricity, or phosphorescence.
And if we choose either of the first two methods, we must
again decide between more specific ways of satisfying the
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desire. Through it all, the object of desire is general
(though it has become more specific), and it has not given
way to an act of volition. Thus, for Peirce, an operative
desire is always general, i shall examine this feature of
desire in greater detail below.
But now it might be thought that a judgment of desire
IS not the same as an operative desire, for Peirce used the
notion of a purpose as an operative desire in order to show
how natural classes evolve. In saying that purpose "is an
operative desire," Peirce seems to be referring only to an
endeavor toward habit-taking— a theme prominent in the
Lamarckian theory of evolution which he, in part, adopts
[6. 299ff (1893) ] . For Peirce, the operative desire repre—
ss^ts the strain of agapasm—evolution by creative love
—
which, together with synechism (continuity) and tychism
(chance)
,
explains the evolution of a world of order and
variety. On the face of it, this does not seem to be the
sort of thing one ordinarily thinks of when considering the
judgment of desire. So if there are two different notions
of desire at work here, then it may be that the judgment of
desire is not something general after all.
I believe that Peirce's notion of an operative desire
is applicable both to the formation of natural classes and
to judgments of desire. This seems quite clear from the
analogy he continues to draw between desire as it operates
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in humans and desire eo t
-
t-as it operates in nature. Peirce
explains vagueness
— the semnrq -p
°f desire-by saying
and different individuals may satisfy the same
type of desire in different ways in •y • I this sense desire is
vague. Peirce concludes:
dividual,' and^prLticalL^^t^?!^'^
number of individuals- ^ larae
Nature's ways with ours, sh^seems^to'^L''^''
compare
given to varietv than wL mu , ^
very different on their subjecUv^side^^rfpurposes of classification ^hey IL'eguivaLnt?"
[ 1.206 ( 1902 )]
The type of desire operative in nature is equivalent to
the type of desire operative in individuals insofar as
both are vague. And vagueness is a feature which is
"closely connected with the fact that every desire is
general" [ Ibid
. ]
.
The remaining feature of desire which Peirce dis-
cusses is also closely related to the feature of generality
Peirce refers to it as the "third dimension"; I would
call It the feature of being subject to compromise, for
it addresses the need we often have for choosing between
(or among) conflicting desires. His example makes this
clear
.
A brighter lamp than what I use would perhaps bemore agreeable to my eyes; but it would be less
so to my pocket, to my lungs, and to my sense ofheat. Accordingly, a compromise is struck; and
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the result is that'^the'^obi^'^t^'^ somewhat vague,
about certain middling quaU^Lf clusterthis way, some that way ^les, some being removed
tributions will characL^i^e-purposivfcL'sses"
[ 1.207 ( 1902 )]
This amounts to Peirce's acknowledgment that in nature, as
in the actions of men, a compromise of desires is called
for in order to achieve the "best possible world."
mo;t-p:rfect?y":at?s?y'a"dLirf\:[ a"sif T'®""
will^be ?ar be^te?"
to^ general, when a state is not
that sLtrthfLiter! " U?!o7^ ®PP'^°^’=hes
I conclude that throughout Peirce's discussion of
the operative desire which determines natural classes, an
analogy is drawn from the way in which desires as judgments
operate. There is no attempt to soften the analogy; on the
contrary, as far as the features of desire are concerned,
there are no differences between the two. And it is telling
to note that in each case, Peirce relies on an example of
a feature of desire as judgment in order to explain that
particular feature of desire as it operates in nature, and
not the other way around. An operative desire is an
important force for Peirce—both in nature and in the
actions of men. Thus, desire of either type would seem
to have the three features of generality, vagueness, and
a third dimension (being subject to compromise)
. In
addition, in a lengthy account of the generality of
Ill
Thirdness, we are treated both to a defense of desire as
something general and to an explanation of desire as
Third. I now wish to comment more fully on these two
aspects of desire.
a
3 • Desire As Something General
In his early writings on the category of Thirdness,
Peirce examines the idea of generality in terms of the
nature of desire, specifically, the desire for something
which will give pleasure: the baking and eating of an
apple pie. He says:
Now, observe that we seldom, probably never, desire
a single thing. What we want is something which
shall produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind.To speak of a single individual pleasure is to use
words without meaning. We may have a single
experience of pleasure; but the pleasure itself is
a quality. Experiences are single; but qualities,
however, specialized, cannot be enumerated.
[1.341 (c. 1895)]
We desire something which is general— something which will
produce a certain pleasure of a certain kind. It is
"always some kind of thing or event which is desired" [1.205
(1902) ]
,
though my experience of desiring or my experience
of having some pleasure is something sincrular.
Further, when Peirce asserts here that "qualities,
however specialized, cannot be enumerated," he is not
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speaking about the vagueness
being subject to compromise,
the point that an object of
other than something of a
of a desire nor about its
Rather, he is driving home
desire as a quality can never
certain kind. His example:
to me r metals well known^ ^^"^ember to have examined lumps of those
the limitation of experiencewhrch attaches that number; there is simply nren^tS
an
qualities 1 can imagine. /cL imagLf
c^DDer anrf =
^ between tin and lead, or betLenopp d silver, or between iron and nickel, orbetween magnesium and aluminum. An apple pie, thenIS desired.
.
. [1.341 (c. 1895)]
Peirce has introduced this example to show the general
nature of any quality. But even though there are infinite
varieties of qualities between any two of the metals he
has mentioned, it seems to me that this alone is not
sufficient to show that any particular metallic quality
which is desired is general. For instance, it seems quite
plausible that a person specifies the form, amount, and
degree of purity of the tin he desires. And in that case,
the object of desire would seem to be something quite
specific and not general at all. Not so, according to
Peirce, and I believe his reasoning rests ultimately on
pragmaticis tic grounds of the following sort.
Between any two qualities of metals, there will be an
infinite variety of other qualities. Should I desire, for
example, a sample of tin, with all the specifications as
given above, my desire is for something that looks like tin.
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feels like tin and, in short, behaves like tin. Further-
more, it is a desire for a .etal of a certain form, amount,
and degree of purity. Pragmaticistically speaking, 1
desire something which will be indistinguishable from tin
and which will meet the requirements I have specified.
What I want is something which will behave in every way
as I expect tin to behave. since there are many metallic
qualities which closely approximate tin insofar as they
behave like tin, it is reasonable to maintain that what I
desire is something of a certain kind-no matter how
specific the object of my desire may be. I believe that
this pragmaticistic interpretation of the general nature
of an object of desire-a quality-is the most plausible
one to attribute to Peirce's enigmatic example from
metallurgy
.
In a similar way, the desire for an apple pie is also
a desire for something general— no matter how specific one
is about the type of pie desired.
An apple pie, then, is desired— a good apple pie,
made of fresh apples, with a crust moderately light
and somewhat short, neither too sweet nor too sour,
etc. But it is not any particular apple pie; for
it is to be made for the occasion; and the only
particularity about it is that it is to be made
and eaten today. [1.34 (c. 1895)]
The cook must choose some applies, but "as long as they
are sound and fine, any apples will do" [ Ibid . ] . Again,
the object of her desire is general until it gives way to
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a volitional act on her nart- ^ •p , until, that is, she takes
some particular apples,
what she
apple. From the nature of thina^^
the quality but must tLft^^pIrhcuLf^h?"
a?L1^rofac‘^Io^-and
irrl?;terL"qu:“tiel"°u:?IiV^895n^^
The cook's desire to select good apples for the pie is the
desire for something of a given quality. However, what
she finally selects are particular apples, for "she cannot
take the quality but must take the particular thing."
In terms of my earlier discussion of desire as judgment,
the general quality of desire is represented by the proposi-
tional object. The object of the cook's desire is a general
quality; the object of any desire is, according to Peirce,
a general quality. For example, suppose I desire that the
talks in Geneva are successful. Then the propositional
object, that the talks in Geneva are successful
, represents
the general quality desired since there are many different
ways in which the talks may be successful, with varying
degrees of specificity. This example lends support to the
notion that desire or, more precisely, the object of desire
is general.
But what about a harder test case? Suppose I wish
that the clerk standing before me in Vessey's Drugstore
115
1^1 to me, right now, tj^iue ballpoint pen T .
5!yjHnd. is this propositional object simply a general
quality? Surely, my object of desire has become more
specific "in the pursuit of it." Whereas before 1 was
uncertain about what 1 wanted in the way of a pen, I now
know Which pen 1 want, the color, style, etc. And I know
when, where, and from whom 1 want to purchase it. Is there
anything about this desire which is general, or does this
example show that there are particular things we desire
after all? i believe Peirce can consistently maintain
that we "probably never desire a single individual thing,"
even when the desire in question is quite specific and,
hence, something more complicated than the desire for a
metal sample.
The desire I am now considering is that the clerk
standing before me in Vessey's Drugstore sell to me, right
now, the blue ballpoint pen I have in my hand. Although
this might appear to be a desire which lacks generality as
I have explained it, it is actually as general as the desire
I have that the talks in Geneva are successful. What I
desire now, however, is a pen which, for all practical
purposes, is indistinguishable from the one I am holding
in my hand. And barring some extraordinary circumstances,
another clerk selling me either the pen I am holding or "an
identical" pen on the shelf would quite probably satisfy my
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desire. I desire something general-" something of a given
quality." Inelegantly expressed, I desire that someone
who, for all practical purposes, is like the clerk in front
of me in Vessey’s Drugstore, sell to me, for all practical
purposes, right now, something which, for all practical
purposes, is like the blue ballpoint pen in my hand. For
Peirce, "it is always some 1^ of thing or event which is
desired" and, as I have argued, this is best fleshed out
in terms of his pragmaticism.
There is, however, a related aspect of the qualitative
nature of the object of desire which warrants comment.
Peirce tells us that desire "is an idea bout an idea" [1.341
(c. 1895)]. Here, the first 'idea' refers to the proposi-
tional attitude of desiring; the second, to the proposi-
tional object.^ In the sense that this object is an idea,
it is always something general. Notice, though, that it
seems odd, indeed, to say that we desire some idea. Yet
that IS what we seem to get with this notion that desire
is an idea about an idea. The oddity, however, is one of
linguistic usage rather than substance, for even though
the propositional object of a desire is characterized here
as an idea, it does not follow that what is desired is an
idea. The notion of a desired thing and the notion of a
propositional object can be related in the following way:
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If I desare 4,, then the (propositional) object of my desire
is the idea of 4. What I desire is still general, it is
still some 4. or other. The propositional object merely
expresses this generality-as the idea of 4 . I repeat a
point made earlier: what I desire is something of a certain
kind, no matter how specific the object of my desire may be.
It is something which, for all practical purposes, behaves
as we would expect the object of our desire to behave.
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^ • Desire As a Third
I have concentrated thnc ^/ nus far, on the general nature
object of desire Rn4- -ia . But Peirce also treats desire as
a whole, considering the attitude of desire together with
the object of desire. As I have pointed out, considered
as the object of desire,
?hing® it iran reference to a particular
Of i i^ea, namely, the idea
master
it would be for me, the cook's, to eat an apple pie. [1.341 (c. 1895)]
But the object of desire together with the propositional
attitude of desire must be treated differently. Peirce
continues
:
aSaTTtv'
desired is not a mere unattachedqu li y, what is desired is that the dream of eatingan apple pie should be realized in Me; and this MeIS an object of experience. So with the cook'sdesire. She has no particular apple pie she parti-ularly prefers to serve; but she does desire andintend to serve an apple pie to a particular person.
[Ibid.
]
Here we find Peirce pulling together the object of desire
and the attitude of desiring, combining them in a way which
more accurately captures what one means when speaking of
desire. Understood as both object and attitude, desire
includes an element of particularity which an object of
desire considered alone and as something general can never
have. Moreover, the attitude of desire introduces an element
of Thirdness and this, again, is something which an object
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of desire considered alone does not involve.
itself has no prominent Thirdness- it ic
is a second But th^ a ®=<Perience as a reality
one to the ithe^fif| ^ - --ch the
[1.341 (c. 1895)]
Allow me to elaborate.
The propositional attitude of desire plays the role of
a Third or a medium. it seeks to attach a First-a general
quality or "dream," to use Peirce alternative expression
to a Second a particular object of experience. The
actual desire that x, then, is the attitude of desiring
that X (a First) is actually realized for some object of
experience (a Second)
. And in this context, desire is a
Third. To repeat:
desired is not a mere unattached quality;what IS desired is that the dream of eating an applepie should be realized in Me; and this Me is an obiectof experience. [1.341 (c. 1895)]
Using Peirce's dream of eating an apple pie, we can schema-
tize the elements of desire in the following way:
Third First
This Desire = Desiring that [ ( the dream of eating an
apple pie ) is realized in (me)
]
I
Second
Notice here that the attitude of desiring involves a
First, but is not itself a First. It involves a First inas-
much as one wishes that his dream or idea (a First) is
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realized in (or satisfied by) some particular object of
experience (a Second)
.
So it is with any law of nature. Were it but a
affdef nature Sf
which it"iLT ® The cases ton I applies are seconds. [1.341 (c. 1895)]
But as a medium between a First and a Second, desire is a
Third. True, Peirce often speaks as though desire just is
the general idea or dream. But once the two aspects of
desire-the propositional attitude and the propositional
object— are distinguished, it is clear that desire as a
relational notion is always a Third. And it is, of course,
desire in this sense which is of immediate relevance for
understanding desire as a motive for action.
I have claimed that Peirce speaks about desire both
as a propositional object and as an attitude including a
propositional object. Unfortunately for his readers,
Peirce does not always keep these two aspects of desire
distinct. I have also argued that the object of desire is
always general and, according to Peirce, a First. But I
now wish to point out that desire considered as an attitude
and including its object is also general. Desire, in this
sense, is a Third and, hence, general. Thus, when Peirce
says generality is an idea of Thirdness [1.340 (c. 1895)]
and then illustrates this by using the particular relation
of desiring, one should be alert to the fact that desiring
121
is general on two
is general and the
general. Thirdnes
scores: the object of desire as an idea
attitude of desiring as a medium is
s is general; desire is doubly so.
Belief, Desire, and Volition
Having distinguished the propositional object of
desire from the propositional attitude of desire, it is
clear that it is the latter which will function, in some
way, as a motive for action. But as I argued in Chapter I,
beliefs also move us to act in the sense that they are
causal factors of our actions and dispositions to act. How,
then, are desires, beliefs, and actions related? Further-
more, there are motives for action other than desires. How,
on the Peircean account, are these related to desire, if at
all? If we are to understand how one is moved to act, these
are questions which demand answers. In addressing these
points, I propose to look first at desire as a motive for
action, and then to consider other motives and their rela-
tionship to desire and to action.
Recall now that I began this chapter by referring to
some of the very few things Peirce had to say on the triad
of belief, motives, and action. Among them, there was the
following passage:
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M03.ritirn0 . do not toTTro-h
equivalent to or -i
^ that every conjecture is
tLt having ^ certain = ^
it if one
=ouirpelllr"l“L?a"L"l?^| accomplish
[ 5.480 ( 1906 )]
Never short of examples,
illustrating just what he
Peirce comes through once again,
means in this passage. He com-
that It IS quite likely a man living long ago would
have been asked at some time by his son whether the sun
that rises in the morning is the same as the one which set
the previous evening. Our sage of old can then be Imagined
to have replied:
I do not know, my boy; but I think that if l couldput my brand on the evening sun, I should be ableto see It on the morning sun again.
[ 5.480 ( 1906 )]
If he could brand the evening sun, our primitive man would
expect to see that brand on the morning sun. Here we see
again the expectative quality of a belief— in this case,
the belief that the morning sun is the same as the evening
sun. (For simplicity, I shall refer to these as the Evening
Sun and the Morning Sun, knowing full well that I am en-
croaching on Quine's skies.) But now recall that two key
elements of Peirce's notion of a practical belief are
deliberation and desire. In Chapter I, my attention was
drawn to an analysis of the deliberation which necessarily
precedes a deliberate action. And at that point, it seemed
fitting to postpone a detailed examination of desire as it
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related to belief and action- at th.'or , is point in my discus-
sion, such an examination is paramount.^
So let us look once again at the case of the primitive
astronomer. what would his motivating desire beP Poliowing
the form I suggested earlier, one can schematize his desire
in the following way:
His Desire
— [ ( the idea of deterini nH nr.
Morning Sun is the eame
the Evening Sun) is realized in ( the
Morning Sun having his brand on it
)
)
Here again. desire would act as a medium between an idea
and a particular object of experience;
a Second. As a motive for action, the
between a First and
primitive astronomer
would want to have his idea or dream of determining whether
the Morning Sun is the same as the Evening Sun realized,
or satisfied, by the Morning Sun having his brand on it.
If our primitive star gazer had such a desire and were to
act deliberately on his desire and belief, then he would
put his brand on the Evening Sun if he could. Clearly,
acting deliberately on a desire presupposes that there is
a desire. Thus, a desire is necessary for deliberate action
to occur. Furthermore, if one were to act deliberately on
a desire, then he would often act in a certain way only if
he could act in that way. (Any astronomer--ancient or
modern would reach a mind-boggling impasse were he to try
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to put his mark on the sun!)
Using the Morning Sun/Evening Sun example, the rela-
tionship between having a practical belief, desiring to see
an object of desire satisfied or realised, deliberating
about future actions, and a subsequent deliberation action
can be recast in the following way:
To say that a person has the belief that the Morning
Sun is the same as the Evening Sun "is to say no more
nor less than" if (i) a person were to desire to see
his brand on the Morning Sun, and if (ii) he were to
deliberate about his future actions, then (iii) he
would usually act in a certain deliberate way, i.e.,
he would put his brand on the Evening Sun if he could.
Assuming conditions (i) and (ii) are met, then we can
expect that (iii) would follow.
There is, however, one further stipulation which
should be made, one which I mentioned briefly in Chapter I,
that is the desire in question cannot be overridden by
some other conflicting desire. In general, if an agent's
desire, d^^, conflicts with his desire, d2» we cannot con-
clude that he will act on d^ rather than on d2* Here,
that feature of desire known as the "third dimension"
—
being subject to compromise—would come into play. Given
the conflicting desires, one will (ideally) opt to act on
that desire which will result in the best possible results.
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In "The Fixation of • >-i^eiiet, Peirce gives us yet
another apt example of the •f rn triadic relationship of belief,
desire, and action:
Our beliefs guide our desirec;
The assassinc: nv i ^^^s and shape our actions.
Mountain!^;sed°L^°isrin?o°L“h
mand, because they believed that obedience^to hi^
^hlf tterwouirnorh"® Had they doubtedrnis, ney ld t have acted as they did.
[5.371 (1877)]
The actuating desire of these assassins would be their
desire that their dream of eternal happiness might be ful-
filled in them. The belief on which they are prepared to
act IS the belief that obedience to the Old Man of the
Mountain will insure eternal happiness. There is a signi-
ficant difference between this and the earlier example,
however. Whereas our ancient astronomer could not act
deliberately on his belief and desire, the eager assassins
could and did act on their shared belief and desire. With
the pondering sage of old, a readiness to act could not
give way to the expected action of branding the Evening
Sun, even assuming the requisite desire was present.
How, one might ask at this point, is desire a "cause,
not effect, of effort" [5.486 (1906)]. As was the case
'^ith the astronomer of old, we often cannot act on our
beliefs and desires due to physical limitations. Moreover,
of the desires we could act on, many are subject to com-
promise: when two desires conflict, we cannot act on both.
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Fortunately, perhaps, for us, our desires do not come neatly
isolated from each other or from the array of beliefs we
hold. And in discussing the reasoning process which pre-
cedes a decision to act or not to act, Aune points out that
"I might decide not to
sophisticated reasons."
give in to my desire for remarkably
7
In what sense, then, can we say
that desires cause us to act?
In order to give a Peircean answer to this question,
I return once again to Peirce's notion of what it means to
say someone believes something. Having a belief means that
If one were to desire something pertinent to the belief
(= proposition believed), and were to deliberate concerning
his future actions, then that person would often act in a
certain way. Moving from the subjunctive conditional
language of the meaning of a belief to the non-conditional
language of actions, the following can be said: Given that
a person does have a desire pertinent to one of his beliefs,
and does deliberate about his future actions, then that
person will quite probably act in a certain way. To use a
specific example here, suppose that Peirce's cook does
believe that certain apples will be good in an apple pie.
Given that she does desire to make a pie of those apples
and that she does deliberate about what she will do, then
quite probably she will pare, core, and slice those apples.
One could say that she will be acting here on her desire
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and her belief.
But as I pointed out earlier, insofar as desire is
P tive in nature, it is an endeavor toward habi t-taking
;
a tendency to take on habits. And I claimed that desire al
judgment is regarded by Peirce in the same way as desire as
it operates in nature. So if desire is thought of by
Peirce as an endeavor toward habit-taking
, desire— as cause
of effort— is, perhaps, best conceived of as a cause of
one's disposition to act. And in this way desires would
seem to mimic the causal efficacy of beliefs: just as a
belief IS a cause of my being prepared to act in a certain
way whenever a certain occasion arises, so also a desire
puts one into the "ready position" to act in a certain way
whenever a certain occasion arises. They are, in this
respect, on a par with each other: both beliefs and desires
are direct causes of one's disposition to act. Moreover,
just as beliefs may indirectly cause us to act, desires are
also indirect causes of actions: they will affect the
causal order in virtue of the habits they produce. So if a
disposition is directly caused by one's beliefs and desire,
then the actions which are directly affected by one's
disposition will be indirectly affected by one's beliefs
and desires.
But there is still another way to view the "causal"
link between desires and actions. The deliberation process
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Which precedes any deliberate action will take into account
how a person can best satisfy his desires. We weigh con-
flicting desires and decide on that course of action which
we believe will help us to satisfy the desire (s) we ulti-
mately wish to see realized. m this way, desires will
directly influence the deliberation which precedes a
deliberate action, though they will only indirectly in-
fluence the action itself. So once again, desires may be
understood as indirect causes of those actions which result
from deliberation. And in this limited way, Peirce would
agree with Aune's view that "Typically, desire moves us to
act only indirectly; it does this by conditioning the
thought that directly moves us to act."^
Thus far, I have considered only desire as a motive
for action. But Peirce does not hold that this is the only
motive one can have which will affect one's disposition to
act. In a review of Karl Pearson's The Grammar of Science
,
Peirce lists a variety of ethical motives "ordered as to
bring into view the various degrees of generality of
motives." The list is extension and so I will pick out
only a few in order to convey a sense of the plurality of
motives for Peirce. Among the motives he gives the follow-
ing in order of generality:
A man may act with reference to the momentary occasion,
either from unrestrained desire, or from preference
for one desideratum over another ... or from dread
of blame ... or according to some general rule
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of pleasure^° or^ bec^^^' pursuit
before action, t
^
a^vfnt^.^ro? Ms
etermined to do nothing not pronounced reasonable
thaf\hl' be filled with the idea
as ultiL?e is^'Sari?^®'' reasonably be admitted
whioh th t living reason for the sake ofc the psychical and physical universe is inprocess of creation (religionism). [8.138 (1901)]
This IS one way of categorizing ethical motives, but there
are others which he considers. For example, they can also
be categorized
. . .according to the degree in which immediate
them, from unrestrained
for
desire present but restrained, actiont self, action for pleasure generalized beyondseit
. . . to such motives as direct obedience, pan-cratism, religionism, in which the element of self-teeling is reduced to a minimum. [8.139 (1901)]
Now one thing which cannot go unnoticed in both these
listings is the gradual move away from unrestrained desire
toward something which involves the generality of rationality
(in the case of the listing according to generality) and
toward a consciousness of otherness (in the case of the
listing according to the immediateness of feelings)
. The
motive of desire is succeeded in these categorizations by
motives which involve higher degrees of reasoning or
objectivity, so that it might seem as if desire need not
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be present at all in motivating one towards action. But I
would argue that this is not guite Peirce's view. Although
there are other motives for action-a rich variety of them,
in fact desire must still be counted among the motives of
any action. In fact, these other motives often present
themselves as beliefs or reasons for acting and, in this
sense, they are quite different from any desire. Yet is is
from these motivating reasons that the requisite motivating
desire stems. I look to Peirce for support of this view.
And once again, Peirce is Johnny-on-the-spot with a
helpful example. In disputing Pearson's claim that a desire
for social stability (mingled perhaps with utilitarian con-
siderations) is the sole motivation of human actions, Peirce
outlines the motives he believes underlie a scientist's
labors. It is, he tells us, an appreciation for the ongoing
pursuit of truth, for the contribution he can make to the
foundations of knowledge, which urge on the man of science.
As Peirce puts it:
He is keenly aware of his own ignorance, and knows
that personally he can make but small steps in
discovery. Yet, small as they are, he deems them
precious; and he hopes that by conscientiously
pursuing the methods of science he may erect a
foundation upon which his successors may climb
higher
. This, for him, is what makes life worth
living and what makes the human race worth perpe-
tuation . The very being of law, general truth,
reason--call it what you will--consists in its
expressing itself in a cosmos and in intellects
which reflect it, and in doing this progressively;
and that which makes progressive creation worth
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feel-is precisely
o^wMcr-; taLs^pIace!
[8.136 (1901); my underscore]
It IS his respect for reason, law, or the general
truth which urges the researcher in his investigations.
And his desires spring from these beliefs. In one of
his drafts of the Pearson review, Peirce spells out the
distinction between motivating reasons and motivating
desire, though admittedly, he does not refer to them in
this way.
It IS not too much to say that he [the scientist]
worships the divine majesty of the power of reason-
ableness behind the fact. From that sentiment
springs h is ardent desire to further the discovery
of truth
. If he cannot discover it himself, he
wishes to lay a sure foundation from which some
successor may come to the truth
.
[8.136, n. 3 (1901) ; my underscore]
So even here, where the motivating reasons are as general
and as other-oriented as the respect for "reasonableness
behind the fact," there are still motivating desires
which spur the scientist on to discover the truth. His
beliefs about the nature of the scientific enterprise,
his thoughts about his role in the pursuit of truth, and
the value he places on truth itself serve as a guide for
him in determining what it is he wants to accomplish.
And, according to the Peircean story, these motivating
reasons or beliefs together with the belief-inspired
desires will shape his actions. Thus, Peirce's view that
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there is a plurality of motives for human action is per-
fectly consistent with his view that desires move us to
act. And furthermore, although there may be other motives
operating, desire as a Third is still a necessary condition
for deliberate action to occur. As an operative force in
nature, desire is an important aspect of Peirce's philo-
sophical views concerning natural classes; as a motive
for deliberate action, desire is of equal importance in
a Peircean theory of action.
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6 • Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I have examined the sort of thing
Peirce considers a motive for deliberate action. I began
by considering Peirce's view that desire is the judgment
that something is good. l then argued that as far as the
three features of desire are concerned, desire as judgment
IS the same as the operative desire which determines
natural classes. I spent some time examining the feature
of generality, and I claimed that, for Peirce, any particu-
larity attributable to desire stems from its being a Third.
An understanding of desire as a motive for action is ham-
pered by Peirce's use of the term 'desire' to refer both to
the object of desire (the propositional object) and to the
attitude of desiring together with its object. It is this
latter use, however, which invites an understanding of de-
sire as a Third. And as I suggested, it is desire as a
Third which is a motive for action. Finally, I considered
the motive of desire as it relates to belief and action. I
suggested two ways in which desire might be thought of as
cause: as is the case with a belief, a desire is a cause of
one's disposition to act and it is a causal influence on the
deliberation which precedes action. And although we may act
deliberately from a variety of reasons, the desire that
one's dream may be realized in some object of experience is
still a necessary condition for acting deliberately.
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NOTES
See Chapter I, Section 1. Also, Peirce says:
The actual calling to mind of the substance of a
annd^o^
as personal to ourselves, but as holdinggoo r true, is a judgment. [4.53 (1893)]
A belief need not be consciou
nized, the act of recognition
a judgment, although this is
psychology. [2.148 (1903)]
s. When it is recog-
is called by logicians
properly a term of
Quine, Willard Van Orman, Word and Object (Massachu-
setts: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), p. 150.
3
I would like to note here that in this passage Peirce
is contrasting the state of belief with that of doubt. And
by contrast, "Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state
from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the
state of belief" [5.372]. Seen from this perspective, it
is, perhaps more understandable why Peirce would view belief
as a "calm and satisfactory state." Apart from such a con-
trast, however, it is difficult to make sense of the notion
that believing something necessarily involves such a state.
If I believe, for example, that I will miss an important
dissertation deadline, it is unlikely that I would charac-
terize my state as calm and satisfactory. Surely other
variables, such as the believer's nature and the subject
and circumstances of the belief, will determine whether
one's state of belief is calm and satisfactory.
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4
^By saying desire is a judgment that something is
good, Peirce is not suggesting that it is an attitude
similar to Donald Davidson's "pro-attitude." Davidson
iriclud0 s undsir pro—attitud6s
. . . esires, wantings, urges, promptings, and agrea variety of moral views, aesthetic principles,
economic prejudices, social conventions, and publicand private goals and values in so far as these can beinterpreted as attitudes of an agent directed towardac ions o ^a certain kind. [Essays on Actions andEvents (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 4]
For Peirce, a desire has a distinctively pragmaticistic
coloring
.
In distancing himself from Hume's view that "desire
is a direct passion," Bruce Aune points out that
. . . many desires seem to be far more intellectual
than a mere feeling, involving the idea of a friend's
happiness or the end of a brutal war. [Reason and
Action (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co..
1977 ) , p. 56]
Aune s claim that desires "involve" ideas seems to capture
Peirce's notion of desire as an "idea about an idea," and
his examples seem to support this: 'Would that Mary were
happy' or 'I want the war to end' [ Ibid . ]
.
In Chapter I, I determined that insofar as a
theoretical belief "can eventually go to the determination
of a practical belief" and involves expectation, it bears
a striking resemblance to a practical belief. In fact,
theoretical beliefs are, practically speaking.
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indistinguishable fro,n practical beliefs
the present discussion, then, I „in ^ot
between the two types of belief.
For purposes
differentiate
of
”^Aune, p. 57.
, p. 58.
Chapter IV
acting intentionally and acting freely
seems almost a truism to say that one cannot act
from any motive unless one intends to and, further, one
cannot act deliberately unless one intends to do what one
does. Both acting from some motive and acting deliberately
seem to involve acting intentionally— acting to some
purpose. Also, as I suggested in the last chapter, a person
may have the relevant belief on which he is prepared to act,
as well as a motivating desire (and intention to act), and
yet not be able to act. Being free to act seems to be
another condition necessary for a deliberate act to take
place. So in order to complete my examination of Peirce's
theory of action, I would like to consider these two addi-
tional features of a deliberate act: acting intentionally
and acting freely. I have briefly touched on each of
these topics in earlier chapters; I would now like to
examine them more fully. I shall do this by presenting
Peirce's distinction between mechanical actions and de-
liberate actions, and by examining the relationship between
desiring and intending in deliberate actions. I shall then
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discuss what it means to be externally free to act and, more
interestingly, what it means, according to Peirce, to be
internally free to act. I believe this will tie off the
loose ends of a Peircean theory of action.
^ * Mechanical Action and Deliberate Actions
In Chapter I, l pointed out Peirce's distinction
between "purely mechanical actions" and "action governed
by reason." What makes an action something other than a
purely mechanical occurrence is a certain action of the
mind an agent's intentions, or his "act of intending."
The two examples Pierce gives of the distinction illustrate
quite clearly just what he has in mind. In the first
example
,
A man gives a brooch to his wife. The merely mechani-
cal part of the act consists in his laying the brooch
down while uttering certain sounds, and her taking it
up. There is no genuine triplicity here; but there
is not giving, either. The giving consists in his
agreeing that a certain intellectual principle shall
govern the relations of the brooch to his wife.
And the second example:
The merchant in the Arabian Nights threw away a
datestone which struck the eye of a Jinnee. This
was purely mechanical, and there was no genuine
triplicity. The throwing and the striking were in-
dependent of one another. But had it aimed at the
Jinnee's eye, there would have been more than merely
throwing away the stone. There would have been
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The merchant throws the stone away. The husband places a
brooch in front of his wife while uttering some words, and
she picks it up. Neither of these actions is an instance
of a genuine triad; they are simply actions which "take
place between pairs of particles" [2.86 (1902)]. They are
mechanical, lacking some third "object" which would connect
the pairs. "A Rational Thirdness
. . . consists in A and B
being really paired by virtue of a third object, C" [2.86
(1902)]. This is the Thirdness that, I argued, desire
exhibits. A mechanical action, then, could never be a
genuine triad for there is no purpose or intentionality
on the part of the agent which would mediate between the
pairs of objects. Since a mechanical action lacks purpose
and intentionality, it could never be a deliberate action,
for, as I argued in Chapter I, if a person were to act de-
liberately, then (among other things) he would have to
attend to his present intentions and purposes.
Every deliberate act, on the other hand, is a genuine
triad since it involves the purpose and intention of the
agent. The merchant aims the stone at the genie, and the
action is intentional, deliberate. The husband gives the
brooch to his wife, and again, the action is intentional
or deliberate. Another example which Peirce gives is the
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intentionality involved in making a contract.
Now let us consider th<^ ^
with C. To c;;,v A triad, A makes a contract
sianc5 +-hQ
^ that A signs the document D and C
S"
“-Hi-"”
Intention and its correlative notions of aims, ends, and
purposes signal action governed by reason as opposed to a
purely mechanical action; it signals a deliberate action-
a genuine triad. it is this feature of deliberate actions
which prompts Peirce to remark that
*1
I-
category of thought, representation, triadicrelation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness assucn IS an essential ingredient of reality.
[5.436 (1905)]
Elsewhere, Peirce tells us that "purposive action must
be action virtually directed toward the removal of stimula-
tion" [5.561 (c. 1906)]. And he spells out the connection
between the meaning of an action and its aim or purpose:
.
_
. . if the meaning of a symbol consists in how it
might cause us to act, it is plain that this ''Tiow"
cannot refer to the description of mechanical motions
that it might cause, but must intend to refer to adescription of the action as having this or that aim.
(5.135 (1903)]
One cannot give something to another person without having
the purpose of giving in mind. Thus, deliberate action
(action governed by reason; purposive action) is action done
with some purpose in mind. Put more strongly, intentionality
is a necessary condition for acting deliberately.
141
^ * Desiring and Intending
Within a Peircean framework, desiring and intending
have at least two things in conmon: they are both instances
of Thirds and they are both necessary for deliberate action
to occur. How, then, might the activities of desiring and
intending be related, if at all? The question is not an
idle one. without the additional concern of placing things
in Peircean categories, the relationship between desire and
intentions has spawned heated philosophical debate.^
Borrowing from that debate, I propose to give a Peircean
view of this relationship by addressing the following
questions: (1) Does desire entail intention? and (2) Does
intention entail desire? In the usual philosophical debate
on the matter, the first question might never arise. But
both questions are relevant for Peirce, given his phenomeno-
logical analysis of desire. To Peircean answers I now turn.
(a) Does desire entail intention ?
As might be expected, the answer to (1) , "Does desire
entail intention? can be readily given. Although Peirce
seems to merge desire with intentions in his pie baking
3
example, the two ought to be differentiated. Both are
elements of Thirdness, true, and both are necessary for
deliberate actions. But for all that, desire does not
entail intention. The partition I am suggesting is easily
seen by way of an example.
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Suppose that our fictional merchant actually desires to
strike the genie with a stone. His desire can be expressed
desire
_
that hi s dream of striking the genie's eyp
will be realized
_
in the s tone hitting the genie's eve . Now
It seems perfectly reasonable to suppose that, although our
Arabian friend has this desire, he may never have the in-
tention of striking the genie's eye. The desire is there,
but he has no intention of acting on that desire. Whatever
his reasons are, he has decided to forgo acting on this
particular desire.
Suppose, however, that the merchant does, in fact, in-
tend to strike the genie and he is successful. Then it
seems quite clear that this action— the striking of the
genie's eye--is intentional and, moreover, the intention-
^^^by extends to at least one other act— the aiming of the
stone at the genie's eye. This can be displayed in the
following way, using the symbolism:
^
= the merchant
a = his wish to strike the genie's eye with a stone
b = striking/strikes the genie's eye with a stone
c = aims the stone at the genie's eye
S desires that a will be realized in b.
^
does b for some purpose x.
^
does c for the purpose of b.
Then
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Thus, S does both b and c intentionally. The merchant
intends to strike the eye of the genie with a stone for
some purpose unknown to us, and he intends to aim the stone
at the genie's eye for the purpose of striking the genie.
Both of these actions would seem to involve acting on a
desire, in fact, the same desire. But the relevant point
here is that the intentionality of the merchant's deliberate
actions stems from his desire, as well as from his beliefs.
So while desire does not entail intention, it is, in part,
from desire that intentions spring.
At this point, one might ask whether the action of
aiming the stone at the genie can be analyzed in a way
similar to the action of striking the genie's eye with a
stone. And the answer to that, on first glance, would seem
to be yes. Starting afresh, then, suppose the merchant
wishes to aim the stone at the genie. His desire can be
expressed as the desire that his wish to aim the stone at
the genie s eye is realized in his aiming the stone at the
genie . Keeping the old symbolism, but adding to it, we
have
:
d = his wish to aim the stone at the genie's eye
e = aiming/aims the stone at the genie's eye
£ = contracts certain eye and arm muscles
Then
S desires that d will be realized in e.
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S does e for the purpose of b.
S does f for the purpose of e.
Once again, it appears that there are two actions (though
there certainly may be more) which stem from the initial
desire, both of them being performed intentionally: aiming
the stone at the genie’s eye for the purpose of striking
his eye, and contracting certain eye and arm muscles for
the purpose of aiming the stone at the genie's eye. In
general, it would seem that two or more different actions
(not the same action under different descriptions)
,
performed
intentionally, may stem from the same desire. But now one
must pause to consider the plausibility of considering a
muscular contraction to be an intentional action.
In Chapter II, l showed that Peirce regards nervous
and muscular contractions as the only actions (or volitions)
which we will directly. But as I pointed out, most often
these actions are performed unconsciously and, hence, non-
voluntarily. Contracting one's muscles "for the purpose
of taking aim would seem to be one such action: it is
both unconsciously performed and, hence, nonvoluntar.ily
performed. Should this action, and others like it, none-
the less, be treated as actions done intentionally—as
actions done with some purpose in mind?
If the analysis I have just given is correct, then it
might seem the answer must be a resounding yes. The merchant
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contracts certain eye and ari. muscles for the purpose of
aiming the stone at the genie's eye. This action would be
as intentional as his action of aiming the stone or his
action of striking the genie. And if we were to hold Peirce
to a reductive account of volition, directly willed actions—
nervous reactions or muscular contractions—would be the
originating intentional actions; all others would be only
derivative. On this analysis, if we really understood the
nature of our actions and our desires, we would begin,
rather than end, any analysis of intentional actions with
a desire to contract certain muscles for the purpose of
some X. Allow me to elaborate by way of an example.
Suppose I have a desire to water the lawn. This would
be a derivative desire, and the original desire from which
this has evolved would be the desire to contract the muscles
necessary for putting the sprinkler in place and turning on
the faucet. So if these actions were performed, we would
say that the contracting of muscles is done for the purpose
of putting the sprinkler in place and turning on the faucet,
and that in turn is done for the purpose of watering the
lawn. We could go on to single out other mediate and
ultimate ends, but it does not seem necessary here. The
point is that if we interpret Peirce in this reductive way,
all of our desires and intentions will be seen to stem from
originating desires and intentions having to do with a
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discharge of nervous energy or son,e muscular contraction.
I reject this interpretation of Peirce for two reasons.
First, It is quite clear, as we have seen in the
numerous passages I have cited, that Peirce recognizes that
the things we desire and intend are not limited to a release
of nervous energy or a muscular contraction. His wonderful
examples are replete with desires of a very mundane kind.
True, an athlete or dancer, or someone undergoing physical
therapy, or someone exerting great physical strength in
order to move a table, might have as his originating desire,
the desire to contract certain muscles. And, of course,
there are other such cases for which there would be an
originating desire to move a muscle. But few of the de-
liberate actions most of us perform stem from a desire to
contract muscles. Our desires and intentions are as color-
ful, troublesome, and varied as are the individuals who
have them. Peirce recognizes this and would reject any
attempt to reduce desires and intentions in this way, though
one might have thought that a critical examination of
Peirce's views forces one into just that position.
Second, it is not even clear that having the intention
of watering the lawn involves having the intention of
contracting certain muscles in order to realize that end.
To use our old example, the merchant may desire to strike
the genie and it is probably that he would also desire to
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do that which is necessary in order to strike him. But for
all that, it is doubtful he would ever have the desire to
contract the muscles necessary for him to take proper aim.
Hence, it is also doubtful that he would intend to contract
those muscles. To say that we perform an action inten-
tionally—with some purpose in mind—and yet are not aware
of that purpose seems muddled indeed. in fact, we have
taken the intentionality out of the so-called intentional
action. Purposive action, action governed by reason, in-
tentional action— these expressions point to actions which
are done consciously and voluntarily. Seldom do we con-
sciously and voluntarily contract our muscles, and I am not
sure It IS even possible to trigger a nerve impulse con-
sciously and voluntarily. To hold Peirce to the view that
these actions are desired and intentional in such a way
that they function as originating desires and intentions
even though we may not be aware of them, would be to saddle
Peirce with an incoherent view. Furthermore, it would be
^^tithetical to one of the functions of pragmatism: "to
lend support, and help to render distinct, ideas essentially
clear, but more or less difficult of apprehension.
. .
"
[5.206 (1903)]. I conclude that Peirce does not maintain
that directly willed actions—nervous reactions and muscular
contractions--are necessarily intentional actions. Nor
does he maintain that these actions are our originating
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intentional actions.
Does intention entail desire ?
I turn now to the more interesting of the two Questions
I posed earlier-interesting both for moral philosophers in
general and for Peirce in particular. The question is:
Does intention entail desire? It is this problem which is
at the nub of philosophical debate concerning issues of
moral culpability. And whereas the first question I
examined show that, for Peirce, desires and intentions do
not point backward to some originating desire and intention,
this question will bring us to a consideration of desires
and intentions in terms of future, expected but unwanted
consequences. My inquiry now reaches forward.
The specific question I shall be addressing is whether
the expected but unwanted consequences of intended actions
are themselves intended. To prepare the way for a Peircean
answer, I would first like to present two sides of the con-
troversy surrounding this question current in the philo-
sophical literature.
If one holds the view which G. E. M. Anscombe puts
forward, then one is committed to the view that one intends
certain consequences of one's actions only if one desires
those consequences. And conversely, if one does not desire
the consequences of one's actions, then one cannot be said
to have intended them. The consequences of Anscombe 's view
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are quite clear. A person may know what he or she is doing,
know the consequences of those actions, and yet if not all
of the expected consequences are desired, then the agent
will be said to intend to do only that which he or she
desires to do.
The example Anscombe uses is that of a water pumper
who is paid to bring water to a house where various party
chiefs live. They are plotting, among other things, the
extermination of the Jews. The water has been poisoned by
a would-be assassin, and the water pumper knows this. The
problem stated by Arthur R. Miller is this:
Now we ask: can this man (the pumper), knowingfull well that the water supply has been poisoned,intend to replenish the supply of drinking water tothe house (X) without thereby intending to poisonIts inhabitants (Y) ?4
Anscombe 's reply is that though the man intends to replenish
the supply of water to the household and earn his pay, he
does not thereby intend to poison the inhabitants of the
house. According to Miller, Anscombe 's solution rests on
the connection she makes between wanting and intending.
He says
:
In particular, Anscombe appears to be committed
to the view that intending entails wanting; or, in
other words, that wanting is a necessary— although
not a suf f icient--condition for intending.
5
For Anscombe, a "desirability characterization" of some
sort must be present for an agent's action to be inten-
tional .
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I
° say there must be some feature in their^tended which the agent finds desirable, some-thing which he (rightly or wrongly) believes to be
locally. extrinLcally orintrin-
Miller rejects Anscombe's analysis, relying primarily
on the way in which mitigating circumstances influence the
ascription of responsibility and the affixing of praise
and blame.
‘iZk*
of intention on the part of the agent,
although it is not always an excusing circumstance(with respect to wrong acts), is nevertheless the
sort of thing which functions as at least a mitigating
circumstance in most cases. ^ ^
From this, the crux of Miller's reasoning unfolds:
. . . if a reason R is sufficient for showing that
a given act is not intentional, then R is also capable
of functioning to identify a relevant mitigating
circumstance .
°
By Modus Tollens, if a reason R is not capable of functioninq
to identify a relevant mitigating circumstance, then it is
not sufficient for showing that a given act is not inten-
tional. According to Miller, the pumper's denial that he
wanted to poison the inhabitants would not be a mitigating
circumstance. A protest on the water pumper's part that
he did not want to poison the inhabitants, therefore, would
not be sufficient for showing that his act of poisoning the
inhabitants is not intentional.
. . . we would not countenance the pumper's sincere
disclaimer that he wanted to poison the inhabitants
as being in any way a mitigating (much less an
exculpating) circumstance, as we could countenance.
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tSt,^in^?heL^ciJc™slh -ignorance on his part
poisoning the inhabitarts?9^' the water =
The water pumper who knowingly replenishes the water supply
with poisoned water has conmitted an intentional act of
poisoning the inhabitants, even though he did not want to.
Where doing X = doing Y. Miller concludes that
doina x^in foreseeable result of
seen hv th circumstances, but fore-
count*^,
agent himself, then if doing x is to
so is doing action on his part, then
If an action is intentional on the part of the agent, and
If he foresees the consequences of that action, then the
consequences are also intentional, wanted or not.
Miller anticipates a possible objection to his position.
One might argue that, in such cases as the one under con-
sideration, the consequences of an act are not intended
though they are nevertheless done willingly. And "this is
why we do not or will not let the agent off the hook in
such cases." Miller's response is to claim that "A was
willing to do Y" should not be understood simply as passive
acquiescence; rather it should be interpreted as "Y was
intentional on A's part."
... in the sorts of cases under consideration,
the agent is not simply willing to let certain thingshappen in fact, he is willing to to these things, or
willing to perform certain actions of which these are
the certain and foreseeable consequences. Thus,
Anscombe's pumper is not only willing to see the
inhabitants die, but he is willing to poison them.^^
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In objecting to Miller's overall line of reasoning,
Wayne A Davis argues, in brief, that (1) There are degrees
of culpability: "... a person is more deserving of
condemnation if he wants to perform a wrong act than if
he does not want to perform it (other things equal)."
- absence of intention is a mitigating but
definitely not an excusing factor when the agent is willing
to perform the evil act."^^ (3) "'A was willing to do Y'
is not the same as 'Y was intentional on A
' s part.' The
latter entails that A did Y, the former does not."^^
(4) Because of his "firm 'linguistic intuition'" that
expected but unwanted consequences of intended actions are
not intended, he [Davis] is led to the explanation that
intention entails desire. Miller, on the other hand,
suggests that Anscombe and others believe expected but
unwanted consequences of intended actions are not intended
solely because they believe intention entails desire.
"... an even firmer intuition that the agent is
willing to bring about the unwanted consequences" leads
Davis to "reject the principle that willingness entails
^ • -.16desire
.
I would add to Davis' list of reasons for rejecting
Miller's position the following objection. The connection
Miller makes between the absence of a mitigating circum-
stance and an intentional action seems to me questionable.
As I have pointed out, he has asked us to accept as his
"major premise" that
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. if a reason R is sufficient for showing thata given act IS not intentional, then R is alL capableof functioning to identify a relevant mitigating
circumstance. ^ ^
This can be read i suggest that, by trans-
position, we would have given But from this
we cannot conclude that a given reason R is sufficient for
showing that a given act is intentional, 'S Yet that
is the basis for Miller's rejection of the view that in-
tending entails wanting.
The problem, once again, is one of deciding on the
status of expected but unwanted consequences of intended
actions: are those consequences themselves intended?^^
Those who, together with Davis and Anscombe, say that the
expected but unwanted consequences of intended actions are
not intended tie their arguments, in some way, to the
principle that intending entails desiring. Opponents of
this position side with Miller's general view that the
expected but unwanted consequences of an intended action
are also intentional. Peirce, I believe, would reject the
rigid conclusions of Miller and add his voice to those of
Davis and Anscombe. But Peirce's voice will have that
distinctively pragmaticistic ring to it. For the Peircean
answer, then, old grounds will be revisited.
I have claimed that, for Peirce, we act both on desires
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and beliefs: they are causes of one's disposition to act
and they influence the deliberation which immediately pre-
cedes one s deliberate action. The question "Does intention
entail desire" is, perhaps, best examined in terms of the
yses I have given of desiring and believing, i would
like to examine the question, first, in terms of desires,
and then in terms of beliefs.
Recall that from the merchant's one desire to strike
the genie's eye with a stone, two actions were performed
intentionally: the action of aiming the stone and the
action of striking the eye. But the actions were (pre-
sumably) for two different purposes: aiming the stone had
as its purpose striking the genie's eye, and striking the
genie's eye had as its purpose harming the genie or some
such thing. However, things are different in the case of
the water pumper's desire to collect his pay. One action
is performed intentionally
— the action of replenishing the
water supply— and this is done for the purpose of collecting
his pay. And while there may be other actions which are
performed intentionally following from that same desire,
poisoning the inhabitants of the house is not one of them.
Following my earlier format, the pumper's desire is
that his wish of getting paid is realized in his receiving
the money he has earned
. The following symbols can be used:
P = the pumper
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a - his desire to get paid
—
^aceiving the money he has earned
c - replenishing/replenishes the water supply
d = poisoning/poisons the inhabitants of the house
Then
P desires that a will be realized in b.
P does c for the purpose of b.
Replenishing the water supply is done intentionally for the
purpose of getting paid. But we would not say that
P does c for the purpose of d.
The pumper, as we have seen, does not care one way or the
other about poisoning the inhabitants. Nor would we say
that
P does d for the purpose of b.
The pumper desires that he receive his pay. Acting de-
liberately on this desire means, among other things,
attending to his present intentions and purposes. His
present purpose, stemming from his desire, is that he be
paid. (".
.
.
purposive action must be action virtually
directed toward the removal of stimulation" [5.561 (c.
1906) ]
.) And it is to this end that he replenishes the
water supply--to realize (to satisfy) his desire of being
paid. There is no intention of poisoning the plotters
which stems from this desire. He replenishes the water
supply intentionally; he does not poison the plotters
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intentionally.
But now it will be said that c and d are identical
actions under different descriptions (replenishing the
water supply = poisoning the inhabitants); if replenishing
the water supply is performed intentionally, so is poisoning
1
8
the inhabitants. But here Peirce would protest loudly:
the two descriptions point to two different actions— they
are not the same at all. And this is a natural result of
Peirce's account of intentions.
As I remarked earlier, for Peirce, a contract between
two people depends on the intent involved.
To say that A signs the document D and C signs thedocument D, no matter what the contents of that
document, does not make a contract. The contract
lies in the intent. [1.475 (c. 1896)]
Nor does a husband's placing a brooch in front of his wife
while uttering some sounds constitute an act of giving. The
actions are mechanical, lacking some third thing which con-
nects them. In these cases, what is lacking is the inten-
tion. Similarly in the water pumper's case. The pumper
replenishing the water supply with poisoned water and the
inhabitants of the house drinking the water and thereby
dying does not a poisoning make. In the act of replenishing
the water supply, the pumper has not, strictly speaking,
poisoned the inhabitants of the house. Some third thing
—
the intention of poisoning—must be present in order for a
"genuine" poisoning to occur. But as I have suggested, the
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pumper does not see. to satify a desire to poison the in-
habitants, and so he could have no intention of poisoning
them. The pumper is acting intentionally on his desire to
get paid, but his intentional action does not include
poisoning the inhabitants of the house. For Peirce, poison-
ing connotes intention; hence, mechanical pumping is not
properly a poisoning. And thus, replenishing the water
supply
^ poisoning the inhabitants of the house. In terms
of desiring, the expected but unwanted consequences of an
intentional action are not themselves intended. And so it
would seem that, for Peirce, intending does entail desiring.
In terms of beliefs, the same result can be supported
in a different way. There are several beliefs on which the
pumper acts: The water is poisoned. if the inhabitants
drink it, they will surely die. if he does not replenish
the water, he will not get paid. Although there may be
more beliefs, these would seem to be the most relevant and
the ones on which he will act. The reasoning process the
pumper might go through would probably be something of the
following sort: "I know the water is poisoned and if I fill
the tank with this supply, the inhabitants of the house will
die. I also believe that the only way to collect my pay is
filling the tank. Collecting my pay is something I
really want (this is the operative desire here) . But I
don't care one way or the other about poisoning the
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inhabitants of the house, no matter what evil they may be
Plotting. Therefore, 1 will fin the water tank with the
poisoned water, even thnnrrVi -it ,ough this will have the consequence
that the Inhabitants of the house will die."
The pumper is prepared and willing to act on his
belief s
.
FuirMlTlf’'is to act upon.
tion in vTfal ov ®tt upon the proposi-
upon it in
opinion is willingness to actI relatively insignificant affairs.
[ 1.636 ( 1898 )]
The situation the pumper finds himself in is obviously a
vital crises. Yet he willingly fills the tank with the
poisoned water which will have, as one of its inevitable
consequences, the deaths of the inhabitants of the house.
He has considered the effects his beliefs have which "might
conceivably have practical bearings," and he has acted
willingly on those beliefs and on the one operative desire
he has. In this sense, then, the consequences of the water
pumper's deliberate action are brought about willingly,
though not all of them are desired or intended by him: he
has willingly poisoned the plotters; he has willingly and
intentionally replenished the water supply. Miller was
in thinking that "A was willing to do Y" is equivalent
to "Y was intentional on A's part." For Peirce, as for
Davis, we can willingly bring about something we neither
desire nor, consequently, intend. For Peirce, as for Davis,
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the principle that
jected, just as the
must be accepted.
willingness
principle
entails desire must be re-
that intention entails desire
^ Internal Freed^^
in Chapter I, i claimed that, for Peirce, acting
delrberately on one's beliefs and desires involves attending
to one's present intentions and purposes, bearing i„ mind
past experiences, making resolves, and exercising self-
control. But as I have suggested previously, this does not
give us a complete account of acting deliberately, for
quite clearly a
yet not be in a
person could meet these requirements
position in which action could occur
and
[See
Chapter in, pp. 123-125]. So
also be in a position in which
relevant beliefs and desires;
one wish to do so. Given this
It would seem that one must
it is possible to act on the
one must be free to act should
additional feature, it would
seem one could act deliberately.
Peirce does not directly address the issue of being
free to act, though in key statements he does seem to use
carefully chosen words which reflect his awareness of the
issue. For instance, in "A Survey of Pragmaticism,
" he
speaks of acting on a belief "if one could perform a certain
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act/' and he refers to the '[readiness] to act in a certain
way under given circumstances" [5.480 (1906)]. And in a
letter written in 1913, he speaks of a habit
The notion of being free to act on one’s beliefs and
desires is quite definitely a part of Peirce’s views on
action, even though he has little to say about it. But
Peirce does have something more to say about being free to
choose to act
. Allow me to elaborate on these two addi-
tional aspects of a deliberate action: the freedom to act
and the freedom to choose to act.
Suppose I decide I want to buy the Sunday New York
newspaper. I desire a newspaper, the Times
,
I intend
to purchase a copy, and I believe that if I am to keep up
with world events, I should buy and read the Times. Then
circumstances which would keep me from my purchase,
I act. I buy the Sunday New York Times . What might those
circumstances be? If the Sunday Times is not sold in the
area in which I live, I could not buy it. If it is sold,
but also sold-out, again no purchase could be made. Or if
I don't have enough money or a means of getting to the only
store which sells the paper, I could not make the purchase.
Of course, there are other such circumstances which would
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make it impossible for me to buy the Sunday Tim^, the
common feature of these circumstances is that they are all
external to me. Beliefs, motives, and intentions will not
be sufficient for buying the newspaper; in addition, I must
22£££2al^°Dltraij^; i must be free to do as
I choose.
And this brings us to the related consideration of
the freedom to choose to act. it is generally thought
that there is some sort of internal freedom without which
a deliberate action could not occur; a person must be
internally free to choose what he will do. This internal
freedom is usually tagged "acting of one's own free will."
And one of the litmus tests for saying someone has acted
freely is to show that he could have done otherwise if he
had chosen to and, furthermore, he could have chosen
19
otherwise
.
Now it would seem that Peirce's theory could not
comfortably accommodate any account of freedom of the will,
for, as a pointed out in Chapter II, the notion of a will
^^^itional faculty of the mind is given up by Peirce and
'volition' itself becomes synonymous with 'action.' On the
other hand, I also argued that freedom of the will is
rejected in favor of the freedom of choice which precedes
an action [Chapter II, pp. 85-86]
.
This is, I believe, a
correct and consistent reading of Peirce: freedom of the
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Will, understood in terms of a volitional faculty, is
rejected by Peirce, but freedom of the will, understood as
freedom of choice, is endorsed by Peirce, still elsewhere,
Peirce expresses himself in such a way that one might be
seduced into thinking he has some theory of free will.
(I shall consider one such passage below.) But here one
should exercise caution. For even as one is caught off-
guard by seduction, one would be caught off-guard by
Peirce’s eloquence. When all the evidence is in, it is
clear there is no such thing as will— free or otherwise-
in Peirce. We act free of internal constraints, not because
we have a will which is free, but because it is possible
for us to make choices. I offer two additional passages in
which a Peircean theory of freedom of choice is strongly
suggested
.
The first passage was quoted in part earlier when I
considered the absolute separation of desire from volition
[See Chapter II, p. 75] . I now wish to consider it in
of Peirce's views on choice. He says:
... we all know conflicting desires but too well,
and how treacherous they are apt to be; and a desire
may perfectly well be discontented with volition,
i.e., with what the man will do. The consciousness
of that truth seems to me to be the root of our
consciousness of free will
. [1.331 (Unidentified
Fragment)
,
my underscore]
Peirce seems quite right about this. As I noted earlier,
we often do have conflicting desires. I may want to work
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another hour tonight,
^i^ht now. The desire
but I might also want to go to sleep
s conflict and I can choose to act on
only one of them. So I continue working, thinking I have
acted of my free will. in truth, I have done nothing more
than choose between conflicting desires-desires which have
been guided by motivating reasons or beliefs. in terms of
my earlier discussion of the Peircean account of desire, it
would seem that one desire has become the operative desire
and, in general the choice between (or among) conflicting
desires is the preference for one of them to be realized in
actuality. So far, the litmus test for an action being
performed freely still works, though there is no need to
invoke the notion of free will. One can say that I could
have acted otherwise if l had chosen otherwise. And I would
have chosen otherwise if l had wanted to. What this amounts
to is the following: if l had wanted B more than I wanted
A (the desire I eventually acted on)
,
then I would have
acted on B instead of A. But as it shall soon become
evident, this is not a test which sits well with the prag-
matistic Peirce after all.
The second passage I have in mind is from a letter
written by Peirce to Frederick Adams Wood, M.D., a lecturer
in biology at the time (1913) at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. In the letter, Peirce speaks about the
logical nature of conditional statements-- the "would-be"
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which we encountered in Chapter I. But he also makes some
cogent observations in this letter about counterfactuals
.
Still speaking about conditional statements, he says that
fact
,*:^^/"tecedent supposes an existenti al
The coiidiLi,.^„1^^^*’*^ actually is or was .n t onal proposition does not accurately ..tat ,.
IS calculated to produce any state of mind, in a
li^h^o K that it estab-s es a h
_
abit in that mind, using the word "habit"n the original sense, as meaning only that the oerson
beha^
habit, would behave (or usually
should ^,r'^
^ certain way whenever a certain occasion
a ise. Bgt if this occasion did in actuality
_
ot arise, such habit of thought as the conditionalproposition might produce would be a nullity oraama-
^stically aj^ractically . [8.380: my
And here we see the pragmatistic coup de grace given to the
free-will advocate's litmus test. It is a "nullity pragma-
tistically and practically" to say that "I could have done
otherwise, if I had chosen to do otherwise" when, in fact,
^ not choose to act otherwise. In a sense, Peirce is
admonishing us not to look back. Having acted, it is mean-
ingless and of no practical consequence to say (or think)
that if I had wanted B more than I wanted A, then I would
have acted on B instead of A. His theory of action is as
forward looking as is his pragmaticism.
What, then, can we say about "internal freedom"? To
revert to the example used earlier: If I believe that
working an additional hour tonight will expedite my work
on this project, and I want to do just that, then assuming
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there are no external constraints on my working, I am free
to choose to act on this particular belief and desire ^
n^g as the possihi 1 i t^_pf_^ staying up exists as a real
£ossibility. And it will be a real possibility for me only
If, for example, I have not already chosen to go to bed for
the night. Peirce's account of the reasoning process of
the deliberating man illustrates this point quite nicely.
Such a man would reason as follows:
should do so and so, 1 should bring about such
result Erar^^'"; J thatsult, go, I shall not do "so and so."
[ 8.381 ( 1913 )]
And Peirce comments:
e thus comes to a profitable conclusion, providedhe had not already fully made up his mind not todo so and so," in which case he would be pursuing
an idle dream, and a bad dream at that. [Ibid.]
We are internally free to choose to act on one desire rather
than another only if the possibilities are still real for
us. Our internal freedom does not depend on freedom of the
will; rather, it is a question of choosing between (or among)
desires. But turning a familiar phrase from James, they
must be "live possibilities Thus, in addition to the
other requirements for acting deliberately on beliefs and
desires, one must also be internally free to choose to act,
as well as externally free to act.
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Concluding Remarks
Although my purpose here is not to consider intentional
and free action in terms of a moral theory, it is difficult
to refrain from making some observations at this point
to monal concGmQ ao t kncerns. As I have shown, for Peirce a
person may not desire or intendr c all the consequences of his
deliberate actions. Nevertheless, he has willingly brought
them about. He is not entirely
-let off the hook,- as
Miller would say, but neither is he wholly blameworthy
should the consequences be "bad,- as Miller maintains.
Because of the importance of desire in Peirce's philosophy
in general, and a Peircean theory of action in particular,
and because of the consequent entailment relation of in-
tending and desiring, Peirce would have a lenient attitude
toward the person whose actions had unwanted but unexpected
consequences. On the other hand, the Peircean view of not
playing half-time quarterback with respect to the choices
one has made, would suggest a less than lenient attitude
toward the person who says "I could have done otherwise,
had I chosen to." The choice of action, once made, makes
alternative" choices a moot issue: instead the conse-
quences of the action chosen are paramount. And that seems
consistent with Peirce's pragmaticistic concern with future
effects
.
With the foregoing account of intentional and free
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action, I believe a full account of a Peircean theory of
action can be given. in order to act deliberately on
one's beliefs and desin^Q r,u- uo res, which requires that one attend
to his present intentions and purposes, bear in mind past
experiences, make resolves and exercise self-control, one
must also ^ intentionally and be (externally) free to
act, as well as (internally) free to choose to act. These
together seem to comprise the necessary conditions for
deliberate action to occur. Whether Peirce would include
anything else as a necessary condition and whether he would
consider these sufficient for performing a deliberate act,
I cannot say for certainty. Here we are handicapped by
the simple fact that Peirce himself did not offer a full-
blown theory of action. Thus, the work of constructing a
Peircean theory based on the little he does say can be
successful only to a point. Having access to additional
manuscripts of Peirce's would go a long way towards pro-
viding a fuller, more faithful account of such a theory.
Still, there is one more thing which can be undertaken
with the works available for public use, and that is to
place the Peircean theory of action within the broader
scope of some of his other theories. This will not only
round out the theory of action I have presented, but it
will also give to it the added virtue of compatibility
with other views considered extremely important by Peirce.
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I turn, then, to Peirce
of his theory of signs
ing (pragmaticism)
.
theory of action within the scope
(semiotics) and his theory of mean-
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NOTES
A mechanical action would be considered a "dyadically
degenerate triad,” as opposed to a genuine triad or a
monadically degenerate triad. See especially 1.473-75
(c. 1896).
^See, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe's Intention (New
York: Cornell University Press), especially pp. 37-42;
"Wanting, Intending, and Knowing What One is Doing,” by
Arthur R. Miller in Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, Vol. 40 (1980); "Acting Intentionally and Acting
Voluntarily,” by J. B. Blumenfeld in Philosophy and Pheno-
menological Research, Vol. 41 (1980), together with Miller's
rejoinder; "Miller on Wanting, Intending, and Being
Willing, by Wayne A. Davis in Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research
, Vol. 43 (1982), and Miller's "A Reply to
Davis," in Vol. 45 (1985) of that same journal.
For example, Peirce says,
. . . she does desire and intend to serve an apple
pie to a particular person.
. . . into that particular bowl she intends to put
some apples.
. . . having taken them she means to make a pie of
those apples. [1.341 (c. 1895)]
"Wanting, Intending, and Knowing What One is Doing,"
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
,
Vol. 40
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(1980)
, p. 335.
, p. 336.
^Ibid
. , p . 337.
"^Ibid., p. 340.
^Ibid
. , p. 341.
^Ibid
. , p . 341.
Ibid
. , p . 341.
Ibid
. , p . 342.
Miller on Wanting, Intending, and Being Willing,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol
. 43
(1982)
, p. 107
.
Ibid
. , p 108.
Ibid
. , p 108.
Ibid
. , p. 109.
Ibid
. , p . 109.
In the ethics of natural law, discussion of this
question focuses on the problem of determining the moral
status of an action which has two effects--one good, the
other bad. The "principle of double effect" is appealed
to when this sort of moral dilemma arises. In general, the
principle says that "when an act produces two effects, one
good and the other bad, the agent may intend the good and
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permit the bad, provided the amount of good is greater than
the amount of bad'' [Carl Wellman, Morals and Kth.V.
(Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1975), p. 167).
A more precise formulation which spells out the specific
way in which bad consequences are considered unintended is
given by C. E. Harris, Jr., in Applying Moral Theories
(California: Wadsworth Publishing Co.
, 1986), pp. 73 - 75 .
In brief, a bad effect is unintended when it is "not a
direct means to the good effect" (p. 73 )
18
^Donald Davidson, for one, would hold that these are
"two descriptions of the same event." He says that "Doing
something that causes a death is identical with causing a
death." What we are seeing here are "related descriptions"
corresponding to "a single descriptum.
" in Essays on
Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982 rpt.),
pp. 58-59.
19
J. D. Mabbott, An Introduction to Ethics (New York:
Doubleday and Co
. ,
I nc
., 1969), p. 118. In Metaphysics
:
The Elements [(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1985)
, pp . 192-94 especially] , Bruce Aune raises sound
objections to a libertarian view such as this--one which
suggests that our choices are not determined but free.
According to Aune, one of the fundamental objections to
the libertarian view is that it rejects the "scientifically
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more orthodox view" of hnm^r, .Ot uman beings being "physical entities
that obey the laws of physics" (pp. 193 - 94 ). This is
rejected in favor of the "stubborn subjective conviction"
that human beings are metaphysically free (pp. 193-94),
and that such metaphysical frepdom " n oy r ea is incompatible with
any )cind of causal determinism" (p. 192 ). Aune also gives
a clever objection which points to the incoherency of the
libertarian's belief that our choices must be free and not
detennined (See p. 193).
For James, the expression is, of course, "live
hypotheses." "A live hypothesis is one which appeals as
a real possibility to him to whom it is proposed" ["The
Will to Believe," in The Writings of William James: A
Comprehensive Edition
,
ed . John J. McDermott (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 717 ].
Chapter V
ACTION AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
In this chapter, I do not intend to give a complete
account of Peirce's theory of signs, for that would take
me too far afield from the topic of action. Yet, it
seems quite clear to me that a Peircean theory of action
warrants examination within Peirce's semiotics, "the
quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs" [2.227
(c. 1897)]. For instance, in discussing the "imagined
investigator's attempts to solve the map-coloring problem,"
Peirce refers to his activity as "an energetic interpre-
tant of the interrogatory he puts to himself" [5.490 (c.
1906)]. And later he says that "the habit conjoined with
the motive and the conditions has the action for its
energetic interpretant" [5.491]. The terminology of signs,
objects, and interpretants will be explained shortly, but
on the face of it, it would seem that there is a natural
place in Peirce's theory of signs for action: it is an
energetic interpretant. And as I shall argue, action
finds a home in the Peircean semiotics not only as an
energetic interpretant, but also as a sign and as an aid
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to understanding the final interpretants of signs. More-
over, desire itself see.s to play the role of a sign’s
iminediate object.
There is good reason, then, to discuss action within
the theory of signs: on Peirce's own account, it would
seem to have natural roles to play within the theory.
Furthermore, semiotics is itself of extreme interest and
importance to Peirce for, as he held from his earliest
writings on, "every thought is a sign" [5.253 (1868);
see also 5.421 (1905); 4.551 (1906)]. Thus, giving a
semiotic account of a Peircean theory of action will lend
support to my general claim that action has a natural and
important place in Peirce's philosophical views.
There are equally good reasons to examine the
Peircean theory of action I have presented within Peirce's
theory of meaning. Recall that in Chapter I, I considered
beliefs as habits of action. And in moving from habits of
deliberate action to particular actions— from beliefs to
actions— I explained that, for Peirce, beliefs function
as direct causal factors in one's pre-disposition to act
in a certain way given the appropriate circumstances and
relevant desire, and they function as indirect causes of
one's actions. It is appropriate now to consider another
way in which habits of action and action are related.
Without compromising Peirce's commitment to realism, I
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will show just how actions
and understanding of habits
contribute to the acquisition
of action. This will further
strengthen my
specifically,
Peirce's rich
claim that a discussion of action— and more
a theory of action—has a rightful place in
philosophical system.
!• Action and Semiotics
Peirce defines semiosis as
An action, or influence, which is, or involves,
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign,
object, and its interpretant
,
this tri-relativeinfluence not being in any way resolvable intobetween pairs. [5.484 (c. 1906)]
a
its
actions
This action or influence can be thought of as a triadic or
sign relation, involving three elements: the sign, its
object, and its interpretant.^ As expressions of Third-
ness, sign relations always involve some mental element
of mediation between the interpretant and the object.
If you take any ordinary triadic relation, you will
always find a mental element in it. Brute action
is secondness, any mentality involves thirdness.
[8.331 (1904)1
The distinction between a brute action [a Second] and a
deliberate action [a Third] is explained by the absence
or presence of some mental element. In examining the
notion of an intentional action, I pointed out how the
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presence of the mental element nf 4-
•
o intentionality makes a
set one of ciivina ts-i-Viq-k- 4-u9 ving, rather than one which is merely
mechanical.
• .
. the relation involved in 'A gives B to
c," can occur only if there i c. •• i ^ i- ,r mer s some kind of law" by which
A makes C the possessor [8.331 (1904)]. One might think
of this law as a convention involving the intention of
giving and the understanding of that intention. A's action
of giving B to C can only occur if ( 1 ) a intends that B
accept C [as a gift] from A, (2) B understands that A
intends B to have C, and (3) B accepts C [as a gift] from
A. As giving B to C is an action involving a sign
relation in which there is a sign, an object, and an
interpretant sign.
In its genuine form, Thirdness is the triadic rela-tion existing between a sign, its objects, and theinterpreting thought, itself a sign, considered as
constituting the mode of being a sign. A sign
mediates between the interpretant sign and its
object.^
At this point, I believe an understanding of the three
elements or "subjects" of the sign relation can best be
aided by a systematic examination of signs, objects, and
interpretant signs. Some definitions and explanations are
now called for
. Note that I shall examine in greater
detail these aspects of the sign relation which are more
directly relevant to the theory of action I have presented.
As defined by Peirce, a sign or representamen is
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o< th. fir., >»»•,««.»>
thf^ related to a Secondhing, Its Object, in respect to a quality, in such
?n ?ela?ion t^'?h
^ ^^ird thing, its Inter^retanti r t o t e same object
. . .
[2.92 (1902); see also 8.332 (1904)]
But things become even more complicated with the intro-
duction of two types of objects and three types of inter-
pretants
.
... a sign has two objects, its object as it is
represented and its object in itself. it has alsothree interpretants
,
its interpretant as represented
or meant to be understood, its interpretant as it
IS produced, and its interpretant in itself.
[8.333 (1904)]
Exactly what Peirce includes as a sign is somewhat
problematic. I shall argue below that he does not wish
to restrict his semiotics to mental signs— thoughts or
concepts--though he most often speaks in this way. Rather,
he exploits a broader notion of signs throughout his
writings, as I shall explain when I take up the topic of
the dynamical interpretant. For the moment, however, I
would like to borrow an example of a sign which Peirce
uses in order to talk about the immediate object of a sign.
The example he uses is the command to "Ground arms!" The
object as it is represented is the immediate object and.
in this case, it is "the will of the officer that the
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butts of the muskets be brouah^- ^ to the ground" [5.473
<-1906),. in keeping With the analysis I h.i ave argued for
" Ihas paper, the •'will of the office^ can her be expressed
- the
..Wish or
.esire of the officer... Port ere is no such thing as a will or willing in Peirce, anatne sense of the ohr";^co a m u,p rase rs best understood as the desire ofthe officer. Given that -i -i- a
' ® quite natural to speak of a
esire as being the inmediate object of a sign.
The obiect_in_it^ i, dynamic^ or real object.
It IS that
• .
. which, from the naturp^ 4.ui
cannot express which 1 1 ra a the Sign
the interprete; to find ourbrcollatera^experi^nc:
[8.314 (1909)]
Peirce spoke about the real or dynamical object in an
earlier paper,
..How to Make Our Ideas Clear,., where the
real object was tied to truth in the following way:
to\v^an°who'’^""’
is
,
fated to be ultimately agreed
truth and th
investigate, is what we mean by the
Ihe rLl
:^^.°h 3 ect represented in this ooL:on
- That IS the way I would explain reality.[5.407 (1878); my underscore]
The dynamical object is the more elusive of the two types
of Peircean objects: it is the object represented in the
opinion which all men are ultimately fated to agree on.
It IS the "really efficient but not immediately present
Object" [8.343 (1908)]. The immediate object, on the
other hand, is that which finds its expression in a sign
which then "stands to somebody for something in some respect
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or capacity. it is the Object as the Sign represents it"
[8.343 (1908)].
The interpretants [the "proper significate effects,
of signs] [5.475 (c. 1906)] are three in number: the
immediate, dynamical, and final interpretants. I am
primarily interested in the last two. The immediate (or
emotional) interpretant is "the first proper significate
effect of a sign"; it is a feeling, though it "may amount
to much more than that feeling of recognition" [5.475 (c.
1906)]. It is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the
right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily
called the meaning of the sign" [4.536 (1906)].
Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music
is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey,
the composer's musical ideas; but these usually
consist merely in a series of feelings.
[5.475 (c. 1906)]
The dynamical (or energetic ) interpretant is "what-
ever interpretation any mind actually makes of a sign"
[8.315 (1909)]. It is an ef for t--either muscular or
mental— and it is always a single act [5.475 (c. 1906)].
It is "the actual effect which the Sign, as a Sign, really
determines" [4.536 (1906)]. And although the sign relation
itself is triadic and epitomizes all triadic relations,
the dynamical interpretant of the sign relation is still
dyadic. Peirce spells this out, mentioning two likely
candidates for the dynamical interpretant of the command
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"Ground arms!"
m«.
.c,„l l«.rprSi/tio„ 7rj“ai^-.-
.
•ijn p; .PbS" m T.T‘ti’,iUi7a
i::%“
-1-Tin txi.0 thump of tho mu^lcf^'hc: rM^ -i-i-v t
-i c -I-K^ 77 4- ^ A on the ground, or ratherthe Act of their Minds. [8.315 (1909)]
Peirce seems somewhat hesitant about which effect is the
dynamical interpretant of the command: is it the thump
of the muskets on the ground, or is it some mental act?
These two actions are certainly quite different—one is
physical, the other mental. Are both of them, in fact,
dynamical interpretants of the sign "Ground arms!"?
In a sense, both effects are dynamical interpretants,
though not of the same sign. Strictly speaking, the inter-
pretant of the sign "Ground arm.s ! " is the mental under-
standing that "Ground arms!" means that one should lower
one's musket to the ground in a particular manner. That
is the interpretation which a mind actually makes of this
^ person first reacts to this sign with such under-
standing. Thus, the dynamical interpretant of the sign
"Ground arms!" would be a mental act."^
But Peirce also notes in an earlier work that "the
imperative command shows that it [the dynamical interpre-
tant] need not be of a mental mode of being" [5.473 (c.
1906)]. I believe this remark can be explained, as can
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Peirce's hesitation in the 1909 passage about identifying
the dynamic interpretant
,
by recalling that as an interpre-
tant of a sign, the dynamical interpretant itself becomes
a sign. It is quite natural at this point, then, to say
that the dynamical interpretant of this new sign— the
HHderstan^ that one should lower one's musket to the
ground in a particular manner when one hears the command
Ground arms! is the action of lowering one's musket
to the ground. deliberate action now serves both
as an interpretant and, since it is an interpretant, as
a new sign.^ Thus, both the mental action of understanding
the meaning of the sign "Ground arms!" and the deliberate
action of lowering one's musket to the ground upon under-
standing the meaning of "Ground arms!" are dynamical
interpretants
. And although there may be no discernible
lapse of time between these two actions, they are, strictly
speaking, interpretants of two different signs.
In a 1904 letter to Lady Welby, Peirce supports this
claim that an interpretant may be a non-mental action.
Yet in that correspondence, he also hints at the view that
if an interpretant is not a concept, it is not a bona fide
sign. He says:
Taking sign in its broadest sense, its interpretant
is not necessarily a sign. Any concept is a sign,
of course. Ockham, Hobbes, and Leibniz have suffi-
ciently said that. But we may take a sign in so
broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not
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a thought, but an action or experience, or we may
even so enlarge the meaning of sign that its inter-pretant is a mere quality of feeling.
[8.332 (1904)]
Any concept is a sign, of course. But if we were to give
a very broad interpretation of what a sign may be, then
its interpretant will not be a thought, but an action or
experience, for example. And, hence, such an interpretant
would not be a sign. Stated more precisely, Peirce's
reasoning seems to be of the following sort: Thoughts or
concepts are bona f ide signs
. An action is neither a
thought nor concept. Thus, actions are not genuine signs.
But if interpretants are themselves signs [2.228], it is
unclear why Peirce would suggest that actions—which
clearly can be interpretants— cannot be signs.
I reject any implicit claim to the effect that actions,
specifically deliberate actions, are not signs. In "Conse-
quences of Four Incapacities," Peirce gives us a broad
picture of what a sign might be. He says that "whenever
we think, we have present to the consciousness some feeling,
image, conception, or other representation, which serves
as a sign" [5.283 (1868)]. And in his correspondence with
Lady Welby, forty years later, he again uses a broad brush
stroke to depict all that a sign might be.
I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand
is so determined by an Object and on the other hand
so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this
latter determination, which I term the Interpretant
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th© sign, is th©reby iTiediat©ly det©rinin©d by
that Object. [8.343 (1908); see also 4.531 (1906)]
The word which wants emphasis in this quotation is ' any-
thing which represents an object in the way
described is a sign "which stands to somebody for some-
thing in some respect or capacity." And it seems auite
plausible to think of deliberate actions such as giving a
gift to a friend, writing a letter to one's Senator,
nodding one's head in agreement, shaking hands in greeting,
and dancing in front of an audience as being signs. These
actions are not concepts, yet they do determine ideas--
interpretants— in some person's mind. Each is an action
which is an instance of a genuine Third; each mediates
between the interpretant sign and its object. And one of
the key elements here which makes these appear as bona f ide
signs is the fact that in each case there is some mind for
whom the sign represents some object . Deliberate actions
of this sort are signs--that seems unquestionable. If one
is in need of further convincing, one has only to recall
that Peirce himself considered the performance of a piece
of concert music to be a sign.
Another type of action whose instances Peirce clearly
thinks of as being signs is a category which bears some re-
semblance to speech acts. ". . . going before a notary and
making an affidavit, executing a deed, signing a note. . ."
are actions which, according to Peirce, resem.ble assertions.
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For each action, "one voluntarily puts oneself into a
situation in which penalties will be incurred unless some
proposition is true" [8.313 (1905)]. And from this, Peirce
reasons that "every proposition involves an assertion" and
"when the element of assertion is, as far as possible,
removed from it" the proposition is "a kind of sign"
[^bid . ] . In this way, the command to "Ground arms!" is a
sign, as are other examples Peirce uses— the inquiry "What
sort of day is it?" and the reply, "It is a stormy day"
[8.314 (1909)]. Again, as they stand, none of these signs
are concepts, but they are signs. And one might think of
them more as actions than as concepts before the element
of assertion is removed from them. Furthermore, Peirce
tells us that the dynamical interpretant of his wife's
query, "What sort of day is it?" is "my answering her
question " [ Ibid . ] . This interpretant is not a concept; it
is an activity undertaken deliberately and it stands as a
sign to his wife. And as I have already suggested, Peirce
would seem to be quite comfortable saying that the action
of lowering one's musket to the ground is both a dynamical
interpretant and, therefore, a new sign.
It would seem, then, that all deliberate actions
—
whether or not one thinks of them as speech acts--are
signs. Even the deliberate action of writing in one's
diary "stands to somebody for something in some respect or
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capacity." But in this case, since a diary keeper's
private thoughts are deliberately written most often as
signs only to the writer, the person who writes in the
diary will also be the interpretant mind. The intention-
ality required of a deliberate action makes it natural to
think of these actions as signs. A deliberate action is
a sign intended to convey meaning to someone— if only the
agent himself.
The final (or ultimate logical ) interpretant "does not
consist in the way in which any mind does act but in the
way in which every mind would act" [8.315 (1909)]. This
suggests that the final interpretant must be something
general. It could never be the dynamical interpretant, for
that interpretant—be it mental or non-mental— is always a
"single act" [5.475 (c. 1906)]. Further, the final inter-
pretant could not be "a thought, that is to say, a mental
sign , " for
. . . if this sign be of an intellectual kind—as it
would have to be--it must itself have a logical inter-
pretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical
interpretant of the concept. [5.476 (c. 1906)]^
We are left with Peirce's discovery that the only candidate
for the ultimate logical interpretant is a " habit-change "
[5.476 (c. 1906)]. A habit-change is not a sign, and,
therefore, will not have a further logical interpretant.
Still it is general and, thus, can give us the meaning of
a general or intellectual concept.
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It can be proved that the only mental effect thatcan be so produced and that is not a sign but if
bv a hah?f-
application is a habit-change
; meaningy bit change a modification of a person's ten-dencies toward action, resulting from previous
previous exertions of his willacts, or from a complexus of both kinds of cause.
[5.476 (c. 1906)]^
A habit-change may be the result of a person's previous
experiences or actions, or a combination of both. So it
would seem that particular actions play a significant role
in causing habit-changes. Peirce seems to reinforce his
claim that actions may play a causal role in bringing about
habit-changes when he says later in the same article that
".
. . the event that causes a habit-change may be a
muscular effort, apparently" [5.479 (c. 1906)]. But Peirce
hedges on this point. He is quite reluctant to give such
an important role to individual actions after all, for he
also says:
But I am persuaded that nothing like a concept can
be acquired by muscular practice alone. When we
seem to do that, it is not the muscular action but
the accompanying inward efforts, the acts of imagi-
nation, that produces the habit. [5.479 (c. 1906)]
In other words, Peirce seems to hold that any habit-change
will actually occur as a result primarily of some mental
effort rather than some repeated physical activity. His
example and proof of this claim are, however, somewhat
dubious
.
Suppose a person who has never done so before tries
to stand on his left foot while rotating his right foot
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in a clockwise direction and his right fist in a counter-
clockwise direction. Peirce observes that a first he will
be unable to perform this Peircean triadic feat because
"he lacks a unitary concept of the series of efforts that
success requires" (5.479 (c. 1906)]. with practice and
attention to the efforts involved in the execution of each
movement, he will soon "catch the idea" and be able to
perform the feat. But lest the reader be persuaded that
repeated actions play the significant role in the acquisi-
tion of this habit-change and others, Peirce offers the
following
:
. . . that proof that it is in no degree the muscular
efforts, but only the efforts of the imagination that
hsve been his teachers, is that if he does not per—
form the actual motions, but only imagines them
vividly, he will acquire the same trick with only
so much additional practice as is accounted for by
the difficulty of imagining all the efforts that
will have to be made in a movement one has not
actually executed. [5.479 (c. 1906)]
Though he admits that
There is an obvious difficulty of determining just
how much allowance should be made for this, in the
fact [that] when the feat is learned in either way,
it cannot be unlearned, so as to compare that way
with the other. [ Ibid .
]
But even given this difficulty, Peirce has clearly moved
from the weaker position that one cannot acquire a habit-
change from muscular practice alone to the stronger
position that one cannot acquire a habit-change from
muscular practice. It is the "efforts of the imagination"
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that are one's teachers.
Peirce presents us with several other exercises
intended to persuade us that a mental effort is needed
for their successful completion. Among the exercises:
reciting the "Peter Piper" verse; "spelling without an
instant's hesitation," in the old way, the name Aldibiron-
tifoscoforniocrononhotontothologes"
; and various "turns of
legerdemain" [ Ibid . ] . And he concludes:
It is from such experiments that I have been led
to estimate as nil the power of mere muscular
in contributing to the acguisition of ideas.
[5.479 (c. 1906)]
So for Peirce, it turns out that what is needed to acguire
a habit-change is some mental effort. Mere muscular effort
contributes nothing to such an acquisition.
I believe the emphasis here should be properly placed
on the contribution of mere muscular efforts. If Peirce
is simply emphasizing that muscular efforts alone will not
contribute to the acquisition of ideas, I believe he is
right. Although deliberate actions (whether they be those
of the agent or some other person) influence what we believe
and, hence, a habit-change, a change of beliefs is largely
the result of some reasoning process, some mental effort.
Muscular activity alone (mere muscular activity) will not
cause a change of beliefs. However, if Peirce is main-
taining that muscular efforts do not contribute at all to
the acquisition of habit-changes, then some additional
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explanation is in order.
At this point, I wish to draw attention to an equivo-
cation which seems inevitable when Peirce speaks of habit-
changes. It is one which brings to mind a similar shift
which I discussed in Chapter l. i argued in that chapter
that Peirce gives two different emphases to 'belief.' m
one way, beliefs are considered as they function in the
reasoning process—as habits of thought or mind. In
another way, beliefs are considered as rules of, or guides
to, action. Seen this way, beliefs are regarded as habits
of action. But now the equivocation is slightly different.
The sorts of habits or habit-changes Peirce describes
here--the triadic feat, reciting the "Peter Piper" verse,
sleight of hand tricks, etc. are all " non—mental ,
"
physical
activities. And so it is quite natural to think of a
habit-change as an actual change in one's behavior or way
of acting. Yet the discussion which accompanies the
examples points to an understanding of habit-changes as
being essentially mental. Habit-changes are the ultimate
logical interpretants of general or intellectual concepts
[5.475 and 5.482 (c. 1906)]; as such, they are "mental
effects" which are also general [5.476 (c. 1906)]. They
are "a modification of a person's tendencies toward action"
[5.476 (c. 1906 )
7
my underscore]. They are, in short,
beliefs .
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[Readiness] to act in a certain way under given cir-
by a given motive is ahabit, and a deliberate, or self-controlled, habitIS precisely a belief. [5.480 (c. 1906)]
Now although it is possible to imagine a habit-change
considered as a belief being formed without the influence
of any non-mental activity, it is difficult to imagine a
habit-change considered as an actual change in one's way
of acting being so formed. Yet if by 'habit-change'
Peirce means an actual change in one's way of acting, and
if Peirce is maintaining that muscular efforts do not con-
tribute at all to the acquisition of these habit-changes,
then apparently we would be forced to accept the conclu-
sion that one acquires these non-mental habits only through
the efforts of the imagination. But I would suggest that
this does not seem to be an accurate account of how we
acquire changes in actual behavior, nor, more importantly,
does it seem to be a correct interpretation of Peirce's
use of 'habit-change.' In the final analysis, I believe
the correct reading of 'habit-changes' is that they are
mental effects (concepts or beliefs) which can (and often
do) affect our ways of acting in the outer world. The
ultimate logical interpretant is not an action, or a series
of repeated actions, or some physical habitual action;
rather, it is a habit of action, viewed variously by Peirce
as a conception, idea, or belief.
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Furthermore, Peirce does seem to hold that actions
contribute causally to the acquisition of habit-changes,
though actions alone can make no such contribution. This
is the view which, I believe, gives the most plausible
interpretation of the apparently conflicting passages at
5.476 and 5.479 [See also 5.487]. The emphasis, for Peirce
is still on the mental activity which causally contributes
to the acquisition of a habit-change, but non-mental
activity should be understood as also making its contri-
bution. This interpretation is consistent with Peirce's
account of how the methods of science serve as an aid in
the acquisition and understanding of meanings— a point to
be taken up in the next section. The point is worth men-
tioning here, however, because the final interpretant of
Peircean semiotics is the habit of Peircean pragmaticism.
And what is true of the former should also be true of the
latter
.
All in all, actions seem to play a vital role in an
important theory for Peirce. They may be signs, dynamical
interpretants
,
and they may contribute to the acquisition
of habit-changes, the final interpretants of signs. And I
pointed out in passing that one of the elements necessary
for a deliberate action to occur--desire--can function as
a sign's immediate object. Thus, to leave an account of
action out of Peirce's theory of signs, no matter how
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condensed
give a di
the presentation of that theory may be
storted version of Peirce's semiotics.
is to
2 • Action and Pragmaticism
The move from Peirce's semiotics to his pragmaticism
is quite natural at this point, for the two theories come
together on at least one crucial point: the ultimate
logical interpretant of Peircean semiotics is the habit of
Peircean pragmaticism. it is my belief that one can now
look at action as it bears on pragmaticism without mistaking
this study for some undesirable form of pragmatism. My
meaning shall become clear momentarily. In this final
section, then, I shall outline key elements of Peirce's
pragmaticism and follow this with a discussion of the
relation of actions to meanings. Besides shedding light
on the role of action in pragmaticism, this final discussion
will serve to bring together many of the key issues I have
explored in the preceding chapters.
In "A Survey of Pragmaticism," Peirce reminds us that
. .
.
pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of meta-
physics, no attempt to determine any truth of things.
It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings
of hard words and of abstract concepts .
[5.464 (c. 1906); my underscore]
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And the method for determining the meanings of hard words
and abstract concepts is, of course, given in Peirce's
pragmatic, or more properly named, pragmaticistic maxim:
^
Sactical'^bear^^^^'^*^^ might conceivably havep actical bearing you conceive the object of vour
ef fToTsTs tL'wHOLE "5"" conception of thoL
object! !s!5l2 a“sn ^°-"Ption of the
In a footnote written in 1906, Peirce defends his
multiple use of derivates of concipere in the formulation
of the maxim as it first appeared in 1878 in "How to Make
Our Ideas Clear." (That earlier formulation was essen-
tially the same as the 1905 statement.) in the note,
Peirce emphasizes that meanings or intellectual purport
must be general and since this is so, we cannot look to
actions or anything else which is singular for meaning.
He says:
This employment five times over of derivates of
concipere must then have had a purpose. In point
of fact it had two. One was to show that I was
speaking of meaning in no other sense than that of
intellectual purport . The other was to avoid all
danger of being understood as attempting to explain
a concept by percepts, images, schemata, or by any-
thing but concepts. I did not, therefore, mean to
say that acts, which are more strictly singular
than anything, could constitute the purport, or
adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol. I
compared action to the finale of the symphony of
thought, belief being a demicadence. Nobody con-
ceives that the few bars at the end of a musical
movement are the purpose of the movement. They
may be called its upshot. [5.402, n. 3 (1906)]
The message is clear: we ought not to think of actions as
providing us with meanings. Actions are singular; meanings
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are general. In a sense, actions may be thought of as
merely the upshot of our concepts, of our beliefs, but
they are not "the final upshot of thinking" as Peirce
seemed to suggest when he wrote "How to Make Our Ideas
Clear" [5.397 (1878)]. The meaning of a concept will
always be given in terms of intellectual or rational pur-
port; in terms of something general, it can never be
explained, according to Peirce, in terms of percepts,
images, schemata, or actions.
. . .a conception
,
that is, the rational purport
of a word or other expression, lies exclusivelyin its conceivable bearing upon the conduct oflife. [5.412 (1905)]
And the conceivable bearings a concept will have on the
conduct of life will be expressed as a conditional-future
statement. [The pragmaticist "recognizes that the sub-
stance of what he thinks lies in a conditional resolve.
.
.
"
[5.499 (c. 1905)].] And what a thing means
,
expressed as
a conditional-future statement, "is simply what habits it
produces" [5.400 (1878)]. Specific consequences or actions
are not habits; they cannot tell us what a thing means.
It is this emphasis which brings out the difference
between Peirce's pragmaticism and James's pragmatism. In
giving just the right expression to Peirce's principle as
he presented it to the Philosophical Union of the University
of California on August 26, 1898, James gave it his own
nominalistic twist. He announced the following:
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exprLrPeircp'f^’'l°^ T"" this evening topress Peirce s principle by saying that the effec-
philosophic propositioH~5iF~?T«avsbrought down to some particular conseonenr-e . -ir,luture practical experience, whether active of paLivethe point lying rather in the fact that the experfe^ce
Zll a^ct^^e^i^'
For James, the meaning of a concept lies in particular con-
sequences rather than general habits. Pragmatism, accord-
ing to James, "agrees with nominalism, for instance, in
always appealing to particulars."^^ And Peirce sarcasti-
cally points out the difference between his pragmaticism
and James' pragmatism by saying that it differs from his
• . . only in that he [James] does not restrict the
meaning, that is, the ultimate logical interpretant
,
as I do, to a habit, but allows percepts, that is
complex feelings endowed with compulsiveness, to be
such. If he is willing to do this, I do not quite
see how he need give any room at all to habit.
[5.494 (c. 1906)]^^
In a 1902 contribution to the Dictionary of Philosophy
and Psychology
,
Peirce again takes the opportunity to dis-
tance his pragmaticism from the views of James. He claims,
in the selection on "Pragmatic and Pragmatism, " that
James's doctrine and any ill-conceived version of his
"pragmatic" doctrine
. . . appears to assume that the end of man is
action--a stoical axiom which, to the present writer
at the age of sixty, does not recommend itself so
forcibly as it did at thirty. If it be admitted,
on the contrary, that action wants an end, and that
that end must be something of a general description,
then the spirit of the maxim itself, which is that
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upshot of our Concepts in orderto apprehend them, would direct us towards
to practical facts, namely,
thought!^ I5.ru902)r® interpreters of our
For Peirce, "Doing is not the Be-all and the End-all of
life" [5.429 (1905)]. We must look to something other
than practical facts, namely, to general ideas, as the
true interpreters of our thought." For action itself
wants an end, and that end must be something general.
And as I have already pointed out,
. . . the most perfect account of a concept that
words can convey will consist in a description of
the habit which that concept is calculated to
produce. [5.491 (c. 1906)]
In a criticism of a definition of pragmatism given
by F. C. S. Schiller, Peirce again takes issue with a
version of pragmatism that regards particular actions as
the interpreters of thought. In the language of his
semiotics, Peirce tells us that this particular definition
"would make the 'meaning' consist in the energetic inter-
pretant and would ignore the logical interpretant ; another
feeble analysis" [5.494 (c. 1906)].
The lines are clearly drawn. For James, as well as
Schiller, meanings consist in particular consequences.
James is a "thorough nominalist" who "always emphasized
13particular sensible experience." For Peirce, meanings
are logical interpretants expressed as conditional-future
statements. And the ultimate logical interpretant is the
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deliberately formed, self-analysing habit" [5.491 (c.
1906) ] . We must look to habits for meaning.
Throughout his writings, Peirce steers away from the
mere suggestion that particular actions or consequences
give us the meanings of intellectual concepts. To deny
this fundamental position of Peirce would be to suggest
yet another feeble analysis a la James or Schiller. I
have no intention of taking that wayward path. Still, it
seems there is something constructive and important which
ought to be said about the role of action in Peirce's
pragmaticism, while avoiding tendencies towards nominalism.
I propose to do this, and I look to the master himself for
guidance
.
The map—coloring problem as proposed by Peirce gives
us a reasonable place to start. The problem roughly
sketched is to determine "the least number of different
colors that will always suffice" to color a map such that
no two regions which "abut along a common boundary-line"
will be the same color [ [5.490 (c. 1906)]. Peirce argues
that somebody who is already skilled at map-coloring will
attempt to find the rule (which he already seems to follow
unconsciously) by engaging in various experiments in the
inner world. And by this, it is clear Peirce means that
the skilled map-colorer entertains various mental hypo-
theses tested by mathematical calculations which are
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familiar to him. But I would suggest that one who is not
as skilled as the "imagined investigator," and perhaps
even the skilled investigator himself, will be forced at
some point to test one hypothesis or another—perhaps the
one that is finally adopted— in the outer world of actions
and reactions.
To take an instance, an investigator might actually
make minute alterations of the boundaries between regions"
on some model, rather than merely imagine such alterations.
And he may then observe that these "alterations can neither
diminish nor increase the number of colors that will in all
cases just suffice" [5.490 (c. 1906)]. And he may proceed
by making various calculations which are aided by the use,
perhaps, of a calculator, as well as notes and other
materials. So although the bulk of the experimenter's work
may take the form of mental effort, he is aided in his in-
vestigation by some activity in the outer world. And the
conclusion of this experimentation— should our investigator
arrive at one--will be the "deliberately formed, self-
analyzing habit" [5.491 (c. 1906)].
In every case, after some preliminaries, the activity
takes the form of experimentation in the inner world;
and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclu-
sion) is that under given conditions, the interpreter
will have formed the habit of acting in a given way
whenever he may desire a given kind of result.
[5.491 (c. 1906)]
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The investigator's habit would be expressed as the
subjunctive statement: If i were to color a map using the
least number of colors with no two colors next to each
other, I would use only three colors. As a start, this
is what would be meant by the least number of colors
which can be used to color a map with no two colors abut-
ting. The meaning of an intellectual concept is the
habit-change
,
. . . meaning by a habit-change a modification of
a person's tendencies toward action, resulting fromprevious experiences or from previous exertions of
this will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds
of cause. [5.476 (c. 1906)]
So since actions contribute to the acquisition of habit-
changes, as I argued in the last section, they should
also be thought of as aiding in the acquisition and under-
standing of general concepts.
This is not a surprising result, given Peirce's
advocacy of the scientific method. In describing the
experimentalist, Peirce says:
. . . his disposition is to think of everything just
as everything is thought of in the laboratory, that
is, as a question of experimentation. . . . when
you have found, or ideally constructed upon a basis
of observation, the typical experimentalist, you
will find that whatever assertion you may make to
him, he will either understand as meaning that if
a given prescription for an experiment ever can be
and ever is carried out in act, an experience of a
given description will result, or else he will see
no sense at all in what you say. [5.411 (1905)]
200
For Peirce, the scientific method of experimentation is
just the method used in solving the map-coloring problem;
It IS the method he prescribes for determining the meanings
of concepts.
. . . since obviously nothing that might not resultfrom experiment can have any direct bearing upon
conduct, if one can define accurately all the con-
ceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation
or denial of a concept could imply, one will haveherein a complete definition of the concept, andthere is absolutely nothing more in it .
[5.412 (1905)]
Among the ingredients of an experiment is the experimenter's
"external (or quasi-external) ACT by which he modifies
those objects" chosen "to be operated upon" [5.424 (1905)].
But as Peirce is quick to point out to an imagined inter-
rogator, rational meaning does not consist in any one
experiment, but in " experimental phenomena ."
When an experimentalist speaks of a phenomenon
,
such
as Hal's phenomenon," "Zeeman's phenomenon" and its
modification, "Michelson ' s phenomenon," or "the
chessboard phenomenon," he does not mean any particular
event that did happen to somebody in the dead past,
but what surely will happen to everybody in the
living future who shall fulfill certain conditions.
[5.425 (1905)]
Thus, the meaning of a concept is given, not by one experi-
ment, but by "all the conceivable experimental phenomena
which the affirmation or denial of a concept could imply,"
not just for the experimenter, but for anyone in the future
"who shall fulfill certain conditions." If my concept.
broadly speaking, is that three is the least number of
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colors one could use to color a map with no two colors
abutting, then anyone else who follows precise methods will
arrive at this same conclusion, and any other number of
colors used will be too few or too many.
• . . of the myriads of forms into which a proposi-lon may be translated, what is that one which isto be called its very meaning? It is, accordingto the pragmaticist, that form in which the propo-sition becomes applicable to human conduct, not inthese or those special circumstances, nor when one
entertains this or that special design, but thatform which is most directly applicable to self-
control under every situation, and to every purpose.
[ 5.427 ( 1905 )]
Particular deliberate actions do not determine the
meanings of concepts, if by 'meanings' is meant "the con-
ceivable experimental phenomena which the affirmation or
denial of a concept could imply." But they may, and often
do, contribute to one's acquisition and understanding of
concepts. As in the case of the map-coloring problem the
greater the knowledge and skills of the investigator, the
fewer experiments in the outer world will be necessary for
him to understand that only three colors are needed. The
weaker one's grasp of relevant mathematical principles,
the more dependent one will be on activity in the outer
world in order to facilitate an understanding of the
problem's solution. Because Peirce's theory of meaning
is based on the model of scientific investigation, it is
not only useful but important to see that, for Peirce,
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particular actions contribute to one's acquisition and
understanding of the meaning of concepts just as the
activities of experimentation aid in the confirmation or
denial of a hypothesis. The "very meaning" of a concept
is to be understood as the conceivable experimental phe-
nomena which "the assertion of the proposition virtually
predicts" (5.427 (1905)1. Anticipating and predicting
future behavior is as important for the ordinary man of
action as it is for the scientist. And it is, as least
in part, through individual actions or experiments (either
thought or physical experiments) that predictions can be
accurately made.
There is another point to be made here—one which
underscores Peirce's dispute with the nominalist. Actions
causally contribute to the fact that one believes what
one does . But actions, it would seem, do not determine
what one believes ; they do not determine, that is, the
content of one's belief. Actions cannot "constitute the
purport, or adequate proper interpretation, of any symbol"
[5.402, n. 3 (1906) ]
.
To say that I hold that the import, or adequate
ultimate interpretation, of a concept is contained,
not in any deed or deeds that will ever be done,
but in a habit of conduct, or general moral deter-
mination of whatever procedure there may come to
be, is no more than to say that I am a pragmaticist
.
[5.504 (c. 1905)]
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When it comes to the meanings of
P^^9^sticist is also a realist.
whole-hearted endorsement of the
leads him to this conclusion. Of
the following:
our beliefs, Peirce the
It is, in part, his
scientific method which
that method, Peirce says
Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiarlanguage, is this: There are Real things, whose
characters are entirely independent of our opinions
about them; those Reals affect our senses according
to regular laws, and, though our sensations are asdifferent as are our relations to the objects, yet,by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can
ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly
are; and any man, if he have sufficient experience
and he reason enough about it, will be led to the one
True conclusion. [5.384 (1877)]
. . . we may define the real as that whose characters are
independent of what anybody may think them to be" [5.405
(1878)]. "... reality means a certain kind of non-
dependence upon thought" [5.503 (c. 1905); See also 5.430
and 5.432 (1905)]. And included in Peirce's developed con-
cept of the real are the potentialities asserted in a true
future subjunctive statement.
I must show that the will be '
s
,
the actually is '
s
,
and the have beens are not the sum of the reals.
They only cover actuality. There are besides would
be '
s
and can be '
s
that are real. [8.216 (c. 1910)
]
Thus, habits, expressed familiarly as future subjective
statements, are real for Peirce; they are "general prin-
ciples" which "are really operative in nature" [5.101
(1903)
]
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Perhaps Peirce's own best illustration of the reality
of mere possibilities is found in the pragmaticistic
solution he gives to the question, "Is a diamond which is
completely destroyed before being touched by any object
really hard?" in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," Peirce
held that questions of this sort "concern much more the
arrangement of our language than they do the meaning of
our ideas" [5.409 (1878)]. ".
. .it would be merely a
question of nomenclature whether that diamond should be
said to have been hard or not" [5.453 (1905)]. However,
in "Issues of Pragmaticism, " written in 1905, Peirce
effectively gives up that earlier view. He says:
No doubt this is true, except for the abominable
falsehood in the word MERELY, implying that symbols
are unreal. Nomenclature involves classification;
and classification is true or false, and the generals
to which it refers are either reals in the one case,
or figments in the other. [5.453]
It is much more than a mere matter of nomenclature were we
to say that the diamond was (or alternatively, was not)
hard. In describing something, we are asserting something
about what class that thing belongs to and if what we say
is true, then the general possibilities to which it refers
are real. "... the reality of a diamond's hardness"
cannot "possibly consist in anything but in the truth of
a general conditional proposition."
For to what else does the entire teaching of chemistry
relate except to the "behavior" of different possible
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kinds of material substance? And in what does thatbehavior consist except that if a substance of a
certain kind should be exposed to an agency of acertain kind, a certain kind of sensible result
would ensue, according to our experience hitherto.
[5.457 (1905)]
If I were to release a heavy object from my hand, it
would (barring unusual circumstances) most surely fall to
the ground. Based on my experiences, I would expect that
this would happen, but I also believe that this " surely
happen to everybody in the living future who shall
fulfill certain cond itions" [5.425 (1906)]. In determining
the meaning of a concept, the pragmaticist
' s task is that
of uncovering or discovering "a description of the habit
which that concept is calculated to produce " [5.491 (c.
1906)]. This is, in short, Peirce's rule for attaining
the third grade of clearness of apprehension." In full,
it is the pragmaticistic maxim [See p. 23 above]
.
Again, one is reminded of the scientist's task of
discovering and describing the laws operative in nature.
The laws of nature are not determined by the scientist's
investigation, but a true description of these laws may be
uncovered by his activities. And it is the hope of the
scientific community that as theories are corrected and
false beliefs discarded, we will eventually be left with
only true beliefs. "... that we can be sure of nothing
in science is an ancient truth" [1.137 (c. 1899)]. For
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the pragmaticist, too, the task is one of discovering and
describing— interpreting— the habits operative in the world
And as for the scientist, this is an ongoing activity, for
Not only is our knowledge
. . . limited in scope,but It is even more important that we should
thoroughly realize that the very best of what we,humanly speaking, know [we know] only in an uncertain
and inexact way. [5.587 (1898)]
Like the scientist, we are constantly correcting our con-
osptions and discarding false beliefs in the hope of
acquiring only true beliefs.
Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism— "that our knowledge
is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a con-
tinuum of uncertainty and of indeteminacy" [1.171 (c.
1897)]—characterizes our ongoing activity of interpreting
1
6
reality. A person may be wrong in his interpretation of
a concept— in his understanding of the habit which that
concept is calculated to produce; indeed, mankind in
general may, for many generations, hold as true a belief
which the "final settled opinion" of mankind rejects as
false. But with sufficient experience and reasoning, all
men would arrive at the same, true set of beliefs— the
same, true interpretation of reality.
The perversity or ignorance of mankind may make this
thing or that to be held for true, for any number
of generations, but it can not affect what would be
the result of sufficient experience and reasoning.
And this it is which is meant by the final settled
opinion. This therefore is no particular opinion
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but is entirely independent of what vou t
number of men may think about it; and therefore itdirectly satisfies the definition of rlTlity
[7.336, n. 11 (1873)]
. any man, if he have sufficient experience and he
reason enough about it, will be led to the one True conclu
Sion" (5.384 (1877)]. Together, sufficient investigations
and reasoning will lead any man to one conclusion
— to the
final settled opinion.
The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreedto by all who investigate, is what we mean by thetruth, and the object represented in this opinion isthe real. This is the way I would explain reality.
[5.407 (1878)]
Thus, it seems clear that, for Peirce, deliberate
actions—whether referred to broadly as investigations,
experiments, or experiences—will contribute to one's
understanding and description of intellectual concepts
and, in the long run, to the final settled opinion. They
will never determine the meanings of intellectual concepts;
Peirce's conception of truth and reality preclude this.
But they will aid us in acquiring and understanding a true
interpretation of that reality. Through and through,
Peirce remains a scientist, pragmaticist
,
and realist,
even though actions be allowed their proper place in his
pragmatic ism.
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3 • Concluding Remarks
In the preceding chapters, I have argued that a
Peircean theory of deliberate action can be constructed
out of the material Peirce provides in his account of
practical beliefs—habits of action. I argued that from
Peirce's conditional formulation of a practical belief,
one can assume the conditions necessary for a deliberate
action to occur, thus making the transition from habits of
action to action. Insofar as habits of action are causes
of one's predisposition to act, they causally affect one's
deliberate actions.
In this chapter, I have shown that actions have an
important function in Peirce's theory of signs and theory
of meaning. Whether one considers Peirce's semiotics or
his pragmaticism (and it is difficult to discuss one with-
out discussing the other), singular actions must be seen
as contributing to one's acquisition and understanding-- to
one's interpretation--of general habits of action. Peirce
remains the pragmaticist and realist that he is, though
actions be given their due. Thus, in effect, I have rounded
out the theory of action presented earlier by showing the
effect of actions on habits of actions.
There is, then, for Peirce, a continuous circle—
a
continuum—of actions affecting habits, and habits affecting
actions. And this brings to mind Peirce's principle of
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synechism which I discussed in Chapter I. This "tendency
to regard everything as continuous" [7.565 (c. 1892)], is
as appropriate in considering the relationship of actions
and habits of action as it was in considering the relation-
ship of physical and mental phenomena. But this ongoing
cycle of actions affecting habits and habits affecting
actions would be pointless were it not directed, according
to Peirce, by the principle of agapasm— the operative desire
discussed in Chapter III. All activity, for Peirce, is
directed toward habit-taking
.
The agapastic development of thought should, if it
exists, be distinguished by its purposive character,
this purpose being the development of an idea.
[6.315 (1893)]
This evolutionary growth of an idea proceeds ideally from
the motive of "the love of mankind at large" [6.291 (1893)],
where "progress comes from every individual merging his
individuality in sympathy with his neighbors" [6.294
(1893)]. This is Peirce's message of hope and belief that
as rational beings we will act together towards a more
rational world. Peirce, of course, developed his views
that, as a community of investigators, we are continuously
but progressively moving ever closer to a world of "concrete
reasonableness" before the rational beings of this planet
engaged in two world wars and embarked on their nuclear
follies. Still synechism and agapasm are cornerstones of
Peircean doctrine and stand to remind us that actions
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serve the progress of thought.
. . . the only ultimate good which the practicalfacts to which it [the pragmaticistic maxim] directs
attention can subserve is to further the development
of concrete reasonableness; so that the meaning of
the concept does not lie in any individual reactions
all, but in the manner in which those reactions
contribute to that development
.
[5.3 (1902); my underscore]
Thus, without altering Peirce's overall views, it
should be clear that actions play a vital role in Peircean
philosophy. They both affect and are affected by habits
of actions. And, in the end, to ignore Peirce's thoughts
on actions is to ignore the role he assigns to actions in
the development of thought.
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NOTES
This calls to mind Frege's more rudimentary examina-
tion of signs according to their sense and meaning (or
reference). In his paper "On Sense and Meaning," written
in 1892, he tells us that
It is natural now, to think of there being connected
with a sign (name, combination of words, written
mark)
, besides that which the sign designates, which
may be called the meaning of the sign, also what I
should like to call the sense of the sign, wherein
the mode of presentation is contained.
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob
Frege
,
ed . Peter Geach and Max Black (New Jersey: Rowman
and Little-Field, 1980), p. 57.
2in Speech Acts
,
John Searle argues that " speaking a
language is engaging in a rule-governed form of behavior"
[p. 41]
.
On the speaker's side, saying something and meaning
it are closely connected with intending to produce
certain effects on the hearer. On the hearer's
side, understanding the speaker's utterance is
closely connected with recognizing his intentions.
[p. 48]
A bridge between the two is possible, given the common
language of the speaker and hearer, and the constitutive
rules governing that language. [ Speech Acts: An Essay
in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge University Press,
1969)
, pp. 40-50.
]
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C. Hardwick, ed
. Semiotics and Signifies (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 33 .
4The dynamical interpretant here is similar to Searle's
notion of an illocutionary effect.
_ the case of illocutionary acts we succeed indoing what we are trying to do by getting our audience
to recognize what we are trying to do. But the
effect' on the hearer is not a belief or response,
it consists simply in the hearer understanding the
utterance of the speaker. It is this effect that I
have been calling the illocutionary effect.
[Searle, p. 47]
This is a more developed account of J. L. Austin's notion
of "securing uptake":
Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the
understanding of the meaning and of the force of
the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary
act involves the securing of uptake .
[ How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1962)
,
p. 116.
]
5The dynamical interpretant here is similar to Searle's
notion of a perlocutionary effect [See Searle, p. 25]
.
Searle, of course, relies heavily on Austin's earlier
account of perlocutionary acts which, however, fails to
distinguish between a perlocutionary act and a perlocu-
tionary effect. For Austin, a perlocutionary act "is the
achieving of certain effects by saying something" [Austin,
p. 120 ].
^See, for example, Jarrett E. Brock's "Peirce and
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Searle on Assertion" in Graduate Studies Texas Tech Univer -
• Proceedings of the C. S. Peirce Bicentennial Inter -
national Congress, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner, et al
.
(Lubbock,
Texas: Texas Tech Press, 1981), pp. 281-87.
7-rIn passing, it should be noted that since the only
signs which have a logical interpretant "are either general
or closely connected with generals" [5.488 (c. 1906)],
Particular actions will not have logical interpretants
.
^ •Here Peirce seems to prefer the expression 'habit-
change' to 'habit.' However, there seems to be no signifi-
cant difference in his use of the two, and the one he seems
to favor is 'habit.' Unless specified, I will generally
follow Peirce's choice of expressions.
9And that, indeed, "is ugly enough to be safe from
kidnappers" [5.414 (1905)].
^*^"Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,"
in The Writings of William James: A Comprehensive Edition
,
ed. John J. McDermott (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1977)
,
pp. 348-49; my underscore.
^^"What Pragmatism Means," p. 380 in McDermott.
12 • •As John Dewey aptly characterizes Peirce's position
in relation to James:
In the literal sense of the word pragmatist . . .
Peirce is more of a pragmatist than James. He is
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^ nominalist. That is to say, he empha-
fnrt
^ P^’^ticular sensible consequence,a d much more the habit, the generic attitude of
response, set up in consequence of experiences with
a thing.
The Pragmatism of Peirce," in Chance, Love and Logic
, ed
.
Morris R. Cohen (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., Inc.,
1923 )
,
p. 307
.
Morris R. Cohen, American Thought (New York:
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co., 1962), p. 343.
See Edward C. Moore's discussions of Peirce's
realism in (i) "The Scholastic Realism of C. S. Peirce"
in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
, Vol. XII,
No. 3, March 1952, pp. 406-417, and (ii) "On an Alleged
Incompatibility between Peirce's Metaphysics and His
Pnagmaticism" in Graduate Studies Texas Tech University
,
pp. 169-178.
15See Charles K. McKeon, "Peirce's Scotistic Realism"
in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce
,
ed.
Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1952), pp. 238-250, for a detailed dis-
cussion of the differences between scholastic realism and
Peirce's realism.
1
6
Peirce's doctrine of fallibilism is intimately
connected with his doctrine of synechism or continuity.
"The principle of continuity is the idea of fallibilism
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objectified.
. . Now the doctrine of continuity is that
alj. ;^ings so swim in continue" [1.171 (c. 1897)]. Our
knowledge is in a continuous state of uncertainty and in-
determinacy because "all things are continuous" [ 1.175
(c. 1897)]. See 1.171-75 for Peirce's discussion of the
relationship between fallibilism, continuity, and evolution.
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